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  1. Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey and Al-Haroun v Qatar National Bank [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin)

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    Solicitors’ Negligence and AI: Lessons from Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey & Al-Haroun v Qatar National Bank [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin)

    This article analyses the High Court judgment in the joined cases of Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey and Al-Haroun v Qatar National Bank [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin), where serious issues arose concerning the misuse of generative artificial intelligence (AI) in legal documentation.

    For expert legal assistance regarding Professional Negligence or Solicitors Negligence, please contact Carruthers Law on 0151 541 2040 or email us at info@carruthers-law.co.uk.

    On 6 June 2025, the High Court handed down judgment. The two cases were heard together under the court’s “Hamid” jurisdiction, its inherent power to regulate proceedings and uphold lawyers’ duties to the court, after serious concerns arose that false legal references and information had been submitted in court documents.

    In each case, the misuse or suspected misuse of generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools led to fictitious case law, fake citations, and misstatements of law being put before the court. The Divisional Court (presided over by Dame Victoria Sharp, P, and Mr Justice Johnson) was asked to decide whether to initiate contempt of court proceedings in light of this misconduct. In its judgment, the Court not only addressed the specific circumstances of the Ayinde and Al-Haroun cases, but also made broader observations about the acceptable use of AI in legal practice and set out baseline expectations for practitioners.

    Background to the Ayinde Case

    The Ayinde case was a judicial review claim concerning the provision of interim accommodation to a homeless individual. The claimant, Mr. Frederick Ayinde, had applied for urgent housing assistance from the London Borough of Haringey, and he challenged the council’s decision through judicial review. He was represented by Haringey Law Centre (a legal charity), with solicitor Mr. Victor Amadigwe (the Law Centre’s Chief Executive) and paralegal Ms. Sunnelah Hussain handling the case, and counsel Ms. Sarah Forey instructed to draft and argue the claim. Ms. Forey was at the time a pupil barrister (in the first year of practice).

    In March 2025, Ms. Forey prepared the claimant’s grounds of claim in the judicial review. These written arguments contained references to at least five legal authorities which were supposed to support Mr. Ayinde’s position. It later emerged that none of those cases actually existed. For example, one cited case, El Gendi [2020] EWHC 2435 (Admin), a case that does not exist under that name; the citation [2020] EWHC 2435 does exist, but relates to an unrelated case; tellingly, the neutral citation [2020] EWHC 2435 does belong to a different, unrelated case. In addition, the submission seriously misrepresented a statute, incorrectly stating the effect of section 188(3) of the Housing Act 1996 (the provision relating to interim housing for the homeless). Upon further scrutiny, the Court found that four more case citations in the document were entirely fictitious as well. The content was accompanied by subtle red flags, the text featured Americanised spelling (for instance, “emphasized” with a z) a red flag for AI. These features ultimately raised the Court’s suspicion that an AI-based tool may have been used to generate the legal arguments.

    Findings in the Ayinde Case

    Before the issues came to court, the defendant’s legal team (representing Haringey Council) alerted the claimant’s lawyers that the authorities cited in Ms. Forey’s grounds appeared to be invalid or non-existent. Rather than immediately concede and investigate the errors, the initial reply from the claimant’s side was dismissive. In a letter sent to the defendant’s solicitors, the claimant’s team suggested the citation problems were “easily explained” errors and offered only to correct them on the record, without further explanation. The letter even chided the defendant’s lawyers, suggesting they “may better serve your organisation” by focusing on finding supporting case law for their own arguments instead of highlighting the claimant’s citation issues. This response, which the High Court later called unsatisfactory, indicated that the gravity of the situation was not initially appreciated by those representing Mr. Ayinde.

    When the matter was referred to the High Court, a special hearing was convened on 23 May 2025 to examine what had gone wrong. Ms. Forey denied using any AI tool to draft the grounds, but the Court found her explanations unpersuasive. She claimed that during her pupillage she received little supervision or access to legal research resources, and that she had been handling a busy caseload on her own. The judges noted, however, that even a junior lawyer in her position had basic means to verify authorities, for example by using the free National Archives case law database or an Inn of Court library, and they remarked that a lack of paid databases or formal supervision was “marginal mitigation” at best.

    In its decision, the Divisional Court concluded that Ms. Forey’s conduct had indeed resulted in misleading the court, meeting the threshold of contempt (i.e. conduct liable to be punished as contempt of court). However, the judges exercised discretion and decided not to commence contempt proceedings against her. They noted her lack of seniority and the unresolved questions about how she had been supervised and trained. Instead, the Court referred Ms. Forey to the Bar Standards Board (BSB), the regulator of barristers, for further investigation and appropriate action. The referral to the BSB specifically invites inquiry into not only Ms. Forey’s own conduct but also the role of her chambers in training and supervising a pupil barrister who ended up submitting such flawed work. The Court pointed out that issues like the adequacy of her pupillage supervision could not be dealt with in a simple contempt hearing focused only on the individual.

    As for Haringey Law Centre’s involvement, the Court did not find evidence of deliberate wrongdoing by Mr. Amadigwe, the supervising solicitor. It appeared that neither Mr. Amadigwe nor Ms. Hussain (the paralegal) had any inkling that the counsel they instructed would cite non-existent cases, in fact, the Law Centre admitted it had never occurred to them that a barrister might do so. The Court accepted that explanation and decided not to pursue contempt proceedings against Mr. Amadigwe. Nevertheless, it viewed the situation as a serious failure of oversight. The judges referred Mr. Amadigwe to the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) so that the SRA could investigate the firm’s practices, for example, looking into how he responded when the false citations were first flagged by the opponent, and whether he ensured that Ms. Forey was competent and properly supervised for the task at hand. The Court’s message was that even under pressure, a solicitor overseeing a case must take active steps to verify and not simply rely on counsel blindly. Ms. Hussain (initially described in some filings as a solicitor but in fact a paralegal) was exonerated of any fault, the Court made clear that she had merely been passing along instructions and, in its words, was “not at fault in any way”. In examining the Haringey Law Centre’s oversight, the Court identified significant supervisory shortcomings, reflecting key issues addressed within our detailed analysis on solicitors’ negligence.

    The judgment also acknowledged the context in which Haringey Law Centre operates. As a small legal charity, the Law Centre was overstretched and under-resourced, providing vital services to vulnerable clients. The Court accepted that resource limitations were genuine, but remarked that such constraints make it “all the more important that professional standards are maintained”. In other words, a lack of funding or manpower is not a licence to cut corners in legal work. The Law Centre was reminded that it must only instruct and rely on those who adhere to proper professional standards, especially when serving vulnerable people.

    Background to the Al-Haroun Case

    The Al-Haroun case, although joined in this judgment due to similar concerns about false information, arose in a very different context. Mr. Hamad Al-Haroun’s claim was a civil action for damages, he sought approximately £89.4 million in compensation, alleging breaches of a complex financing agreement by Qatar National Bank (QPSC) and its subsidiary, QNB Capital LLC. At an earlier stage of that litigation, an order was made (unfavourable to Mr. Al-Haroun), and he applied to set aside that order so that his claim could proceed. In support of this application, witness statements were prepared and filed in early 2024 by Mr. Al-Haroun himself and by his solicitor, Mr. Abid Hussain of Primus Solicitors. These statements were intended to persuade the court to reinstate the claim, and they cited a large number of legal authorities to bolster the argument.

    Upon examination, the court discovered that many of the referenced cases and quotations in the Al-Haroun statements were bogus. In the words of the judgment, the statements contained “numerous authorities, many of which appear to be either completely fictitious or which, if they exist at all, do not contain the passages supposedly quoted from them, or do not support the propositions for which they are cited.”. In short, several cited case law authorities were non-existent, and others were real cases but were misquoted or mischaracterised.

    Confronted with this revelation, Mr. Al-Haroun provided an explanation. He acknowledged responsibility for the inclusion of the false material and admitted how it happened: he had used online tools, including generative AI, to do legal research on his own. According to his account, he employed publicly available AI services and other legal search websites, then took the output and believed it to be accurate. He had “complete (but, he accepts, misplaced) confidence” in the authenticity of what he found online. In other words, Mr. Al-Haroun, a lay person, unwittingly inserted AI-generated falsehoods into his court submissions, genuinely thinking they were valid legal precedents.

    More surprising was the role of Mr. Hussain, the solicitor. Mr. Hussain admitted that he incorporated Mr. Al-Haroun’s research into the legal filings without independently verifying the authorities. Essentially, the client (Mr. Al-Haroun) had taken the lead on research via Google and ChatGPT, and the solicitor trusted this research and copied the string of citations into the witness statement supporting the application. The Court found it astounding that a solicitor would defer to a client in this way on a matter of legal research. As the judgment later highlighted, it is supposed to be the lawyer who vets and guides the client, not the client guiding the lawyer on what the law says.

    Findings in the Al-Haroun Case

    The judges were “scathing” about the solicitors’ conduct in this case. They described it as “extraordinary that the lawyer was relying on the client for the accuracy of their legal research, rather than the other way around.” In failing to check the authorities, Mr. Hussain had shown a “lamentable failure to comply with the basic requirement to check the accuracy of material that is put before the court.”

    Importantly, the Court accepted that Mr. Al-Haroun did not act with an intention to deceive the court. His mistake was one of naivety, he overly trusted the outputs of an AI tool and other online resources without the legal expertise to discern truth from fabrication. The judges noted that Mr. Al-Haroun had misplaced trust in these sources but did not set out to mislead. As a self-represented litigant on the research front, he lacked the legal knowledge to verify what he found, which is precisely why the duty falls on the lawyer to do so.

    As with Ayinde, the Divisional Court decided not to commence contempt proceedings over the false material in Al-Haroun. Mr. Hussain and his firm (Primus Solicitors) were referred to the SRA for investigation of their conduct. The SRA will consider whether they failed to meet professional standards, for instance, by not having proper safeguards to prevent the filing of unsupported legal claims and not verifying the content drafted with client input. Any disciplinary consequences (such as fines or practicing restrictions) will depend on the outcome of that regulatory investigation, which was beyond the scope of the court’s judgment. Mr. Al-Haroun, for his part, was not subjected to any sanction by the court aside from the likely setback this incident caused to his lawsuit. The Court viewed him as a layperson who fell victim to unreliable technology and poor legal advice, rather than a malicious actor.

    Court’s Broader Observations on AI Use

    While addressing these two cases, the High Court took the opportunity to articulate broader principles regarding the use of AI in legal proceedings. The judges acknowledged that artificial intelligence tools, especially large language models capable of generating text, are increasingly accessible and used in various fields, including law. However, the judgment emphasised a clear warning: AI-generated content cannot be taken at face value in legal practice. The Court noted that a language model such as ChatGPT, despite its impressive capabilities, is “not capable of conducting reliable legal research.” These tools may produce answers that look coherent and plausible, but the output can be entirely incorrect, confidently citing sources that do not exist, or quoting passages that were never written. Indeed, the very errors seen in Ayinde and Al-Haroun (invented case names, wrong quotations) illustrated this phenomenon of AI hallucinations in a legal context.

    The Court made it clear that lawyers who choose to use AI for research or drafting must do so responsibly. Any information or citation coming from an AI assistant must be rigorously cross-checked against reliable primary sources before being relied upon. For example, if an AI suggests a particular case as authority, the practitioner should verify that case via authoritative databases, such as legislation.gov.uk for statutes, the National Archives or official law reports for cases, or established legal databases from reputable publishers. This duty of verification isn’t new, the Court stressed, it is simply a modern application of the lawyer’s fundamental duty to exercise due diligence and to not mislead the court. Crucially, the duty applies not only to the person who directly uses the AI tool, but also to any lawyer who relies on or adopts another’s work that was AI-generated.

    The judgment also spoke to the wider legal profession and institutions. The judges expressed concern that incidents like these, if unaddressed, could undermine public confidence in the justice system. They noted that misuse of AI in litigation has serious implications, so law firm partners, heads of chambers, and others in leadership positions must actively ensure that those they supervise understand their obligations. The Court signalled that in any future hearings of this kind, it will inquire into what preventative measures senior lawyers have in place, for example, training and internal protocols regarding AI use. This was effectively a call for legal organisations to instill a culture of compliance: embracing technological tools must go hand-in-hand with reinforcing ethical standards.

    The Court reviewed existing professional guidance on AI and noted that there is no lack of advice from regulators, but mere guidance, by itself, has limits. It cited, for instance, the Bar Council’s January 2024 guidance, which warned that large language models can generate “convincing but false content” and admonished lawyers “Do not… take such systems’ outputs on trust and certainly not at face value.” Misleading the court, even inadvertently via AI, would still amount to incompetence or negligence on the lawyer’s part, breaching core professional duties. Likewise, the Solicitors Regulation Authority had flagged the risks of relying on AI without proper verification. Despite this, the Court observed that simply publishing guidance is not enough to prevent mishaps. In a further step, the judgment invites the Bar Council, the Law Society, and the Inns of Court to consider urgent further action in light of these incidents. This might include enhanced training, stricter rules, or other measures to ensure compliance. The underlying message is that the legal profession must be proactive and united in addressing the challenges posed by AI, so that technology serves the interests of justice, rather than inadvertently undermines them.

    Conclusion

    The joined judgment in Ayinde and Al-Haroun is a cautionary tale about the pitfalls of uncritical reliance on AI in legal work. In both cases, well-intentioned uses of technology led to serious errors, fictitious cases and quotations, which almost misled the court. The High Court’s response was measured: it stopped short of holding the individuals in contempt, instead opting to refer the lawyers involved to their respective professional regulators for investigation. and the lawyers themselves.

    Embracing innovative tools like AI is not forbidden, indeed, such tools can assist with research and efficiency, but they cannot replace the essential judgment and oversight of a trained lawyer. No matter how advanced legal technology becomes, fundamental duties of accuracy, honesty and diligence remain paramount. A solicitor or barrister must never present unchecked information to a court, whether that information came from a junior colleague, a client, or an AI program. The Ayinde/Al-Haroun case confirms that if these duties are breached, even through carelessness or unfamiliarity with new technology, the courts will take action to uphold professional integrity (via wasted costs orders, referrals, or other more serious sanctions).

    If you require advice on issues relating to Professional Negligence or specifically Solicitors Negligence, contact our experienced team at Carruthers Law today. Call 0151 541 2040 or email info@carruthers-law.co.uk.

  2. BBC Wins Key Pleading Ruling in Amersi Libel Claim

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    BBC Defamation Claim to Proceed Following High Court Judgment in Amersi v BBC [2025] EWHC 1323 (KB)

    The High Court has confirmed that the defamation claim brought by businessman and political donor Mohamed Amersi against the BBC will proceed to trial, following a significant interlocutory judgment in *Amersi v British Broadcasting Corporation* [2025] EWHC 1323 (KB). In a ruling delivered by Mr Justice Jeremy Johnson, the Court rejected an application by Mr Amersi to strike out parts of the BBC’s truth defence and granted the broadcaster permission to amend its particulars. The judgment marks a key procedural success for the BBC and underscores the principled, forensic approach adopted by the English courts when assessing complex defences to libel claims, particularly where public interest journalism is engaged.

    Background: The Allegations and the Claim

    The proceedings arise from a BBC Panorama broadcast and an accompanying online article published in October 2021 as part of the international “Pandora Papers” collaboration. The programme investigated allegations of corporate misconduct by the Swedish telecommunications company Telia in Uzbekistan, a jurisdiction where Telia subsequently admitted to engaging in bribery and paid substantial penalties to US and Dutch authorities.

    Mr Amersi was identified in the broadcast in connection with consultancy work undertaken for Telia during the relevant period. He alleges that the publications conveyed a defamatory imputation that he was knowingly involved in corrupt practices and, in doing so, seriously damaged his personal and professional reputation. He commenced proceedings in late 2022, seeking damages, injunctive relief, and a public retraction.

    The BBC has defended the claim in its entirety, relying primarily on the statutory defences of truth and publication on a matter of public interest under sections 2 and 4 of the Defamation Act 2013.

    Preliminary Meaning Ruling

    In an earlier judgment delivered in April 2024, His Honour Judge Lewis (sitting as a High Court Judge) determined the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of. The Court held that the publications bore a defamatory meaning at common law, namely, that there were reasonable grounds to suspect Mr Amersi of knowingly participating in corrupt transactions on behalf of Telia.

    Although the Court found that the meaning fell short of an express allegation of guilt, it nonetheless amounted to a serious defamatory imputation with reputational consequences of a high order. The BBC was therefore put to proof either that the meaning was substantially true or that the publication satisfied the requirements of responsible journalism on a matter of public interest.

    The Challenge to the BBC’s Truth Defence

    The case returned to the High Court in 2025 for determination of cross-applications concerning the scope of the BBC’s truth defence. Mr Amersi applied to strike out various particulars on the basis that they were irrelevant, lacked probative value, or risked prejudicing a fair trial—pointing in particular to references to entertainment provided to foreign officials and the scale of consultancy payments received. He contended that such material bore no rational connection to the imputation identified by the Court and should not be permitted to form part of the BBC’s defence.

    In parallel, the BBC sought permission to amend its defence to incorporate further particulars in support of its truth plea. These amendments included additional contextual evidence and investigative material, including financial records and communications alleged to support the overarching narrative that Mr Amersi had knowledge of and involvement in corrupt arrangements.

    High Court Judgment: Defence Allowed to Stand

    In a reserved judgment dated 30 May 2025, Mr Justice Johnson refused most of the application to strike out and granted the BBC permission to amend its pleadings. The Court held that the truth defence, viewed in its entirety, disclosed a triable issue. The Judge accepted that while certain individual particulars might not independently prove the central allegation, they could form part of a cumulative evidential case.

    Importantly, the Court emphasised that it is not the role of the interlocutory court to conduct a mini-trial on the merits of each pleaded fact. Provided the defence is properly particularised, relevant to the identified meaning, and not inherently incapable of establishing the defence if proved, it should be permitted to proceed to trial.

    Mr Justice Johnson further observed that the proposed amendments were not a departure from the BBC’s original case but represented a permissible elaboration intended to ensure the defence was appropriately articulated. The amendments were not oppressive and would not cause unfair prejudice to the claimant.

    The Judge did strike out part of the defence pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a)-(c). The Judge found that the BBC’s reference to the NRF review, which allegedly led to the termination of Mr Amersi’s engagement with Telia, was not directly relevant to the truth defence. It did not amount to primary evidence of corruption and risked giving rise to satellite litigation. It was vexatious and did not give details of matters on which the defendant could permissibly rely in support of its truth defence.

    Implications and Next Steps

    As a result of the ruling, the BBC retains its principal defences of truth and public interest, now bolstered by a more detailed factual matrix. The broadcaster will need to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the sting of the libel—that Mr Amersi was knowingly involved in corrupt transactions—is substantially true.

    Should the BBC be unable to establish the truth defence, it may nevertheless rely on section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013, which protects publication on matters of public interest where the defendant reasonably believed that publication was in the public interest and acted responsibly in doing so.

    The matter is now listed for trial in June 2026. The trial is expected to involve contested oral evidence, expert analysis of corporate dealings, and detailed scrutiny of documentary material, including disclosures from the Pandora Papers.

    Legal and Media Significance

    The High Court’s ruling affirms that serious allegations must be justified by coherent and particularised pleadings but that courts will not prematurely exclude relevant material merely because it may ultimately fall short. The judgment also reaffirms the principle that public interest journalism occupies a protected space under English defamation law, albeit one which carries significant responsibilities and evidential burdens.

    Further Reading

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  3. URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd UKSC 21

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    URS Corporation Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd [2025] UKSC 21

    Background to the Case

    On 14 June 2017, Grenfell Tower in London was engulfed in flames, tragically resulting in 72 fatalities. The disaster exposed widespread safety defects in high, rise residential buildings, most notably the use of unsafe cladding. In response, the Government urged developers to undertake necessary remedial works and bolstered this by imposing new legal liabilities on developers through the Building Safety Act 2022 (the “BSA”). This is the backdrop against which disputes between property developers and their design professionals, such as the case of URS v BDW, have arisen.

    For advice on professional negligence contact Carruthers Law on 0203 846 2862 or 0151 541 2040, or email info@carruthers-law.co.uk.

    BDW Trading Ltd (“BDW”) is a major UK housing developer and URS Corporation Ltd (“URS”) is an engineering consultancy. During BDW’s post, Grenfell safety investigations in late 2019, BDW discovered structural design defects in two high, rise residential developments for which BDW had been the developer and URS had provided the structural engineering designs. In 2020, 2021, BDW carried out remedial works to fix those defects at its own cost, even though by that time BDW no longer owned any interest in the buildings, no claims had been made against BDW by homeowners, and any such claims would have been time, barred. In March 2020, BDW initiated a negligence claim against URS to recover the costs of these remedial works.

    Claims and Procedural History

    The case first came before the High Court as a trial of preliminary issues in October 2021. Mr Justice Fraser found in essence that BDW’s claim could proceed, deciding that:

    • URS’s duty of care in tort extended to the losses claimed by BDW (with the exception of a separate claim for reputational damage which was not allowed);
    • The losses were recoverable in principle and were not too remote;
    • Any issues of legal causation or mitigation (such as whether BDW acted reasonably in fixing the defects) should be resolved at the full trial; and
    • Accordingly, BDW’s claim should not be struck out at the preliminary stage.

    While BDW’s negligence claim was ongoing, legislative change came into play. In June 2022, section 135 of the BSA took effect, retrospectively extending the limitation period for claims under section 1 of the Defective Premises Act 1972 (“DPA”) from 6 years to 30 years. (Section 1 DPA imposes a duty to ensure that dwellings are fit for habitation, applying to those involved in constructing a dwelling, including developers like BDW and professionals like URS.) In light of this development, BDW successfully applied to amend its case to add a claim against URS under section 1 DPA, as well as a claim for contribution under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (“the Contribution Act”).

    URS appealed the High Court’s preliminary rulings and the permission to amend. In July 2023, the Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed URS’s appeals, affirming that BDW’s claims could proceed. The Supreme Court thereafter granted URS permission to appeal on four grounds of law, which are addressed in its judgment.

    The Supreme Court’s Judgment

    On 21 May 2025, the Supreme Court (Lords Hamblen and Burrows giving the lead judgment) unanimously dismissed URS’s appeal on all four grounds. The judgment confirms important principles about when developers can recover the cost of remedial works and clarifies the interpretation of the Building Safety Act 2022, the Defective Premises Act 1972, and the Contribution Act 1978 in this context. The four grounds of appeal and the Supreme Court’s conclusions on each are summarised below.

    Ground 1: Scope of Duty and Remoteness of Loss

    Ground 1 asked whether the losses BDW sought (the cost of the remedial works) were outside the scope of URS’s duty of care, or too remote, on the basis that BDW had incurred these costs voluntarily (i.e. without a legal obligation and after it had sold its interest in the properties). URS argued that English law recognises a “voluntariness principle” under which a party who voluntarily remedies a defect, in the absence of a legal duty, cannot recover those costs in negligence. In other words, URS contended that because BDW chose to carry out repairs when it had no proprietary stake or legal liability at the time, the loss fell outside the scope of any duty URS owed or was too remote.

    The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It held that the authorities URS relied upon did not establish any rule of law barring recovery for “voluntary” remedial expenditures. While a claimant’s voluntary actions might be relevant to factual questions of causation or mitigation (for example, whether the claimant acted reasonably), those questions are fact, sensitive and must be resolved at trial on the evidence. In this case, it is not disputed that URS assumed responsibility to BDW in its engineering contracts and breached its duty by providing defective designs, which in principle entitles BDW to claim the cost of repairs in negligence. Moreover, the Court observed that on the assumed facts it is “strongly arguable” BDW did not act wholly voluntarily, given the serious risk of personal injury or death to homeowners if the safety defects were left unaddressed, BDW’s decision to carry out remedial work was a reasonable response to an imminent danger.

    Since the Court held that BDW’s expenditure on repairs is recoverable in principle (subject to proof of loss and causation at trial), it did not need to decide an additional question raised under Ground 1 about when BDW’s cause of action in negligence accrued (and whether to depart from the old authority of Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd v Oscar Faber & Partners [1983] 2 AC 1 on that point). That issue was academic given the Court’s conclusion that a voluntariness, based defence does not bar BDW’s claim.

    Ground 2: Application of Section 135 of the Building Safety Act 2022

    Ground 2 concerned section 135 of the Building Safety Act 2022, and whether its new 30, year limitation period for DPA claims (applied retrospectively) also extends to related claims in negligence and for contribution, like those brought by BDW in this case. Section 135(1) BSA amended the Limitation Act 1980 to provide a 30, year limitation period for causes of action accruing under section 1 DPA before 28 June 2022, and section 135(3) stipulated that this amendment is to be treated as always having been in force (i.e. fully retrospective) except in two situations: if applying it would breach a defendant’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, or if the claim was already settled or determined before 28 June 2022. In BDW’s case, by the time it discovered the defects, any DPA claims by homeowners were long time, barred under the old 6, year limit; however, the new law potentially revived those claims by extending the period to 30 years, thereby exposing BDW to liability and enabling BDW to bring its own claims against URS.

    It was undisputed that section 135 applies to claims under section 1 DPA (for example, a homeowner’s claim against a developer). The contentious issue was whether the retrospective effect of section 135(3) also applies to other causes of action that are dependent on a DPA claim’s timeline, such as BDW’s negligence claim against URS or a contribution claim that hinges on BDW’s liability under the DPA. URS contended that the extended 30, year limitation should be confined strictly to DPA claims, meaning BDW’s negligence and contribution claims against URS would remain time, barred (since, absent the BSA, any liability of BDW to the homeowners had expired).

    The Supreme Court held that section 135(3) BSA does apply to claims which are dependent on section 1 DPA causes of action. In other words, the statutory extension of time is not limited to direct DPA claims by homeowners, but also ensures that “onward” claims by developers (such as in negligence or contribution) benefiting from the extended DPA liability window are likewise not time, barred. The Court’s interpretation was based on both the wording and the purpose of the provision. First, section 135(3) refers to “an action by virtue of section 1 DPA,” rather than simply actions “under” the DPA, which indicates a broader scope covering claims arising out of DPA, related liability.

    The heading of section 135(1) and its text provide context, also using “by virtue of the DPA,” suggesting Parliament intended to capture not only direct DPA claims but any actions deriving from the existence of a DPA duty. Second, the policy aim of the BSA was to ensure those responsible for historic building safety defects can be held to account. Limiting the extended limitation to only the original homeowner claims under the DPA, but not to developers’ follow, on claims against those actually responsible (like contractors or consultants), would undermine that purpose. It would create a disjointed “split regime” where a developer might be liable to a homeowner (thanks to the extended 30, year period) but unable to recover a fair share of the cost from the wrongdoer, effectively penalising conscientious developers who proactively remediate defects.

    The Court noted that section 135’s retrospective effect will not apply to every scenario where a DPA issue is raised incidentally, but it clearly applies in circumstances like this case, i.e. actions in respect of building defects that fundamentally rely on the existence of a DPA obligation. Thus, BDW’s negligence and contribution claims (being contingent on BDW’s DPA liability to homeowners) benefit from the 30, year limitation period, and URS cannot avoid those claims on limitation grounds.

    Ground 3: Duty Owed Under the Defective Premises Act 1972

    Ground 3 asked whether URS owed BDW a statutory duty of care under section 1(1)(a) of the Defective Premises Act 1972, and if so, whether BDW’s claimed losses are of a kind recoverable for breach of that duty. Section 1 DPA, in summary, imposes a duty on those involved in the construction of a dwelling to do their work in a workmanlike or professional manner so that the dwelling will be fit for habitation. Specifically, section 1(1)(a) provides that the duty is owed to persons for whom the dwelling is “provided to the order of” (essentially, the person who commissions or arranges the construction), and section 1(1)(b) extends the duty to any person who “acquires an interest” in the dwelling (such as a future homeowner).

    In this case, BDW was the developer that arranged for the construction of the residential buildings, and URS was the engineering consultant engaged to provide designs. URS argued that the DPA distinguishes between those who owe duties and those to whom duties are owed, contending that a developer cannot be a beneficiary of the DPA duty because developers themselves owe duties to eventual purchasers. In URS’s view, only the ultimate homeowners (who acquire an interest) should be owed duties, whereas a party like BDW, who was itself a duty, holder under the Act, could not simultaneously have rights under the same statute.

    The Supreme Court rejected this narrow interpretation. The Court found no reason why a developer cannot both owe a duty and also be owed a duty under the DPA. In particular, where (as here) the developer is the first owner of the property, that developer can fall within the class of persons to whom the section 1(1)(a) duty is owed. The purpose of the DPA was to protect those with an interest in the dwelling, including not only subsequent purchasers but also the person who initially commissioned the work (often the developer itself in the role of first owner). Legal commentary and construction law textbooks supported the view that a developer in BDW’s position is intended to be covered by the Act’s protection as someone for whom the dwelling was provided.

    Accordingly, the Court held that URS did owe BDW a duty under section 1(1)(a) DPA, since the structural design work was done “to the order of” BDW. BDW is therefore entitled to pursue a claim against URS for breach of that statutory duty. Furthermore, the losses BDW seeks (the cost of rectifying the defects) were confirmed to be a type of loss recoverable for breach of that duty. This means BDW’s remedial costs can, in principle, be claimed as damages under the DPA if the other elements of the claim are proven.

    Ground 4: Contribution Claim Without Prior Judgment or Claim

    Ground 4 concerned BDW’s claim for a contribution from URS under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. The question was whether BDW is entitled to bring a contribution claim against URS even though there had been no prior judgment, settlement, or even a third, party claim by any homeowner against BDW. The Contribution Act allows a party who is liable for damage (denoted “D1”) to recover a contribution from another party (“D2”) who is also liable for the same damage, distributing the burden of compensation between them according to their relative responsibility. Here, BDW claimed that by performing the repairs it effectively compensated the homeowners for the damage caused by the defects, and since URS’s negligence was also responsible for that damage, URS should contribute to the cost.

    URS argued that BDW’s contribution claim was premature, maintaining that a right to contribution does not arise unless and until BDW’s liability to the homeowners has been established by a court judgment or BDW has admitted liability or settled a claim with them. In other words, URS contended that without an actual claim or award against BDW by a homeowner, BDW could not seek to share the loss with URS. BDW, on the other hand, argued that its right to contribution arose as soon as the homeowners suffered damage for which both BDW and URS are liable, even if the homeowners never pursued BDW or URS for that damage. BDW’s position was that the law should allow proactive remediation: once the defect caused loss to the homeowners (diminishing the value or safety of their flats), and BDW took responsibility by fixing it, the contribution claim against URS was valid even absent a formal claim by the homeowners.

    The Supreme Court took a middle path, rejecting both extremes of the parties’ positions. It clarified when a right of contribution arises under the 1978 Act. Two conditions must be satisfied: (i) the person who suffered the damage (here, the homeowners) has indeed suffered actionable damage for which both D1 and D2 are liable, and (ii) D1 has actually paid compensation, or been ordered or agreed to pay compensation, in respect of that damage. Only once both those conditions are met does D1’s statutory right to recover contribution from D2 crystallise.

    Applying that test, the Court concluded that BDW’s contribution claim was valid in this case because BDW had effectively paid compensation in kind to the homeowners by remedying the defects at its own expense. The fact that there was no judgment against BDW, no admission of liability, and no claim ever filed by the homeowners does not prevent BDW from seeking contribution, since BDW’s voluntary repair expenditures stand in place of compensation that would otherwise be owed to the homeowners. In short, once BDW took it upon itself to pay for the damage (thereby satisfying the homeowners’ loss), BDW became entitled to pursue URS for a fair contribution to that cost. The Court thus decided Ground 4 in BDW’s favour, allowing the contribution claim to proceed.

    For expert advice on professional negligence, surveyor’s negligence or structural engineer negligence, please visit our Professional Negligence Claims and Surveyor’s Negligence pages.

    For advice on professional negligence contact Carruthers Law on 0203 846 2862 or 0151 541 2040, or email info@carruthers-law.co.uk.

  4. Aluko v Barton [2025] EWHC 853 (KB)

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    High Court Clarifies Defamatory Meaning of Tweets in Aluko v Barton [2025] EWHC 853 (KB)

    In April 2025, the High Court (King’s Bench Division) handed down a judgment on preliminary issues in the libel case of Eniola Aluko v Joseph (“Joey”) Barton. The claimant, Eniola Aluko, is a prominent former England footballer and media pundit, and the defendant, Joey Barton, is a former professional footballer and manager. The dispute arose from posts made by Mr Barton on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter) in January 2024, which Ms Aluko claimed were defamatory. The High Court was asked to determine several key issues about these posts as a preliminary matter (before any full trial on liability or damages). Specifically, Mr Justice Lavender considered: (1) the natural and ordinary meaning of the posts; (2) any innuendo meaning (a meaning conveyed to readers with additional knowledge) of the first post; (3) whether the meanings were statements of fact or opinion; and (4) whether the posts, in those meanings, were defamatory of Ms Aluko.

    If you are concerned about damage to your reputation or have been accused of defamation, contact Carruthers Law today for clear, expert advice. Call us on 0151 541 2040 — we act swiftly to protect our clients’ reputations and legal interests.

    The Allegedly Defamatory Posts

    Two posts were at the center of the case (with an additional related post providing context). Both were published on Mr Barton’s X/Twitter account over a two-day period and concerned remarks about Ms Aluko’s past actions:

    “Victim Card” Post (17 January 2024, morning): In the first post (nicknamed the Victim Card Post), Mr Barton wrote: “Cry me a f*ing river… I was waiting for the victim card to be played. Eni, sorry luv, you’re dreadful as a pundit. Tone deaf, can’t count and most importantly you know next to nothing about men’s football. You should have ran off to a desert island after your ‘Arteta phoning Pep to put a bid in’ nonsense. Everyone is laughing at you. Not just me.”

    This message, containing an expletive and various insults, was posted alongside a preview of a video in which Ms Aluko spoke about online abuse and harassment of women in football broadcasting . The clear insinuation was that Ms Aluko was “playing the victim” in response to criticism. (Ms Aluko would later argue that this post provided important context for interpreting the next post.)

    First Post (17 January 2024, afternoon):

    A few hours later, Mr Barton posted another message reading “Surprise surprise …” followed by three clown-face emojis and a crown emoji . Below this text, he attached a screenshot of a six-year-old Guardian news article from August 2017 about Ms Aluko’s past accusations of racism and bullying within the Football Association (FA) . The article’s headline was “FA faces calls for fresh investigation after Eni Aluko’s claims of racism and bullying”, and it reported on calls for an inquiry into how the FA handled Ms Aluko’s complaints. By resurfacing this old story with a sarcastic “Surprise surprise” and clown emojis, Mr Barton appeared to ridicule the situation – suggesting it was predictable and absurd. Ms Aluko contended this post implied she was again making unfounded complaints (essentially accusing her of habitually playing the “victim card” or “race card”), especially when read in light of the earlier Victim Card Post.

    Second Post (19 January 2024):

    Two days later, Mr Barton posted yet another message targeting Ms Aluko. This post stated: “More has come to light about poor, little Eni Aluko. Dad was a Nigerian Senator. Dodgy money. Ran to England. Massive house in Wentworth. 3 Rolls Royce’s [sic]. St Mary’s in Ascot private education. Lawyer. Race card player.” . Under this text was a preview of a BBC News link titled “Aluko apologises for furlough posts”, referring to a 2020 story where Ms Aluko had apologised for remarks criticising people on the UK furlough pandemic scheme. In this Second Post, Mr Barton effectively listed aspects of Ms Aluko’s privileged background (wealthy family, expensive education and lifestyle) and then labeled her a “Race card player.” The tone was derisive. The implication drawn by Ms Aluko was that Mr Barton was calling her a hypocrite (for criticising others’ “entitlement” despite her own advantages) and accusing her of cynically using her race to gain sympathy or advantage.

    These posts – particularly the First and Second Posts – became the subject of the libel claim. Ms Aluko alleged that the posts defamed her by suggesting she habitually makes false claims of racism/bullying (i.e. plays the victim or race card) and is hypocritical and dishonest . Mr Barton, in turn, denied defamation, maintaining that his statements were either true or mere opinion, and in any event not defamatory in meaning.

    Key Legal Issues Before the Court

    At the preliminary issues trial (heard by Mr Justice Lavender in December 2024), the court did not decide whether Mr Barton’s posts were true or whether any defences applied. Instead, it focused on foundational questions common in defamation cases, which would shape how the case proceeds:

    • Meaning – Natural and Ordinary Meaning: What meaning would the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader naturally take from the words (and emojis) in the First Post and the Second Post? This involves reading the posts in their full context (including any linked material visible to readers) but without special knowledge.
    • Meaning – Innuendo: Whether the First Post conveyed any additional defamatory meaning to readers who had extra knowledge, namely those who had also seen the Victim Card Post earlier that day. (In defamation law, an innuendo meaning is one that is not explicit from the words alone but arises due to extrinsic facts known to some readers.)
    • Fact or Opinion: Whether the meanings of each post (as found by the court) amounted to statements of fact or opinions. An allegation of fact asserts a concrete truth about someone (which could be proven true or false), whereas a statement of opinion is a value judgment or commentary that an honest person could hold based on facts. The classification is significant because it dictates possible defences (e.g. honest opinion defence applies only to opinions, while truth must be proven for factual allegations).
    • Defamatory Character: Whether the meaning identified is defamatory at common law – i.e., whether it would tend to damage Ms Aluko’s reputation in the eyes of reasonable people. In essence, a statement is defamatory if it imputes something that would make people think worse of the claimant or shun/avoid them. The judge applied the established test: a publication is defamatory if it (a) attributes to the claimant conduct or qualities that are widely disapproved of in society, and (b) is sufficiently serious to cause harm to reputation.

    By resolving these issues now, the court set the stage for the next steps. If the meanings were found not defamatory, that part of the claim would end. If they were opinions (not facts), Mr Barton would not have to prove their truth but could rely on an opinion-based defence (if the opinion was one a person could honestly hold). If they were facts and defamatory, Mr Barton would potentially have to prove they are true (a high bar, especially for implications about someone’s motives).

    Court’s Findings: The First Post

    Meaning (Natural and Ordinary):

    The court found that the ordinary meaning of the First Post was relatively limited and not as defamatory as Ms Aluko alleged. Mr Justice Lavender held that the First Post meant “it was both predictable and laughable that the Football Association had faced calls for a fresh investigation into its handling of the claimant’s claims of racism and bullying.” In other words, an average reader would understand Mr Barton to be commenting on the Football Association’s situation – that renewed calls (by others) for an investigation into Ms Aluko’s 2017 racism/bullying allegations were absurd yet unsurprising . Notably, this meaning did not directly criticise Ms Aluko personally. It ridiculed the scenario (and perhaps the FA or those making the calls) rather than explicitly accusing Ms Aluko of lying. The judge rejected Ms Aluko’s argument that the post’s ordinary meaning accused her of dishonesty or a pattern of false complaints. He also disagreed with Mr Barton’s contention that the post was only about the FA and had no reference to Ms Aluko – clearly the context was her claims, even if the ridicule was aimed at the calls for investigation .

    Meaning (Innuendo):

    Importantly for Ms Aluko, the court found that readers who had additional context – specifically, those who also saw the earlier Victim Card Post that morning – would have taken a more pointed defamatory meaning from the First Post. Combining the sarcastic “Surprise surprise… 🤡🤡🤡 👑” with the knowledge of Mr Barton’s “Cry me a river” rant, the judge held the First Post conveyed an innuendo meaning that Ms Aluko had cynically exploited claims of racism and bullying for her own ends. In the judge’s words, the First Post (with innuendo) meant “In making claims of racism and bullying in respect of her participation in the England women’s football team the claimant cynically sought to exploit her status as an alleged victim of racism and bullying, her claim to be a victim of racism and bullying was unwarranted and it was both predictable and laughable that she acted in this way.” This essentially captures the notion of “playing the race card” – without using that phrase, the meaning is that Ms Aluko unjustifiably portrayed herself as a victim of racism/bullying to benefit herself. Unlike the natural meaning, this innuendo squarely impugns Ms Aluko’s integrity, suggesting her 2017 complaints were made in bad faith.

    Fact or Opinion:

    The judge decided that both the natural meaning and the innuendo meaning of the First Post were statements of opinion, not fact. An ordinary reader would recognise Mr Barton’s post as commentary on a news item, given its tone and the use of an old article as context. For instance, calling a situation “predictable and laughable” is a value judgment, not a factual report. Even the innuendo that Ms Aluko “cynically sought to exploit” her victim status was deemed Mr Barton’s view or inference rather than an assertion of objective fact. The judgment notes that Mr Barton was essentially offering his personal reaction to Ms Aluko’s racism claims (especially signaled by phrases like “Surprise surprise” and his prior “victim card” remark). There was no specific undisclosed fact being alleged about her conduct beyond his evaluative assertion. Thus, the First Post in both meanings was treated as an expression of opinion.

    Defamatory?

    In its natural meaning, the First Post was not defamatory of Ms Aluko. Since that meaning was focused on the FA’s response and did not disparage Ms Aluko, it had no tendency to lower her reputation. The judge explicitly found the natural meaning “is not critical of the claimant”. However, the innuendo meaning of the First Post was found to be defamatory. Accusing someone of cynically advancing an unwarranted claim of racism clearly crosses the threshold of seriousness – it implies dishonorable conduct that society would condemn. Mr Justice Lavender noted that alleging Ms Aluko engaged in such cynical behavior would undoubtedly affect how people view her, satisfying the common law test for defamation. In summary, Ms Aluko cannot succeed on the First Post’s ordinary meaning (since it isn’t defamatory), but she can proceed on the innuendo meaning which portrays her as acting in bad faith.

    Court’s Findings: The Second Post

    Meaning:

    The Second Post was unequivocally about Ms Aluko herself, and the court largely agreed that it carried two stinging imputations: hypocrisy and playing the “race card.” Mr Justice Lavender found that the Second Post’s ordinary reader would understand it to mean: (1) “The claimant was a hypocrite for saying that the furlough scheme created a ‘do-nothing’ mentality and a ‘culture of entitlement’ when she was herself the beneficiary of dodgy money obtained by her father, a Nigerian senator who ran to England, which has paid for her to have a massive house, three Rolls Royce cars and a private education.” and (2) “The claimant has on at least one occasion cynically sought to exploit her race.”  In simpler terms, Mr Barton’s post suggested that Eniola Aluko criticised others for “entitlement” despite leading a life of privilege funded by questionable money, which makes her a hypocrite, and that she has also “played the race card” at least once for personal advantage.

    This was somewhat narrower than Ms Aluko’s pleaded meaning (she had argued the post implied she persistently made false racism allegations for unjustified benefit). The judge did not adopt the more extreme formulation that “persistently” or that her father was “corrupt” (words Ms Aluko’s side had used). Instead, he limited the “race card” allegation to at least one occasion and didn’t infer a motive like gaining unjustified advantages beyond exploiting her race. He also declined to label it outright “dishonest” or criminal, sticking to the phrasing that she acted cynically in using her race . Nonetheless, this meaning is still strongly defamatory.

    Fact or Opinion:

    The Second Post was found to contain a mix of opinion and fact. The court drew a line between the two implications in the meaning:

    The allegation of hypocrisy was characterised as opinion. This is because Mr Barton was essentially giving his view that Ms Aluko’s criticism of others (regarding “culture of entitlement” and furlough) was inconsistent with her own circumstances. The post itself listed factual elements of her background (wealthy upbringing, etc.) as the basis and then delivered the value-laden punchline that it made her a hypocrite. An ordinary reader would see this as Mr Barton’s evaluative commentary on those facts . Indeed, the judgment noted that the “hypocrisy” part was clearly the defendant’s view drawn from stated facts .

    The statement that Ms Aluko is a “Race card player” – i.e. that she had exploited her race at least once – was deemed a statement of fact . Unlike the hypocrisy jibe, this phrase was not presented as a subjective opinion with reasons given, but rather came at the end of a list of ostensibly factual assertions about her background. There was “nothing to indicate” to the reader that “Race card player” was meant as an opinion or commentary; it would be taken as an assertion about something she has done. In other words, Mr Barton stated it as a fact that Ms Aluko has “played the race card.” The judge also pointed out that this phrase, while derogatory, lacks a clear basis or explanation in the post – making it a bare allegation of cynical behavior . As a result, it is treated as a factual imputation (one that Mr Barton would need to prove true if he were to defend it as truthful).

    Defamatory? The Second Post’s meaning was plainly defamatory. Mr Barton’s own legal team conceded that the hypocrisy accusation was defamatory at common law. Accusing someone of gross hypocrisy in their professional commentary is something likely to cause serious reputational harm. Furthermore, the court found that the “race card” allegation was also defamatory, as it accuses Ms Aluko of cynically exploiting her race – conduct that right-thinking members of society would surely condemn. There was little doubt that readers would think much less of Ms Aluko if they believed this assertion. Thus, both aspects of the Second Post’s meaning met the defamation threshold. In summary, the Second Post was held to be defamatory in both respects: Mr Barton’s post conveyed one defamatory opinion (hypocrisy) and one defamatory factual allegation (playing the race card).

    Conclusion

    While Mr Barton succeeded in characterising some of his remarks as opinion, the court upheld the gravamen of Ms Aluko’s complaint. The ruling confirms that even informal posts, when they impute serious misconduct such as dishonesty or bad faith, will attract close judicial scrutiny. In particular, the finding that Mr Barton made a defamatory factual allegation,one he may struggle to prove, marks this as a significant early victory for Ms Aluko.

    If you believe that you have been defamed online or elsewhere, or if you are facing a defamation claim, Carruthers Law can help. Our specialist defamation solicitors have extensive experience in defending and pursuing complex libel and slander cases. Please contact Carruthers Law today on 0151 541 2040 or email us to discuss how we can assist you. We offer expert advice with professionalism, discretion, and results-driven representation.

    Further Reading

    • Serious Harm in Defamation Claims
      An analysis of the statutory requirement under section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013, detailing the threshold for establishing serious harm to reputation.
    • Determination of Meaning in Defamation Cases
      An exploration of the ‘single meaning’ rule and the methodology courts employ to ascertain the natural and ordinary meaning of allegedly defamatory statements.
    • Overview of Defamation Law Services
      A summary of the legal services offered in relation to defamation, including libel, slander, and reputation management strategies.

    If you require expert legal advice on defamation matters, our experienced solicitors are available to assist you. Please contact us on 0151 541 2040 or 0203 846 2862. Alternatively, you may email us at info@carruthers-law.co.uk or visit our contact page to submit an enquiry.

  5. Patarkatsishvili and another v Woodward-Fisher [2025] EWHC 265 (Ch)

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    Patarkatsishvili and another v Woodward-Fisher [2025] EWHC 265 (Ch)

    The case involves a claim for rescission and damages for fraudulent misrepresentation in the sale of a house, Horbury Villa, Ladbroke Road, London W.11. The Claimants, Iya Patarkatsishvili and Yevhen Hunyak, alleged that the Defendant, William Woodward-Fisher, falsely answered three pre-contract enquiries, concealing a serious clothes moth infestation in the house’s insulation.

    Summary of Facts

    The Claimants sought repayment of the purchase price with interest and damages for losses incurred in buying the house and attempting to remedy the infestation. The Defendant disputed the allegations, arguing that the Claimants were unaware of or did not rely on the replies to the pre-contract enquiries. He also claimed that the Claimants had delayed excessively in bringing their claim and had waived their right to rescind. However, the court found that the Defendant’s replies were false and that he did not honestly believe their truth. The Claimants’ lawyers knew of the relevant replies, and the Claimants relied on them in purchasing the house.

    Particular Misrepresentations

    The specific alleged misrepresentations made by the Defendant during the conveyancing transaction were as follows:

    Vermin Infestation:

    The Defendant falsely answered the pre-contract enquiry about vermin infestation, stating that he was not aware of any such matters affecting the property. However, he knew that there was a serious clothes moth infestation in the house’s insulation. This was a misrepresentation because the Defendant had received and read reports from pest control companies (Rentokil and Environ) that identified the infestation and recommended removing the woollen insulation.

    Reports on Vermin Infestation:

    The Defendant falsely claimed that there were no reports concerning vermin infestation or the fabric of the property, other than what had already been disclosed. In reality, he had received reports from Environ dated 16 May 2018 and 25 June 2018, which informed him of the infestation and the need to remove the infested insulation. These reports were not disclosed to the Claimants.

    Hidden Defects:

    The Defendant falsely stated that he was not aware of any hidden defects in the property. He knew that the insulation was infested with moths and that this was a serious defect that was not apparent on inspection. The Defendant did not honestly believe the truth of his replies, as he was aware of the infestation and its implications for the property’s condition.

    Defences Raised by the Defendant

    Delay:

    The Defendant argued that the Claimants delayed excessively in bringing their claim for rescission. They contended that the Claimants knew from June 2020 that they had a claim for misrepresentation but did not elect to rescind until May 2021. The Defendant suggested that this delay was evidence that the Claimants had decided to affirm the contract and continue with the purchase.

    Affirmation:

    The Defendant claimed that the Claimants had affirmed the contract by continuing to live in the house after they knew of their right to rescind. They argued that the Claimants’ continued occupation of the house, without communicating their intention to rescind to the Defendant, amounted to an election to affirm the contract.

    Impossibility of Restitutio in Integrum:

    The Defendant contended that restitutio in integrum (restoration to the original position) was impossible for two main reasons:
    Financial Inability: The Defendant argued that he was financially unable to repay the purchase price of £32.5 million plus interest, as his total assets were between £15 and £20 million.
    Changes to the Property: The Defendant claimed that the Claimants had carried out substantial works of alteration to the house and allowed it to deteriorate, making it impossible to restore the property to its original condition.

    Practical Justice:

    The Defendant also argued that granting rescission would be practically unjust. They contended that the court should refuse rescission on the grounds that it would create a different relationship between the parties, with the Defendant becoming a debtor subject to enforcement and uncertainty.

    These defences were ultimately rejected by the court, which found that the Claimants were entitled to rescission and substantial damages.

    Legal Analysis

    The court examined several issues, including whether the replies were misrepresentations, whether the Claimants knew of and relied on the replies, and whether the Defendant knew or suspected that the replies were untrue. The court found that the replies were false, the Defendant knew or suspected their untruth, and the Claimants relied on them. The court granted rescission and awarded damages, considering practical justice and adjustments for counter restitution.

    Findings and Decision

    The court granted rescission of the contract and awarded substantial damages to the Claimants. The Claimants’ right to repayment will be protected by an equitable lien on the house, and there will be an allowance against the sum repayable by the Defendant for the value of the benefit to the Claimants of use of the house since May 2019. The exact terms of the relief to be granted, the amount of the damages, and other consequential matters will be determined at a short hearing to be held later this month.

    For expert advice on professional negligence, surveyor’s negligence or structural engineer negligence, please visit our Professional Negligence Claims and Surveyor’s Negligence pages.

    For advice on professional negligence contact Carruthers Law on 0203 846 2862 or 0151 541 2040, or email info@carruthers-law.co.uk.

  6. Limitation Periods in Professional Negligence.

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    Limitation in Professional Negligence: Practical Litigation Strategy

    Limitation periods can determine the success or failure of a professional negligence claim. Even the strongest case can be lost if issued outside the relevant time limit. Conversely, a well-advised defendant may avoid liability entirely by relying on a limitation defence. For both claimants and defendants, early attention to limitation is essential.

    This article sets out the key practical considerations that arise in professional negligence litigation. Drawing on current authority and procedural best practice, it is intended to assist solicitors, legal advisers and business owners navigating these disputes.

    Why Limitation is Often Decisive

    The law of limitation in England and Wales is governed primarily by the Limitation Act 1980. In most cases, the expiry of a limitation period bars the right to bring an action. The defendant must plead it, but once raised it offers a complete defence.

    In professional negligence, the facts surrounding breach, damage, and knowledge can be complex. Yet, time often runs before the client is even aware they have suffered loss. As such, a key tactical consideration in professional negligence litigation is whether the claim is already time-barred—or whether a longer period under section 14A applies.

    What Are the Relevant Limitation Periods?

    • Contractual claims against professionals (e.g. solicitors or accountants) must usually be brought within six years from breach.
    • Tortious claims (e.g. for negligent advice) also have a six-year period, running from the date when actual damage is suffered.
    • If the client did not know they had suffered damage, section 14A of the Limitation Act may apply, giving three years from the date of knowledge, subject to a 15-year longstop.
    • Claims involving fraud or deliberate concealment may benefit from further extensions under section 32.
    • Contribution claims (e.g. between professional defendants) must be brought within two years from the date of payment or judgment.

    When Does Time Start to Run?

    In contract, time starts at the point of breach. There is no need for the client to know about it. In tort, time runs from when the client suffers measurable damage. In many professional negligence cases, this is the moment when a financial loss crystallises (for example, entering into a flawed settlement or missing out on a better result).

    Where the claimant did not know they had suffered harm, section 14A applies. It provides three years from the date when the claimant had, or ought reasonably to have had, knowledge of the material facts. The leading authority remains Haward v Fawcetts [2006] UKHL 9, which confirms that time does not start to run until the claimant is aware there is a real possibility that their loss was caused by the act or omission complained of. This position was recently affirmed in Witcomb v J Keith Park Solicitors [2023] EWCA Civ 326.

    Standstill Agreements: Suspending the Clock

    Where time is close to expiring but parties are in negotiation or need further time to prepare, a standstill agreement can be used to pause the clock. These agreements are contractual and must be drafted with precision.

    Common terms include:

    • Suspension of the limitation period from a defined date
    • One party giving written notice to restart time running
    • An agreement not to plead limitation in future proceedings

    These arrangements should be finalised well before time expires. Courts will not extend time unless a clear agreement is in place.

    Issuing the Claim: Timing and Process

    A claim is deemed to be “brought” for limitation purposes when it is received by the court office, not when it is processed or sealed. In St Helens Borough Council v Barnes [2006] EWCA Civ 1372, the Court of Appeal confirmed that receipt of the claim form is determinative—even if the issuing date falls after the limitation deadline.

    This principle has particular significance when issuing online or close to midnight. In Matthews v Sedman [2021] UKSC 19, the Supreme Court clarified that where a cause of action accrues at the first moment of a day, that day is included for the purpose of calculating limitation.

    Practitioners using CE-File should also take note of Citysprint UK Ltd v Barts Health NHS Trust [2021] EWHC 2618 (TCC), which held that minor filing errors or paying a slightly incorrect court fee did not invalidate the issue of the claim form—provided the claimant acted in good faith.

    Similarly, in Butters v Hayes [2021] EWCA Civ 252, the Court of Appeal held that the underpayment of a court fee did not mean a claim had not been “brought” for limitation

    Pleading and Defending Limitation

    Defendants must plead limitation if they wish to rely on it. Once pleaded, the burden shifts to the claimant to establish that the claim is in time. This may involve reliance on section 14A or 32, which must be clearly pleaded. A failure to do so may result in the claim being struck out.

    In Trilogy Management Ltd v Harcus Sinclair [2016] EWHC 170 (Ch), the court held that where a claimant relies on section 32 (fraud or concealment), they must plead that the breaches were committed with knowledge that they were wrongful.

    Late pleading of limitation may lead to claims of waiver. However, in Vilca v Xstrata Ltd [2018] EWHC 27 (QB), the High Court allowed a late amendment to plead limitation, holding that silence and delay in raising the issue did not amount to waiver. The judgment confirms that under the CPR, even late-stage limitation defences may be permitted where no prejudice is caused.

    Strategic Use of Limitation Defences

    A well-founded limitation defence can be decisive. Defendants may apply:

    • To strike out a claim that is plainly time-barred
    • For summary judgment on limitation grounds
    • To have limitation tried as a preliminary issue

    Strategically, raising limitation early may prompt early settlement or lead to a swift dismissal. Conversely, failing to raise it promptly could lead to adverse costs consequences.

    Conclusion

    Limitation is not just a procedural detail—it is a central issue in professional negligence litigation. Timing mistakes, uncertainty over knowledge, or delay in issuing proceedings can be fatal to a claim.

    Carruthers Law advises on all aspects of limitation law. Whether you are pursuing or defending a professional negligence claim, we can provide precise and strategic advice to protect your position.

    Contact Carruthers Law on 0151 541 2040 or email info@carruthers-law.co.uk

  7. Clarke v Guardian News and Media Ltd [2025] EWHC 222 (KB)

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    The claimant, Noel Anthony Clarke, brought a claim against the defendant, Guardian News and Media Limited, for defamation and breach of data protection. The case was heard in the High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Media and Communications List, with Mrs Justice Steyn DBE presiding.

    The case concerned around eight articles published by the defendant, with the first and principal article titled, “‘Sexual predator’: actor Noel Clarke accused of groping, harassment and bullying by 20 women,” published online on 29 April 2021. The article alleged that Clarke was a serial abuser of women, engaging in unwanted sexual contact, harassment, and professional misconduct over a span of 15 years. Subsequent articles published between 30 April 2021 and 28 March 2022 echoed similar allegations.

    The Application

    The claimant sought to strike out the Amended Defence, particularly the defence of publication on a matter of public interest provided by section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013. The claimant argued that the defendant’s employees had deleted relevant evidence and fabricated correspondence to pervert the course of justice.

    The court may strike out a statement of case if it discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim, is an abuse of the court’s process, or there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction, or court order. The claimant relied on authorities concerning the preservation of documents and the duty to issue a litigation hold when litigation is reasonably contemplated.

    Submissions by the Claimants and Defendants

    The claimant’s counsel submitted that the defendant’s employees had deliberately deleted extensive evidence relevant to the proceedings, knowing that litigation was imminent. They also alleged that the defendant’s employees had fabricated correspondence to replace the deleted communications, thereby attempting to pervert the course of justice. The claimant’s counsel emphasised that the deletions and fabrications were intended to suppress unfavourable evidence and mislead the court.

    The defendant’s counsel submitted that the deletions occurred before litigation was reasonably contemplated and were in line with the organisation’s data minimisation policy. They contended that the defendant’s employees were not under any duty to preserve documents at the time of the deletions and that the deletions did not have a tendency to pervert the course of justice. The defendant’s counsel also argued that the claimant’s allegations of fabrication were unfounded and that the claimant’s representatives had failed to provide any specific evidence to support these serious allegations.

    Judge’s Decision and Reasoning

    Mrs Justice Steyn DBE refused to strike out the Amended Defence. She provided a detailed analysis of her reasoning, which can be summarised as follows:

    Timing of Deletions:

    The judge noted that the deletions of the Signal messages occurred before litigation was reasonably contemplated. The defendant’s legal team did not issue a litigation hold until a letter before action was received on 12 August 2022, more than a year after the first article was published. The judge found that the deletions were in line with the organisation’s data minimisation policy and were not intended to pervert the course of justice.

    Nature of the Deleted Messages:

    The judge examined the content of the deleted messages and found that they were peripheral documents. The surviving threads, “Last Day” and “Final,” did not contain any material that would have changed the outcome of the case. The judge concluded that the deletions did not have a tendency to pervert the course of justice.

    Intention to Pervert the Course of Justice:

    The judge found no evidence that the defendant’s employees intended to pervert the course of justice. The employees were following their organisation’s data minimisation policy and were not under any duty to preserve documents at the time of the deletions. The judge emphasised that the employees were not lawyers and could not be criticised for following the legal department’s lead on when a duty to preserve documents applied.

    Fabrication of Evidence:

    The judge rejected the claimant’s allegation that the defendant’s employees had fabricated evidence. The judge found no foundation for this extremely serious allegation and noted that the claimant’s representatives had failed to provide any specific evidence to support it. The judge concluded that the deletion of documents did not amount to fabrication of evidence.

    Fair Trial:

    The judge determined that the deletions did not render a fair trial impossible. The truth defence primarily depended on the evidence to be heard at trial from numerous witnesses, and the deletion of a small number of documents did not preclude a fair trial. The judge also noted that no basis for suggesting a fair trial of the data protection claim would be impossible was put forward.

    Criticism:

    Mrs Justice Steyn DBE was critical of the serious allegations made by the claimant’s counsel against the defendant’s employees. The judge found these allegations to be unfounded and stated that such grave allegations should not have been made and publicly aired without foundation.

    The judge also criticised the claimant’s solicitors for their approach in making these serious allegations. The judge noted that the claimant’s representatives had failed to provide any specific evidence to support the allegation of fabrication of evidence.

    The judge rejected the claimant’s application to strike out the Amended Defence, finding that the deletions occurred before litigation was reasonably contemplated and were not intended to pervert the course of justice.

    The judge found that the claimant’s evidence was insufficient to support the serious allegations made against the defendant’s employees. The judge noted that the claimant’s representatives had failed to provide any specific evidence to support the allegation of fabrication of evidence and that the deletion of documents did not amount to fabrication.

    Conclusion

    Mrs Justice Steyn DBE refused to strike out the Amended Defence, finding that the deletions occurred before litigation was reasonably contemplated, were not intended to pervert the course of justice, and did not render a fair trial impossible.

     

    If you require expert legal advice on defamation matters, our experienced solicitors are available to assist you. Please contact us on 0151 541 2040 or 0203 846 2862. Alternatively, you may email us at info@carruthers-law.co.uk, visit our contact page, or read more on our main defamation page.

  8. WFZ v The British Broadcasting Corporation EWHC 376 (KB)

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    The case of WFZ v The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) concerned the claimant, WFZ, who sought permanent injunctive relief against the defendant to prevent the publication of a report that would identify him as the subject of active criminal proceedings. The claimant argued that such publication would constitute misuse of private information, contempt of court, and a breach of his Article 6 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to a fair criminal trial.

    The claimant, WFZ, was arrested in 2022 on suspicion of serious sexual offences following allegations made by multiple complainants. While in police custody, he faced further allegations and was subsequently bailed. The police later confirmed they were taking no further action in relation to one of the allegations. The claimant was subsequently interviewed under caution on suspicion of committing a sexual offence against a third complainant.

    Meanwhile, a BBC investigation team had been conducting a news investigation, focusing on allegations of sexual and relationship abuse within the sector in which WFZ worked. The BBC intended to publish a report naming WFZ, which prompted his application for an interim injunction to restrain the publication.

    The use of witness statements for purposes other than those for which they were made is outlined in Civil Procedure Rule 32.12. This rule provides that a witness statement may only be used for the purpose of the proceedings in which it is served, except in certain circumstances. These exceptions include when the witness gives written consent for another use, when the court gives permission for another use, or when the witness statement has been put in evidence at a public hearing.

    In this case, the BBC witness who made the relevant statement (the journalist who investigated the story and prepared the report originally intended for publication) did not consent to the claimant’s proposed use. The statement was put in evidence at the hearing of the claimant’s application for interim relief, but that hearing was not held in public. The statement itself is protected by restrictions on access to it on the court file. Therefore, the claimant applied under CPR 32.12(2)(b) for permission for some other use.

    The Court’s power to give permission is discretionary. The basis on which that discretion should be exercised was a matter of legal dispute between the parties, as was its application to the facts of this case.

    The Application

    The claimant applied for permission to use the witness statement to make representations to the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in connection with the ongoing criminal investigation. The defendant opposed this application, arguing that the witness statement contained journalistic material protected under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and should not be disclosed without a court order.

    The claimant’s primary submissions were presented by the claimant’s counsel, who argued that the claimant had the burden of establishing that permission should be given and that he had to show a good reason to depart from the default rule that a witness statement may be used only for the purpose of the proceedings in which it is served. The claimant’s counsel accepted that there was little direct guidance available from the authorities on the exercise of this discretion and suggested that analogy with the approach adopted to applications for permission to use disclosed documents under CPR 31.22(1)(b) might be appropriate.

    The claimant’s counsel argued that the key consideration in the protection of disclosed material was that the provider had been under compulsion of law to disclose the material in the first place, in order for the litigation to be fair. He contended that this consideration was not relevant in the present case, as the defendant was under no compulsion to provide the witness statement or to include its contents. The claimant’s counsel also argued that the purpose of the witness statement in the litigation was fully discharged, as it was served for the purpose of resisting the interlocutory injunction application and not as advance notice of trial evidence.

    The claimant’s counsel submitted that the only reason the claimant needed permission to make collateral use of the witness statement was that the hearing was held in private. He argued that this was adventitious and that the purpose of the privacy ruling was to protect the claimant’s own interests and enable a fair hearing of the injunction application. The claimant’s counsel contended that the claimant’s interests were stronger than those of the defendant and urged the court to consider the claimant’s Article 10 ECHR rights to impart information and his Article 6 rights to fair criminal proceedings.

    The claimant’s counsel drew attention to the claimant’s solicitor’s evidence that it was necessary to show the witness statement to the police and CPS in order to fully exercise his right to make pre-charge representations. He argued that the claimant’s application was not simply a request for permission for the further use of material lawfully in his hands, but also a request for the exercise of legal compulsion over unpublished journalism.

    The defendant’s counsel argued that the claimant’s application was highly unusual, as it sought to use CPR 32.12(2)(b) to put journalistic material into the hands of the police and CPS, which they would otherwise only be able to obtain through the PACE regime. The defendant contended that the witness statement contained material acquired or created for the purposes of journalism and was therefore protected as “special procedure material” under PACE.

    The defendant’s counsel emphasised that the PACE regime provided a specific legal framework for obtaining journalistic material, which included stringent conditions to protect the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of journalistic sources and material. He argued that allowing the claimant’s application would undermine the protections afforded to journalistic material and set a dangerous precedent for circumventing the PACE regime.

    The defendant also argued that the claimant’s application was premature, as the police and CPS had already indicated their intention to apply for a production order under PACE to obtain the witness statement. The defendant’s counsel contended that the appropriate course of action was for the criminal law enforcement agencies to pursue their application under PACE, rather than for the court to grant the claimant’s application under CPR 32.12(2)(b).

    The defendant’s counsel further argued that the claimant’s application failed to demonstrate a good reason for departing from the default rule that a witness statement may only be used for the purpose of the proceedings in which it is served. He emphasised the importance of protecting journalistic material and the public interest in maintaining the integrity of journalistic investigations.

    Judge’s Decision and Reasoning

    Mrs Justice Collins Rice considered the application and the arguments presented by both parties. She acknowledged the claimant’s right to make representations to the CPS but emphasised the importance of protecting journalistic material. The judge noted that the police and CPS had indicated their intention to apply for a production order under PACE to obtain the witness statement from the defendant. She concluded that it was premature to grant the claimant’s application and that the appropriate course of action was for the criminal law enforcement agencies to pursue their application under PACE.

    The judge highlighted the balance between the claimant’s interests in making representations and the public interest in protecting journalistic material. She emphasised that the criminal investigation should proceed without interference and that the claimant’s opportunity to make representations would arise once the criminal procedure had taken its course.

    Mrs Justice Collins Rice’s reasoning was detailed and multifaceted. She began by considering the nature of the witness statement in question and the collateral purpose for which the claimant wanted to use it. The judge noted that the witness statement was created for the purposes of litigation, specifically for defending an interlocutory application in civil proceedings. However, she acknowledged that the content of the witness statement included material acquired and created for the purposes of journalism.

    The judge recognised that the defendant’s opposition to the claimant’s application was based on the protection of journalistic material. She agreed with the defendant’s characterisation of the content of the witness statement, noting that it contained information about the journalist’s investigative methods, relationship with sources, and editorial analysis. Mrs Justice Collins Rice emphasised that the protection of journalistic material was a matter of public interest and that the police and CPS had indicated their intention to apply for a production order under PACE to obtain the witness statement.

    The judge also considered the claimant’s proposed purpose of making representations to the police and CPS. She acknowledged the claimant’s right to participate fully in making pre-charge representations that might assist him, consistent with the opportunity provided in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. However, she emphasised that the claimant’s application was premature and that the appropriate course of action was for the criminal law enforcement agencies to pursue their application under PACE.

    Mrs Justice Collins Rice concluded that the claimant had not discharged his burden of showing a good reason for the court to make the order he sought. She emphasised that the criminal investigation should proceed without interference and that the claimant’s opportunity to make representations would arise once the criminal procedure had taken its course. The judge highlighted the importance of protecting journalistic material and the public interest in maintaining the integrity of journalistic investigations.

    Conclusion

    The judgment is useful in exploring the circumstances under which a witness statement can be deemed journalistic material, stressing the difference between the civil framework of CPR 32.12 and the criminal framework of PACE. Currently, non-parties need court permission to access witness statements, but this might change with the ongoing consultation to revise CPR Part 5.4C, which could make witness statements accessible to non-parties without requiring court approval.

     

    If you require expert legal advice on defamation matters, our experienced solicitors are available to assist you. Please contact us on 0151 541 2040 or 0203 846 2862. Alternatively, you may email us at info@carruthers-law.co.uk, visit our contact page, or read more on our main defamation page.

  9. Iqbal v GEO TV Ltd [2024] EWCA Civ 1566

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    The case of Iqbal v Geo TV concerned a libel action brought by Salman Iqbal, the founder and president of ARY Digital Network, against Geo TV Limited, a member of the Jang Group. The dispute arose from a political rally held by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) on 19 May 2022 in Sargodha, Pakistan. During the rally, Maryam Nawaz Sharif, a senior figure in the PML-N, made several defamatory statements against Imran Khan, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, and Salman Iqbal. These statements were broadcast live and subsequently reported in multiple news bulletins by Geo TV.

    During the political rally held by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) on 19 May 2022, Maryam Nawaz Sharif made several defamatory statements against Salman Iqbal and Imran Khan. She accused Salman Iqbal, the founder and president of ARY Digital Network, of being a “gold smuggler” and alleged that he had received significant financial benefits from Imran Khan, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan. Specifically, she claimed that Imran Khan had waived 10 to 12 billion rupees of taxes for Iqbal, provided him with 4 billion rupees worth of World Call without due process, and that they were “equal partners in theft.” These statements were broadcast live by Geo TV and subsequently reported in eleven news bulletins, leading to the libel action brought by Salman Iqbal.

    High Court Decision

    In the High Court, Geo TV applied for summary judgment, arguing that the broadcasts were fair and accurate reports of proceedings at a public meeting, thus protected by qualified privilege under Section 15 of the Defamation Act 1996. His Honour Judge Lewis, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, found that the rally was a public meeting and that the broadcasts were fair and accurate reports of the proceedings. However, the judge concluded that there was a realistic prospect of success for Iqbal’s claim on two issues: whether the broadcasts satisfied the requirements of Section 15(3) and whether they were published maliciously. Consequently, the judge dismissed Geo TV’s application for summary judgment.

    Court of Appeal Decision

    Geo TV argued that the broadcasts were fair and accurate reports of a public meeting, thus protected by qualified privilege under Section 15 of the Defamation Act 1996.
    They contended that the rally was a public meeting held for a lawful purpose and discussed matters of public interest.Geo TV maintained that the reports were made without malice and that the allegations made by Maryam Nawaz Sharif were already in the public domain.

    Salman Iqbal argued that the broadcasts were not fair and accurate and that they were made with malice. He contended that the allegations were false and that Geo TV knew or should have known about their falsity. Iqbal also argued that the publication was not for the public benefit and that the broadcasts were intended to damage his reputation.

    The Court of Appeal held that the High Court judge had erred in finding that there was a realistic prospect of success for Iqbal’s claim on the issues of public interest, public benefit, and malice. The Court of Appeal emphasised that the statutory privilege under Section 15 of the Defamation Act 1996 is intended to protect fair and accurate reports of public meetings, and that the broadcasts in question met these criteria. The court also noted that the allegations made by Maryam Nawaz Sharif were matters of public interest and that their publication was for the public benefit. Finally, the court found that there was no evidence to support a claim of malice against Geo TV.

    The Court of Appeal considered whether the case was inherently unsuitable for summary judgment and concluded that it was not inherently complex, obscure, or uncertain. The court referenced Easyair Ltd (t/a Openair) v Opal Telecom Ltd in its reasoning.

    The court followed the approach in McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers Ltd and found that the event had been a public meeting. The court also referenced Cook v Alexander in determining that the live broadcast and later bulletins were fair and accurate reports.

    The court clarified that Section 15(3) raises two different issues: the qualities of the matter and the impact of publication. The court found that the words complained of were plainly of public interest and that the privilege could not be lost by virtue of Section 15(3).

    The court referenced Horrocks v Lowe in its analysis of malice and concluded that the claimant’s pleading of malice contained allegations of careless or irresponsible journalism, which were insufficient to establish a probability of malice. The court also referenced Lillie v Newcastle City Council and Tsikata v Newspaper Publishing Plc in its reasoning.

    Summary of the Final Decision

    The Court of Appeal upheld the efficiency of summary judgment applications, especially in defamation cases where costs can become disproportionate. Geo TV’s Defence on qualified privilege was clear, and there was no need for a trial. The live broadcast and bulletins were fair and accurate reports of a public meeting, and the judge’s refusal to summarily determine the applicability of Section 15(3) was incorrect. The publication was of public interest and for the public benefit, and there was no evidence of malice. The claimant’s allegations of careless journalism were insufficient to establish malice.

    If you require expert legal advice on defamation matters, our experienced solicitors are available to assist you. Please contact us on 0151 541 2040 or 0203 846 2862. Alternatively, you may email us at info@carruthers-law.co.uk, visit our contact page, or read more on our main defamation page.

  10. Schofield v Politicalite Ltd & Anor [2024] EWHC 543 (KB)

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    Simon Schofield, an award-winning theatrical producer, actor, and creative director, brought a claim against Politicalite Limited and its founder, Jordan James Kendall. Schofield is well-known for his roles in various West End productions and for founding The 2 Faces Theatre CIC and Sisco Entertainment Ltd. The defendants published an article on their website, Politicalite, alleging that Schofield was involved in grooming children and young people. These allegations were untrue and seriously defamatory.

    The article, published on 24 September 2022, was shared multiple times on social media. Despite attempts by Schofield’s solicitors to resolve the matter amicably, the defendants refused to retract the article and continued to publish it, leading to significant distress and reputational damage for Schofield.

    The defendants’ failed to engage. They did not appear or provide any defence at any stage of the proceedings. Despite being notified of the remedies hearing and informed that the court would likely proceed in their absence if they failed to attend, the defendants did not attend the hearing and were not represented.

    The claimant first complained to the defendants about the article in a letter from his solicitors sent on 8 June 2023. The defendants responded dismissively and abusively, refusing to take the article down and belittling the claimant’s concerns. The defendants’ failure to engage continued throughout the legal process. On 21 August 2023, the deadline for the defendants to file an acknowledgment of service or defence passed without them filing any acknowledgment or defence. On 6 September 2023, the claimant applied for default judgment. On 29 November 2023, Nicklin J granted the claimant judgment in default and gave directions for the remedies hearing.

    The claimant sought remedies for libel, malicious falsehood, and misuse of private information. The article in question was published on 24 September 2022 and was shared multiple times on social media. Despite attempts by Schofield’s solicitors to resolve the matter amicably, the defendants refused to retract the article and continued to publish it, leading to significant distress and reputational damage for Schofield.

    The legal principles applicable in this case include the Defamation Act 2013, which governs claims for libel and malicious falsehood. The court must assess damages based on the claimant’s unchallenged particulars of claim, including the gravity of the defamation, the extent of its publication, and the injury to the claimant’s feelings and reputation. Additionally, the principles for assessing damages in misuse of private information were considered, focusing on the distress and loss of dignity caused by the wrongful disclosure.

    Judge’s Reasoning

    Gravity of the Defamation:

    The judge emphasised the seriousness of the defamatory allegations, which imputed that the claimant was guilty of complicity in child grooming and had actively used his position to manipulate, exploit, or abuse children and young people. This was considered inherently very serious and at the upper end of the scale of gravity. The judge noted that the allegations struck at the claimant’s reputation generally as well as his professional reputation and standing within the theatre and entertainment industry. The defamatory nature of the allegations was compounded by the fact that they were published on a popular and influential online news platform, which increased their potential to cause harm.

    Extent of Publication:

    The judge considered the extent of publication, including the number of shares and views on social media, and the visibility of the article on the defendants’ website. The primary readership of the article was estimated to be in the region of 20,000-30,000 readers, with a significant percolation effect through the internet. The judge also took into account the fact that the article was shared multiple times on social media, which further amplified its reach and impact. The widespread dissemination of the defamatory allegations contributed to the serious harm caused to the claimant’s reputation. The article was shared from the website 4,300 times, and the defendants’ Twitter account, which had about 18,300 followers, shared the article on at least three separate occasions. The first tweet sharing the article had been commented on 9 times, retweeted 60 times, and liked 96 times. The second tweet had been commented on 6 times, retweeted 31 times, liked 51 times, and had an impression status of 6,251. The third tweet had been viewed 2,528 times, retweeted twice, and liked 11 times.

    Evidence of Harm:

    The claimant provided compelling evidence of the distress and financial losses suffered as a result of the publication. The judge noted the severe degree of distress caused to the claimant, the impact on his family and friends, and the damage to his business relationships. The claimant’s evidence included details of the financial losses incurred as a result of the defamatory publication, such as the loss of funding from Live Nation and the cancellation of a production booked with Celebrity Cruises. The judge also considered the claimant’s testimony about the emotional toll of the defamatory allegations, including the impact on his mental health and personal relationships. The claimant described the severe distress caused by the allegations, which led him to seek professional help from a therapist. He also mentioned the impact on his business relationships, including the loss of financial backing from Live Nation for “The Barricade Boys,” estimated at £55,000, and the loss of a contract with Celebrity Cruises worth $4,000.

    Aggravating Factors:

    The judge highlighted the aggravating conduct of the defendants, including their failure to contact the claimant prior to publication, their abusive responses to pre-action correspondence, and their threats to republish the article. This conduct exacerbated the claimant’s distress and fear of a resurgence of the allegations. The judge found that the defendants’ behaviour demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth and a malicious intent to harm the claimant’s reputation. The defendants’ refusal to engage with the legal process and their repeated publication of the defamatory allegations further aggravated the harm caused to the claimant.

    Assessment of Damages:

    The judge awarded the claimant £90,000 in damages to compensate for the injury to reputation, feelings, and to ensure adequate vindication. The award was based on the gravity of the defamatory allegations, the extent of publication, the evidence of harm, and the aggravating conduct of the defendants. The judge emphasised that the damages were intended to provide a measure of vindication for the claimant and to compensate for the distress and humiliation caused by the defamatory publication. The award was also intended to serve as a deterrent to the defendants and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future.

    Injunction:

    The judge granted an injunction to prevent further publication of the defamatory article, considering the real prospect that the defendants would republish the allegations. The injunction was deemed necessary and proportionate to protect the claimant’s reputation. The judge noted that the defendants had already republished the article once in response to the service of the claim and had threatened to do so again. The injunction was therefore necessary to prevent further harm to the claimant’s reputation and to ensure that the defamatory allegations were not disseminated further.

    Publication of a Summary of the Judgment:

    The judge ordered the defendants to publish a summary of the judgment on their website and social media, to assist the claimant in repairing the damage to his reputation and obtaining vindication. The judge found that the publication of a summary of the judgment was a proportionate and necessary measure to ensure that the claimant’s reputation was restored and that the defamatory allegations were publicly refuted. The summary was intended to reach the same audience that had been exposed to the defamatory publication and to provide a clear and unequivocal statement of the court’s findings.

    Costs:

    The judge awarded the claimant’s costs, summarily assessed at £35,000, to be paid by the defendants. The judge found that the claimant was entitled to recover his legal costs as the successful party in the litigation. The costs were assessed on a summary basis to ensure that they were reasonable and proportionate. The judge also noted that the defendants’ conduct in failing to engage with the legal process and their abusive responses to pre-action correspondence had contributed to the costs incurred by the claimant.

    If you require expert legal advice on defamation matters, our experienced solicitors are available to assist you. Please contact us on 0151 541 2040 or 0203 846 2862. Alternatively, you may email us at info@carruthers-law.co.uk, visit our contact page, or read more on our main defamation page.

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