Determination of Meaning

A Guide to Determination of Meaning in Defamation Cases (May 2025)

In defamation, the meaning of the words complained of is a decisive issue. A statement may be understood in various ways by different readers, but the court will determine a single “natural and ordinary” meaning for the words in question. This “single meaning rule” requires the judge (or jury, in the rare case of a jury trial) to choose one definitive meaning that the hypothetical reasonable reader would take from the publication. The importance of this exercise cannot be overstated – whether a statement is defamatory (tending to harm reputation) depends on the meaning ascribed to it, and that meaning also dictates which defences might be available (for example, a publisher might be able to prove a lesser meaning true, but not a more serious imputation). Courts often address meaning as a preliminary issue, precisely because an early ruling on meaning can dispose of a claim that has no viable defamatory meaning or clarify the playing field for the rest of the case. In modern practice, especially since the Defamation Act 2013 removed the presumption of jury trial, judges routinely determine meaning at an early stage.Explore Our Defamation Services. For an overview of our services and how we support clients in defamation matters, visit our main defamation page.

The Single Meaning Rule

In a defamation claim, a publication is not assessed through the myriad interpretations different readers might have. Instead, the law applies the single meaning rule: the court fixes on one meaning as the “right” meaning for legal purposes. As Lord Diplock explained in Slim v Daily Telegraph (1968), even if a million readers each formed their own view, none of this matters. What does matter is what the adjudicators at the trial think is the one and only meaning that the readers as reasonable men should have collectively understood the words to bear. That is ‘the natural and ordinary meaning’ of words in an action for libel. In other words, the judge must decide the single meaning that a reasonable reader, reading the whole publication in context, would take from the words.

This single meaning rule serves several purposes. It brings finality and consistency, the defendant’s liability and the assessment of any damage to reputation are judged on that one meaning. It also prevents a claimant from succeeding by showing that some readers took an extreme or defamatory interpretation if the objective reasonable reader would not have done so. Conversely, it prevents a defendant from escaping liability merely because some innocent interpretation could be conceived; if the reasonable reader would understand a defamatory gist, that meaning will be adopted (subject to the statement being capable of that meaning as a matter of law). The rule also interacts with procedure: each party will plead what they contend the single meaning is. The claimant typically pleads a meaning that is defamatory and as damaging as is reasonable, whereas the defendant often pleads a more innocent or less severe meaning. At a preliminary meaning hearing, the court is not bound by either side’s pleaded meaning and may choose an alternative meaning which it finds correct (so long as it does not find a more injurious meaning than the claimant has pleaded). Once the court determines the single meaning, the case proceeds on that basis, if that meaning is not defamatory, the claim fails at the outset; if it is defamatory, the focus shifts to whether any defences (such as truth or honest opinion) succeed in relation to that meaning.

The Ordinary Reasonable Reader Standard

How do courts decide what the words actually mean? English defamation law has developed a set of guiding principles centered on the perspective of the “ordinary reasonable reader”. The task is to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the words, which includes not just the literal meaning of the statements but any implications or inferences that an ordinary reader would reasonably draw. Crucially, the exercise is objective and contextual, it considers the publication as a whole, through the eyes of a reasonable person, and without special knowledge (unless a pleaded innuendo meaning is involved, which is addressed below).

Over the years, the courts have distilled key principles governing this exercise. In summary, when determining meaning, courts apply the following guidelines:

1. Reasonableness is the governing principle: The test is based on the interpretation of a hypothetical reasonable reader . The court is not concerned with extreme or perverse readings, but with what a reasonable person would understand.

2. The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but also not unduly suspicious: This reader can “read between the lines” and may engage in a certain amount of loose thinking, but is not “avid for scandal” or likely to seize on the most defamatory possible meaning when a less defamatory or innocent meaning is available. In other words, the reasonable reader will not always assume the worst-case scenario without good reason, but nor will they be Pollyannaish if a defamatory inference is apparent.

3. No over-elaborate analysis: The court must avoid an unduly forensic or academic parsing of the words. Judges are cautioned against dissecting the text as a lawyer might or against searching for hidden meanings that would not strike the ordinary person. The meaning is determined by the broad impression on the reader, not by minutiae of syntax or dictionary definitions. (The Supreme Court in Stocker v Stocker [2019] reinforced this point, criticising an overly literal analysis, in that case, consulting dictionary definitions, as the wrong approach. Instead, context and the ordinary usage of language on casual social media platforms had to be considered, because a Facebook post is “in the nature of conversation rather than carefully chosen expression”, and readers’ reactions are “impressionistic and fleeting”).

4. Intention of the publisher is irrelevant: The meaning is assessed from the perspective of the reader, not what the writer meant or intended to convey. A defamatory imputation can be conveyed even if the author did not mean it, and conversely an innocently meant remark can be read as defamatory – the legal question is how the words would be understood by others, not the writer’s state of mind.

5. The publication must be read as a whole (context is everything): The court will consider the entire context in which the words appear. This means reading the full article, message or broadcast, including any headlines, images, captions, or other material that form part of the publication, in order to glean the overall impression. An allegedly defamatory statement in isolation may be tempered or clarified by later passages, this is often referred to as the “bane and antidote” principle. For example, a sensational headline might appear defamatory (the “bane”), but if the article’s text (the “antidote”) makes clear that the implication of wrongdoing is untrue or unsubstantiated, the overall meaning may be non-defamatory. The classic illustration is Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65, where a headline and photo caption suggested two actors were involved in a scandal, but the article clarified the images were doctored; the House of Lords held that the totality of the publication was not defamatory, and claimants could not cherry-pick the headline alone. As a matter of principle, there can be only one correct meaning of a publication, so it is not permissible to say the headline means one thing and the full text another – the single meaning must accommodate the entire context. (That said, questions can arise in the internet era: e.g. if a defamatory headline is visible in a search result but the correcting text is behind a paywall, it is an open question how the “bane and antidote” principle applies – generally, however, courts lean toward expecting that a reader would access the full article, especially if freely accessible).

6. The hypothetical reader is a representative of the target audience: The court may take into account the medium and its typical readership. A reasonable reader of a Twitter message or a casual Facebook post is considered to have the general characteristics of an average social media user (who skims content quickly, as noted in Stocker ), whereas a reader of a specialist journal might be assumed to have certain background knowledge. However, judges must be cautious about relying on generalities or stereotypes about an audience without evidence, they can take judicial notice of facts that are common knowledge, but should beware of impressionistic assumptions about readers. In all cases, the reader is assumed to read the entire publication once with an ordinary level of attention; the modern practice (approved by the Court of Appeal) is that a judge determining meaning will typically read the material just once (to mimic a real reader’s first impression) and then consider the parties’ arguments.

7. No strained or extreme interpretations: When delimiting the range of permissible meanings, the court will rule out any meaning that can only emerge from an “strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable” interpretation of the words. The meaning must be one that could reasonably be conveyed to some ordinary readers. If a proffered meaning is so fanciful that only a peculiar or biased reader would construe the words that way, it will be rejected at the meaning stage (often via a ruling that the words are not capable of bearing that meaning as a matter of law).
8. Merely possible meanings are insufficient: It is not enough for a claimant to show that someone, somewhere might read the words in a defamatory sense. The focus is on the likely understanding of a reasonable readership generally. Thus, a claimant cannot succeed by pointing to a handful of readers who misunderstood the words in a defamatory way if the court concludes that the balance of reasonable readers would not take that meaning.

These principles, first articulated in cases like Jeynes and consistently reaffirmed (for example, by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis v Random House [2019] and by the Supreme Court in Stocker v Stocker [2019]), form a stable framework for meaning determination. In practice, they require judges to put themselves in the shoes of an average reader of the particular publication and to ask: “What would this person naturally understand the words to mean, given the whole context and without legal or special knowledge?” The court may also consider analogous precedents for similar words, but ultimately each case turns on its own facts and context.

Natural and Innuendo Meanings

Not every defamatory meaning is explicit on the face of the words, the law recognises that some statements might carry a defamatory innuendo that only certain readers will appreciate. Defamation pleaders distinguish between:

Natural and ordinary meaning:

This encompasses the straightforward meaning of the words to a reasonable reader, including any implications or insinuations that such a reader would infer without knowing special facts. “Natural and ordinary” meaning is not confined to the literal meaning; it includes any implication a typical reader would draw just from the publication itself and general knowledge. (Sometimes lawyers refer to an “false innuendo” to mean a defamatory implication that arises by reading between the lines, as opposed to a true legal innuendo. For example, saying “Police visited John’s house last night” might, to an ordinary reader, imply John was suspected of wrongdoing, even though it’s not explicitly stated, that implication is part of the natural and ordinary meaning).

True innuendo meaning:

This is a meaning that depends on extrinsic facts,facts not includd in the publication but known to some readers, which render the statement defamatory only to those in the know. In such cases, the words might appear innocent to the general public, but to readers aware of certain additional facts, a defamatory interpretation emerges. A classic example: a newspaper innocuously reports that a certain person has married for a second time. To the average reader this seems fine, but to those who know that person was already married, it implies bigamy – a serious defamatory imputation. This is a “true innuendo.” Another well-known example is McAlpine v Bercow [2013], where the tweet “Why is Lord McAlpine trending? Innocent face” did not name any wrongdoing, but readers who knew about a recent news story linking an unnamed politician to child abuse would understand it as accusing Lord McAlpine of being that abuser. In true innuendo cases, the claimant must plead and later prove the extrinsic facts that give rise to the defamatory meaning, and also show that there were readers who actually knew those facts at the time of publication. If they succeed, the court will determine the innuendo meaning for that subgroup of readers.

When pleading a defamation case, the claimant should specify if they are relying on any innuendo meaning. Generally, one cannot spring an innuendo meaning later in the case without it being pleaded, because the defendant is entitled to notice of the allegation and the underlying facts. If both a natural meaning and an innuendo meaning are pleaded in the alternative, the court may have to decide on each (though very often, if the natural meaning is found to be sufficiently defamatory, the innuendo may not need separate determination).

It’s worth noting that, under the Defamation Act 2013’s serious harm requirement (discussed below), claimants sometimes focus only on the most serious defamatory meaning that can reasonably be attributed to the words. More trivial innuendo meanings that do not seriously harm reputation may not be worth pursuing. However, innuendo meanings remain important where a defamatory sting truly only emerges to a limited audience with special knowledge.

Levels of Defamatory Meaning (Chase Levels)

Not all defamatory meanings are equal, some allegations are much more serious than others. In cases where the words allege some kind of wrongdoing by the claimant, the court often characterises the meaning by reference to the Chase “levels” of meaning, derived from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772. Chase levels refer to three gradations of defamatory allegation:

• Level 1: Guilt, a direct accusation that the claimant has committed the wrongdoing in question (e.g. “X is a thief” meaning X in fact stole something).
• Level 2: Reasonable grounds to suspect, an allegation that there are reasonable grounds to suspect the claimant might have committed the act (e.g. “The circumstances point to X being involved in the theft”). This is defamatory, but it stops short of outright assertion of guilt; it implies the claimant is under a cloud of suspicion.
• Level 3: Grounds to investigate, a lesser allegation that there are grounds to investigate whether the claimant may have done something wrong (e.g. “Questions need to be asked about X’s dealings; an investigation is warranted”). This is the mildest level, suggesting the matter is as yet unclear but meriting inquiry.

These levels were summarised in Chase and have been cited in many cases since. In modern cases, judges often use the Chase level shorthand when determining meaning. For instance, a meaning might be characterised as “a Chase level 2 imputation of wrongdoing.” The classification is significant because the level of the allegation affects how serious the defamation is and what a defendant must prove if they are to run certain defences. A defendant who has been found to publish a level 1 meaning (guilt) must prove the claimant’s actual guilt to succeed on a truth defence – a very high bar. By contrast, if the meaning is only level 3 (grounds to investigate), the defendant might successfully defend it by proving that there were indeed grounds to investigate (a much easier task than proving actual guilt) .

Because of this, claimants tend to argue for the most severe (highest) level of meaning that is reasonable, to maximise the reputational harm and make defences like truth or honest opinion harder for the defendant to establish. Defendants, on the other hand, often urge a lower-level meaning, which can either knock out the claim (if it becomes too trivial or perhaps an expression of opinion) or make their defences more viable. It is ultimately the court’s role at a meaning hearing to slot the imputation into the correct level (or otherwise describe its gist), and the court is not strictly bound to pick an exact Chase category if the meaning doesn’t fit neatly, the levels are a helpful guide, not a straightjacket. For example, in one case a judge found a meaning of “cogent grounds to suspect”, which was essentially between Chase level 2 and 3 in gravity. What matters is that the judge articulates the single meaning with sufficient detail to capture the defamatory sting and its degree of seriousness.

When Is a Statement Defamatory? Linking Meaning to Defamatory Effect

Once the court has determined the single meaning of the words, it then assesses whether that meaning is defamatory. The traditional common law test is that a statement is defamatory if it would “tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally”, or cause them to be shunned or avoided, or expose them to hatred, contempt or ridicule . In modern phrasing, a statement is defamatory if it would likely have a substantially adverse effect on the attitude of others toward the claimant. This is still judged objectively – given the meaning found, would a reasonable member of society think less of the claimant or treat them differently if the meaning were true?

Importantly, since the Defamation Act 2013 came into force, a claimant must also show that the statement has caused or is likely to cause “serious harm” to their reputation (s.1 of the Act). This statutory threshold raised the bar above mere defamatory tendency. In the leading case of Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27, the Supreme Court held that whether serious harm is suffered must be determined by reference to actual facts about its impact, not just the inherent meaning of the words. In other words, even if a meaning is clearly defamatory at common law (for example, an allegation of dishonesty), the claimant might still need to prove that this caused serious reputational damage – for instance, through evidence of how widely the publication was disseminated and whether people believed it. However, the gravity of the meaning is still very relevant. The more serious the imputation, the more readily a court may infer that serious harm was or will be caused, especially if published to a significant audience. For example, a national newspaper falsely accusing someone of terrorism or pedophilia (a profoundly serious allegation) might inherently meet the serious harm test by inference, whereas a minor slur in a small newsletter may require proof of actual damage.

In practical terms, meaning and defamatory character are often determined together at a preliminary stage. The court will first interpret the meaning, then ask: is this meaning defamatory at common law? If the answer is no, for instance, the meaning is merely a trivial insult or a benign comment that would not lower the claimant’s reputation in the eyes of society – the claim fails outright. If yes, the court may also consider (either at that hearing or later) if the serious harm requirement is satisfied, which can involve evidence such as circulation figures or witness statements about reputational impact. When meaning is determined as a preliminary issue, sometimes the “serious harm” question is reserved for trial or a separate application, unless it is clear one way or the other.

It should be noted that not every potentially hurtful statement is deemed defamatory. The context of social discourse matters, for example, crude insults or hyperbole (“You’re the worst singer in the world!” on Twitter) might be understood as vulgar abuse or mere opinion not intended to be taken literally, and thus not defamatory in the legal sense. The meaning exercise helps filter out such non-defamatory interpretations. Only if the meaning found carries the requisite defamatory sting (and meets the seriousness threshold) will the case proceed.

Preliminary Issue Trials on Meaning

Determining the meaning of the words complained of is frequently dealt with by the court as a preliminary issue, before the main trial. This has become standard practice in defamation litigation in England and Wales. The rationale is that an early, authoritative ruling on meaning can save time and costs. If the meaning decided by the judge is not defamatory or is far less serious than the claimant alleged, the claim might be struck out or promptly settled. Alternatively, if the meaning is found closer to the claimant’s view and is very serious, a defendant might decide to settle (realising it may not be able to defend that meaning), or the scope of any trial is narrowed to whether defences like truth or honest opinion succeed against that meaning.

The courts encourage parties to seek a meaning determination at an early stage, often before a Defence is filed. Under the Civil Procedure Rules, meaning can be ordered as a preliminary issue on application; the Media and Communications List Practice Direction (PD 53B) now explicitly states that such applications “should be made promptly” after service of the particulars of claim. In practice, a claimant will set out in their particulars the defamatory meanings they ascribe to the words, and the defendant in its acknowledgment of service or Defence will set out if it disagrees and what alternative meaning it proposes. If there is a dispute, either side can apply to the court for a preliminary hearing to determine meaning (and sometimes related questions, such as whether the statement is fact or opinion, or whether it is defamatory at common law). It is not easy to resist such an application, a party who attempts to postpone the issue of meaning without good reason may be penalised in costs, given the courts’ clear preference to deal with meaning early.

A preliminary meaning hearing is typically argued with reference to the words themselves and the relevant legal principles, no witness evidence is permitted on what people understood the words to mean. The judge’s role is to interpret the publication, not to poll readers. Indeed, the determination of meaning is a point of law (capable of appellate review if outside the bounds of reasonableness) and is grounded in the judge’s application of the objective test. Thus, disclosure and other evidence are generally dispensed with for meaning determinations. The court will usually have before it the publication in question and the competing pleadings or submissions on meaning. The modern procedure, as mentioned, often involves the judge reading the material once or maybe twice to form an initial view, then hearing counsel’s arguments. Over-elaborate legal submissions are discouraged, as they risk straying into the forbidden territory of dissecting the text too much.

In some instances, especially recently, courts have resolved meaning on the papers without an oral hearing, for example, Nicklin J observed that there is “no practical reason why meaning cannot be determined without a hearing, based on the parties’ written submissions” where that can save costs and time. In a 2019 case (Hewson v Times Newspapers), he noted that if both parties consent (or even if they do not, in a suitable case) the court might decide meaning by considering written submissions and handing down a judgment, with a short formal hearing only for the verdict to be delivered and published alongside the submissions and judgment. This procedure promotes efficiency and open justice, though in practice many meaning disputes are still resolved via a short oral hearing, especially if they are intertwined with other issues like whether the statement was fact or opinion.

It is common for preliminary issue hearings to cover more than just the bare meaning. Courts often at the same hearing determine whether the meaning is defamatory (at common law) and whether it’s fact or opinion, since these questions are closely related and also judged objectively by reference to the meaning. For example, in the recent case of Aluko v Barton [2025] EWHC 853 (KB) (a libel case over tweets), the judge was asked to decide: (1) the natural and ordinary meaning of the posts; (2) any innuendo meaning of one post; (3) whether the meanings were statements of fact or opinion; and (4) whether those meanings were defamatory of the claimant – all as preliminary issues before any trial on the merits. Resolving these questions early can significantly streamline the subsequent proceedings. If a meaning is found to be an expression of opinion rather than fact, for instance, the claimant will know that any truth defence is unnecessary (since truth relates to factual allegations) but the defendant might deploy an honest opinion defence instead. Similarly, if the judge rules the meaning is not defamatory or is trivial, the claim may not meet the serious harm threshold and could be dismissed.

One practical consequence of the shift to early meaning determinations is the impact on costs. In the past, if one party “won” at the meaning hearing (say, the judge agreed with the defendant’s innocuous meaning over the claimant’s more harmful one), that party would often seek its costs for that hearing immediately. However, recent practice has changed. The High Court has indicated that, ordinarily, the costs of a meaning determination should be considered “costs in the case”, meaning they follow the outcome of the whole action, unless exceptional circumstances justify otherwise. For example, in Sharif v Associated Newspapers [2021] EWHC 343 (QB), Nicklin J cautioned against making a winner-of-the-meaning-issue costs order at the preliminary stage, noting that a party who loses on meaning might still ultimately win the case on other grounds, and it could be unfair for them to pay costs for the meaning hearing if they eventually prevail overall. The default now is usually that each side bears its own costs of the preliminary issue, to be resolved as part of the final costs order, unless one side behaved unreasonably. This approach encourages parties to litigate meaning issues on their merits without fear of immediate heavy cost consequences, and it reflects the fact that meaning is just one (albeit crucial) issue in the case.

Conclusion

Meaning is the central battleground in many defamation cases. It dictates whether the words are defamatory at all, how seriously they impugn the claimant, and what defences might succeed. The courts have developed a robust methodology for determining meaning, grounded in the perspective of a fair-minded, reasonable reader and tempered by common sense and context. In modern practice, resolving meaning at an early stage has proven to be an effective tool for focusing defamation disputes: a clear ruling on meaning often leads to summary resolution, either the claim falls away if the meaning is not defamatory or not as alleged, or the parties proceed on known ground.

Further Reading

• Defamation Defences
• Damages in Defamation Claims
• Absolute Privilege in Defamation
• Offer to Make Amends

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