Valuer Negligence

May 8, 2025

Valuer Negligence Claims: Bratt v Jones [2025] EWCA Civ 562 Clarifies the Law

Case Summary:Bratt v Jones

On 2 May 2025, the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in Bratt v Jones, a case on professional negligence by property valuers. The claimant, Mr Bratt, alleged that a valuation of his development land by the defendant (Mr Jones, a surveyor) was negligently low, costing him millions. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Bratt’s appeal and in doing so reaffirmed the legal test for negligence in valuation cases. This article summarises the case background, the High Court’s decision, and the Court of Appeal’s findings on each ground of appeal, in a practical way for professionals and clients interested in negligence claims.If you believe a negligent property valuation has caused you financial loss, contact Carruthers Law for expert legal advice on your claim. Call 0151 541 2040 or email us today.

Factual Background and Allegations

Mr Bratt owned about 10 acres of land in Oxfordshire with planning permission for 82 houses. He had an option agreement with a developer to sell the land at 90% of market value (with certain costs deducted) if the option was exercised. In June 2013 the developer exercised the option, but the parties could not agree on the land’s value. They jointly appointed Mr Jones as an independent expert to determine the market value of the site.

Mr Jones carried out his valuation using two standard methods: a comparable sales approach and a residual valuation (which projects the developer’s costs and profits to derive land value). He found one comparable land sale he viewed as highly similar to Mr Bratt’s site and placed exclusive reliance on that comparable in reaching his valuation. Based on the comparable, he assessed the site’s market value at £4.075 million. (His residual calculation came out slightly lower, around £3.634 million, but it later emerged that this residual valuation contained an error; if corrected, it would have indicated a value of about £4.6 million.) Under the option formula, the developer’s purchase price was set at 90% of the market value (after certain deductions), which came to approximately £3.53 million for Mr Bratt’s land.

Believing this figure was far too low, Mr Bratt sued Mr Jones for professional negligence. He claimed the true market value was around £8 million, meaning the valuation was off by many millions. In essence, he alleged that Mr Jones had negligently undervalued the site and thereby caused a significant loss (the difference between what the developer paid and what it would have paid had the valuation been higher). Mr Bratt had his own expert valuer who supported a much higher valuation; unusually, however, the claimant’s expert did not state what range of values a reasonable valuer might have given for this property. In contrast, the defendant’s expert opined that a reasonably competent valuation of the site would likely fall within ±15% of about £4.2 million. This suggested that figures roughly between £3.6 million and £4.8 million could be considered reasonable for this valuation.

High Court Decision on Valuer Negligence

The case first went to trial in the High Court (Chancery Division) in March 2024. The trial judge (HHJ Cawson KC) dismissed Mr Bratt’s claim. He agreed with the defendant’s view of the law and found that Mr Jones had not been professionally negligent in carrying out the valuation. In reaching this decision, the judge applied the established two-stage test for valuer’s negligence claims:

• Determine the “true” value and margin of error: The court must form its own view of the property’s correct market value at the valuation date, based on the evidence, and then decide an appropriate margin of error (or acceptable range) around that value. Valuation is not an exact science, so competent professionals may arrive at slightly different figures. Typically a margin of about ±10% is allowed in normal cases, but it can be larger (e.g. ±15% or more) for unusual properties or where valuation involves more uncertainty. If the valuer’s figure falls within this reasonable range of values, it will be considered a non-negligent result. Only if the valuation is outside the acceptable range does the court proceed to the next step.
• Assess the valuer’s conduct (the Bolam test): If the valuation lies outside the reasonable range, the court examines how the valuation was conducted to decide if the valuer failed to exercise the skill and care expected of a reasonably competent professional. This is the standard test for professional negligence (often called the Bolam test, originally from medical negligence law). In practical terms, the claimant must identify specific errors or unreasonable aspects of the valuer’s methodology – things no reasonably careful valuer would have done – that led to the aberrant valuation. It is not enough for a claimant simply to show a difference in outcome; there must be a demonstrable flaw in the valuer’s approach or reasoning that breaches the professional standard.

Using this framework, the High Court judge considered all the evidence. He concluded that the most likely true market value of Mr Bratt’s site (at the valuation date in 2013) was about £4.74 million. He also determined that, given the characteristics of the site and the differing expert opinions, a margin of error up to 15% was appropriate in this case. A 15% tolerance reflected the inherent uncertainty and judgment involved in valuing this development land. Mr Jones’s valuation of £4.075 million was approximately 14% below the judge’s own figure of £4.74 million – within the 15% acceptable range. Because the valuation fell inside the reasonable bracket of values, the judge held that negligence was not established and it was unnecessary to examine further whether Mr Jones’s conduct fell below professional standards. In other words, even though Mr Jones’s valuation was lower than the court’s view of the true value, it was still close enough to be considered a result a competent valuer might have reached.

Notably, the judge did comment on certain criticisms of Mr Jones’s work. For instance, he found that Mr Jones had made an error in the treatment of “enhancements” (developmental improvements) in his residual valuation – essentially a double-counting mistake. This mistake suggested Mr Jones hadn’t fully “got to grips” with that aspect of the valuation, and if the overall valuation had fallen outside the acceptable range, that error would have been evidence of negligence causing an estimated £500,000 loss in value. However, because the final valuation number was within the acceptable range, Mr Jones was not held liable for this mistake. The principle is that a valuer’s minor errors do not lead to damages unless the overall result is outside what a competent valuer could defensibly arrive at. Ultimately, the High Court dismissed Mr Bratt’s claim in full, finding that Mr Jones’s valuation, while perhaps on the low side, was within a reasonable range and had not been shown to be the product of any professionally negligent methodology.

Court of Appeal Decision:Key Grounds

Mr Bratt appealed to the Court of Appeal on four grounds, contesting both the legal test applied and the trial judge’s factual conclusions.. The Court of Appeal fully upheld the High Court’s approach and findings. Each ground of appeal and the Court of Appeal’s reasoning are summarised below.

Ground 1: The Two-Stage Test for Valuer Liability

The issue: Ground 1 concerned the correct legal test for establishing negligence against a valuer. Mr Bratt argued that the High Court judge had applied the wrong test. In the appellant’s view, once the court determines that a valuation is outside the reasonable margin of error (or “bracket”), that fact should be essentially determinative of liability. In other words, Mr Bratt contended that proving the valuation was out of bounds should by itself effectively establish negligence, shifting the onus to the valuer to show that they exercised due care. His counsel suggested that an “outside the bracket” finding ought to create a presumption or prima facie case of negligence – an evidential burden would then fall on the defendant to rebut negligence by demonstrating that, despite the poor result, he had not fallen below the standard of care. This argument drew support from some earlier case law that focused on outcome: for example, Mr Bratt cited precedents suggesting that if a valuation is outside an acceptable range, that is a “strong indication” of negligence and may suffice to infer a breach of duty.

Mr Jones’s response: The defendant countered that this was not the correct approach. On behalf of Mr Jones, it was argued that valuers’ negligence claims follow the same basic principles as any professional negligence case. The claimant always bears the burden to prove that the professional fell below the standard of a reasonably competent practitioner, and this doesn’t change just because a valuation seems low. In this view, an out-of-range valuation is only evidence that something might have gone wrong, but the court still must be satisfied that the valuer actually failed to exercise reasonable skill and care in some respect. The defense emphasised that a valuation is judged negligent not simply for being “wrong,” but for being reached through a process that no competent valuer would adopt. Thus, the High Court was right to require Mr Bratt to prove a specific breach of duty (such as a methodological error or an unreasonable assumption) rather than treating the gap between valuations as automatically decisive.

Court of Appeal’s ruling: The Court of Appeal firmly rejected Ground 1 and upheld the trial judge’s test. The court agreed that an “out of bracket” valuation is not, by itself, sufficient to establish negligence. It is at most an indicator that “something may have gone wrong” with the valuation, but liability still requires proof that the valuer failed to carry out the valuation with the requisite skill, care, and diligence. In a key passage, the Court of Appeal stated that “whilst a valuation outside the acceptable bracket is an indication that something may have gone wrong, a claim in negligence or breach of contract against a valuer cannot succeed unless the court is satisfied that the valuer has failed to exercise due and proper professional skill, care and diligence in undertaking the valuation.” This confirmed that the focus remains on the valuer’s conduct, not merely the result.

Crucially, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the notion of any automatic burden-shift in such cases. The judges noted it is “unhelpful” to talk of an “evidential burden” shifting to the defendant. The legal burden of proving negligence rests on the claimant at all times, even after an out-of-range valuation is shown. In practical terms, this means the claimant must always point to specific respects in which the valuation work was performed negligently. The defendant does not have to prove a negative (i.e. prove they were not negligent); it remains the claimant’s job to convince the court that the valuer failed to meet the professional standard.

The Court of Appeal fully approved the High Court’s two-stage approach to valuers’ liability. It reiterated that, as established by earlier authorities, the first question is whether the valuation falls outside any reasonable margin of error; if it does, the second question is whether the valuer’s performance fell below the standard of a reasonably competent valuer (the Bolam test). If the valuation is within the acceptable range, the claim fails at the first stage and no finding of negligence is possible. If it is outside the range, the court must then identify what the valuer did wrong – some specific aspect of the valuation that was negligent – before the valuer can be held liable. In this case, since the High Court had found Mr Jones’s valuation was within the margin of error, it never reached the second stage. The Court of Appeal found no fault with that approach.

In summary, the Court of Appeal confirmed that Ground 1 (the argument for an outcome-based test of negligence) was misconceived. Even a sizeable error in the result does not dispense with the need to prove a breach of duty. A claimant must both show the valuation was outside the permissible range and prove that the valuer lacked reasonable care or competence in producing that valuation. Simply being “wrong” is not enough to establish negligence.

Ground 2: Margin of Error: Law vs Fact

The issue: Ground 2 of the appeal challenged how the margin of error was determined by the trial judge. Mr Bratt contended that the judge treated the acceptable margin as a matter of expert evidence and case-specific fact when it should have been a question of law with a generally fixed tolerance. The claimant argued that prior case law fixed the standard margin of error at 10%, absent special circumstances. He asserted that the judge should not have relied on expert opinion to set a 15% margin for this case but instead should have applied a 10% margin as a legal rule. Had a 10% margin been used, Mr Jones’s £4.075m valuation would have been clearly outside the acceptable range (since it was about 14% below the court’s value of £4.74m), potentially leading to a finding of negligence. In short, the appellant claimed the judge misdirected himself by treating the margin as a factual assessment rather than simply enforcing a 10% benchmark.

Response: Mr Jones’s team maintained that the width of the margin of error is a fact-sensitive determination, not a hard-and-fast legal rule. While a ±10% range is often cited as a rule of thumb, it can vary. Factors such as the nature of the property, market conditions, and the amount of subjective judgment involved can justify a wider margin in some cases. Here, the defendant’s expert had testified that the margin could reasonably be as high as 15–20% for this particular site, given its unique features and the valuation difficulties. Moreover, the claimant’s own expert did not give any evidence on what the appropriate margin should be. It was therefore proper for the judge to evaluate the evidence and decide the margin. The defendant argued that there is no immutable 10% rule in law that the court must apply irrespective of the case facts.

Court of Appeal’s ruling: The Court of Appeal rejected the claimant’s position and agreed with the trial judge’s handling of the margin of error. The court made it clear that the acceptable margin or bracket of valuations in a given case is very much a question of fact, to be determined on the evidence before the court. There is no fixed percentage that applies to every valuation. Although ±10% is a common starting point, the court is entitled to adopt a larger margin if the circumstances warrant it (for example, where a property is hard to value or expert opinions diverge widely). Ground 2 was therefore dismissed.

The Court of Appeal noted that in this case, Mr Bratt had provided no expert evidence at trial regarding what the margin should be, whereas Mr Jones’s expert opined that a margin up to 20% could be justified (ultimately suggesting 15% as appropriate due to the availability of a close comparable). The trial judge had weighed all the evidence – including the nature of the property and the range of valuations presented, and came to the conclusion that ±15% was a reasonable tolerance here. The Court of Appeal found no error in that approach. It endorsed the judge’s evaluation, stating he was “entitled to reach the conclusion he did as to a reasonable margin of error” on the facts of the case.

In summary, the margin of error is not predetermined by law but is an evidential matter. The Court of Appeal confirmed that a trial judge can set a margin greater (or smaller) than 10% if justified by the evidence. Here, the judge’s acceptance of a 15% margin was upheld, and thus the finding that Mr Jones’s valuation fell within that margin (and so did not breach his duty) remained intact.

Grounds 3 and 4: Challenges to the Factual Findings

The issues: The remaining two grounds of appeal (Grounds 3 and 4) were essentially challenges to the High Court’s factual findings. Although the Court of Appeal’s judgment did not spell them out in detail, these grounds likely concerned points such as the trial judge’s determination of the true market value and his evaluation of Mr Jones’s methodology. For example, Mr Bratt may have contended that the judge’s own valuation of ~£4.74m was erroneously low (arguing that the court should have accepted more of the claimant’s expert evidence), or that the judge gave Mr Jones undue benefit of the doubt on certain alleged mistakes. Another possible argument was that the judge should have found Mr Jones negligent for the specific valuation errors that were identified (like the handling of enhancement costs), even if the overall figure was within 15%. Essentially, these grounds asked the Court of Appeal to second-guess the trial court’s assessment of the evidence and the conclusions drawn from it.

Court of Appeal’s ruling: The Court of Appeal gave short shrift to these fact-based grounds. Appeals courts are generally reluctant to interfere with a first-instance judge’s findings of fact unless a clear error is shown, and here the appellate judges found no such error. They held that the trial judge had a solid evidential foundation for all his key findings. He had carefully considered the expert testimony and the valuation materials, and his conclusions (such as the £4.74m true value and the 15% margin) were within the range of reasonable outcomes on the evidence. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the judge had properly weighed the criticisms of Mr Jones’s valuation and was entitled to conclude that those criticisms did not amount to professional negligence in the context of this case. Accordingly, Grounds 3 and 4 of the appeal were dismissed. The High Court’s factual determinations, that Mr Jones’s chosen valuation approach was within acceptable professional standards and that the resulting figure was not outside a reasonable range – were left undisturbed.

The Court’s Obiter Comments

Although the Court of Appeal’s decision upheld the status quo in valuer negligence law, the judges did include some noteworthy obiter dicta (observations not strictly necessary for the decision). In particular, the court addressed a potential “logical fallacy” in the current approach. Under the established rule, a valuer could make a clear mistake in their methodology (thus failing the Bolam competence test) and yet escape liability entirely if the final valuation number still falls within the acceptable range. In this case, for example, Mr Jones made an error regarding enhancements, but because his valuation was within 15% of the true value, he was not liable for the loss that error might have caused. This outcome appears counter-intuitive to some, since it means a professional can be proven negligent in process but incur no liability as long as the result is “close enough.” The Court of Appeal acknowledged this tension. It noted past comments by Lord Hoffmann (in cases such as South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd (“SAAMCO”) and Lion Nathan) that emphasised focusing on whether the valuer took reasonable care, rather than just looking at the end valuation figure. Lord Hoffmann’s view in those cases seemed to downplay the importance of any fixed “bracket” at all, suggesting that if a valuer has exercised reasonable care and skill, he should not be liable, whereas if he has not, he should be liable for the consequences of that negligence, regardless of whether the final figure is within a certain range.

The Court of Appeal in Bratt v Jones thought that this approach might not sit comfortably with the current two-stage test requiring the valuation to be outside a reasonable range before liability arises. However, these discussions were theoretical and did not affect the outcome of the case. The Court expressly refrained from altering the law, noting that any re-examination of the scope of a valuer’s duty or the role of the “margin of error” precondition would be a matter for the Supreme Court in some future case. In other words, the established framework – requiring both a negligent process and a valuation outside the reasonable bracket – remains in force unless and until a higher court decides otherwise. For now, valuers and their insurers can take comfort that the long-standing orthodox test was left firmly intact by the Court of Appeal’s decision.

Implications for Claimants and Professionals

The Court of Appeal’s judgment in Bratt v Jones [2025] EWCA Civ 562 provides a clear reaffirmation of the principles governing professional negligence claims against valuers. The court confirmed that a claimant who alleges a negligent undervaluation must do more than show the valuation was significantly too low; they must pinpoint specific ways in which the valuer’s performance fell below the standards of a reasonably competent professional. The valuation must be proven to lie outside any reasonable range and the claimant bears the burden of proving some actionable fault in the valuer’s methodology or reasoning. In this case, Mr Bratt could not surmount those hurdles. The High Court’s finding – that Mr Jones’s valuation, while on the low end, was within a defensible range and achieved through an approach a competent valuer could have taken – was upheld. The result is a win for the defendant valuer and a confirmation of the orthodox two-stage test for liability.

For practitioners and clients, Bratt v Jones underscores a few practical points. First, when bringing a professional negligence claim against a valuer, it is crucial to plead and prove concrete errors in the valuation process, not just a discrepancy in figures. Courts will look for evidence of what exactly the valuer did wrong. Second, expert evidence should address the question of the acceptable margin of error for the particular valuation – as seen here, a claimant who neglects to adduce evidence on the margin may find the court defaulting to the defendant’s view on that point. Finally, while the “margin of error” doctrine remains a protective buffer for valuers (ensuring they are not liable for mere differences of opinion within a reasonable range), valuers should still take care to document their methodology and adhere to professional standards. If their valuation strays beyond what the court considers justifiable, the focus will then turn sharply to whether they exercised proper care in arriving at their figure. The Bratt v Jones decision confirms the law as it stands, striking a balance between holding professionals accountable for true negligence and recognising the inherent variability in valuation opinions.

Explore Our Professional Negligence Services

For more information on how we can help with claims involving professional negligence, please see our Professional Negligence overview.

• Claims Against Solicitors
• Claims Against Surveyors
• Claims Against Accountants
• Claims Against Architects
• Claims Against Financial Advisers
• Claims for Conveyancing Negligence

Contact Carruthers Law

If you believe you may have a professional negligence claim, please contact our expert team today.

Call us on: 0151 541 2040 or 0203 846 2862
Email: Contact us via our online form