Lukins and another v Quality Part X Ltd and another [2026] EWHC 301 (KB)

March 19, 2026

Claim held time barred after solicitors failed to use CE-File

Introduction

In Lukins and another v Quality Part X Ltd and another [2026] EWHC 301 (KB), Deputy Master Lorna Skinner KC considered whether claims in negligence and nuisance had been brought within the six-year limitation period where the claimants’ solicitors sent paper claim forms to the King’s Bench Division by post rather than using the mandatory CE-File system. The claim arose out of fire damage to the claimants’ business and personal possessions, and the defendants sought summary judgment on the basis that the proceedings were time barred.

The central issue was whether the claims had been brought when the paper claim forms were received by the court before expiry of the limitation period, or only when proceedings were later issued electronically after expiry. The court held that the claims were time barred. It further held that CPR 3.10 could not cure the failure because no extant proceedings existed at the time of the procedural default.

Background

The proceedings were issued on 9 April 2024. The claimants advanced claims in negligence and nuisance in respect of damage caused by a fire which broke out on or about 6 April 2018 at premises in Wembley Commercial Centre. The fire spread and destroyed the contents of Unit 2E, including business and personal possessions of the first claimant and personal possessions of the second claimant.

The first defendant was, at the material time, the occupier of Unit GD, which was alleged to have been the seat of the fire. The second defendant was the landlord of Units GD and 2E.

By special delivery letter dated 25 March 2024, the claimants’ solicitors sent five copies of the claim form to the King’s Bench Division at the Royal Courts of Justice and asked the court to deduct the issue fee from their PBA account. The letter was received and signed for on 26 March 2024.

By letter dated 28 March 2024, the court returned the claim forms. The stated reason was that, since 1 July 2019, it had been mandatory for legally represented parties to use the Electronic Working service in the Central Office of the King’s Bench Division, with the result that documents sent by post, DX, fax or email would not be accepted. For reasons unknown, that letter was not received by the claimants’ solicitors until 9 April 2024. On that day, proceedings were issued through CE-File.

The defendants each applied for summary judgment under CPR Part 24 on the footing that the claims were statute barred under section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980. The claimants argued that the claims had been brought when the court physically received the paper claim forms on 26 March 2024. In the alternative, they relied on CPR 3.10.

Legal Framework

The court began with the summary judgment test in CPR 24.3 and the well-known principles stated by Lewison J in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch), approved by the Court of Appeal in AC Ward & Son Ltd v Catlin (Five) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1098; [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 301. The court observed that the present case was a short point of law or construction, with no dispute as to the relevant facts.

Section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980 provides that an action founded on tort shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. It was common ground that the relevant limitation period expired on 6 April 2024. The judgment records that the Act contains no discretion to disapply that six-year period.

CPR 7.2 provides that proceedings are started when the court issues a claim form at the request of the claimant, and that the claim form is issued on the date entered on the form by the court. The claimants relied in particular on paragraph 6.1 of Practice Direction 7A, which provides that where the claim form as issued was received in the court office on a date earlier than the date on which it was issued, the claim is brought for limitation purposes on that earlier date.

The court emphasised, however, that the question of when an action is brought for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 is ultimately one of construction of the statute. In that regard the court referred to Page v Hewetts Solicitors [2012] EWCA Civ 805, where Lewison LJ explained that the CPR and any practice direction may inform that question, but do not determine it.

The court also considered CPR 7.12 and CPR 51.2, under which practice directions may permit or require electronic issue and may modify or disapply ordinary rules during pilot schemes. At the material time, Practice Direction 51O governed the Electronic Working pilot scheme. It provided that, in the Central Office of the King’s Bench Division, from 1 July 2019, a legally represented party had to use Electronic Working to start or continue any relevant claims or applications. It also prescribed the steps required to file a document electronically, including use of the Electronic Working website and payment of the appropriate fee.

The judgment reviewed the principal authorities on when proceedings are brought for limitation purposes, namely Barnes v St Helens MBC (Practice Note) [2007] 1 WLR 879, Page v Hewetts Solicitors [2012] EWCA Civ 805, Butters v Hayes [2021] 1 WLR 2886, Chelfat v Hutchison 3G UK Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 455; [2022] 1 WLR 3613, and Guo v Kinder [2024] EWCA Civ 762. Those authorities show that a claimant is not penalised for shortcomings of the court where the claimant has done all that is required or all that could reasonably be expected to commence proceedings in time. Conversely, actual delivery to the correct court office must be by a means permitted by the rules.

As to CPR 3.10, the court recorded the defendants’ reliance on Peterson v Howard de Walden Estates Ltd [2023] 1 WLR 3057 and Nathadwarawala v General Medical Council [2025] EWHC 459 (Admin), both of which treated CPR 3.10 as concerned with errors arising after proceedings have already been commenced.

The Court’s Reasoning

The court accepted the defendants’ submissions. It held that the authorities establish a clear requirement that, in a case of this kind, a claimant must show that he has done at least all that could reasonably be expected of him in order to ensure that proceedings are issued within time.

The court held that what is reasonable depends on the relevant circumstances, including the requirements imposed by the rules and practice directions, whether the claimant is legally represented, and the content and timing of any communication with the court concerning issue.

On the facts of this case, the court concluded that the claimants had not satisfied that standard. For legally represented parties, Practice Direction 51O had required electronic issue in the Central Office of the King’s Bench Division for more than five years. The claimants’ solicitors should have been familiar with that requirement. By sending the claim forms by post, they had not done all that could reasonably be expected to ensure that the claims were issued within time.

The court rejected the claimants’ submission that the court office should nonetheless have issued the claims because the claim forms were in proper form and fee information had been supplied. It held that the authorities relied upon by the claimants had to be understood by reference both to their own facts and to the procedural regimes then in force. The analogy with Karen Lawrence and Cala Homes was not accepted as determinative. In neither of those cases had the claim forms been returned or rejected, and the court considered that Karen Lawrence had proceeded without reference to the full Court of Appeal line of authority considered in the present case.

The court also rejected the argument that the court office should have informed the claimants’ solicitors of their error in some more effective way or should itself have scanned the documents into PDF format. The court had in fact informed the solicitors promptly that paper filing was not acceptable. The provisions of Practice Direction 51O dealing with proceedings continued using Electronic Working did not assist because they implicitly contemplated proceedings already validly commenced outside Electronic Working.

Nor did the comparison with litigants in person assist. The court held that the position of a litigant in person was materially different because a litigant in person was expressly permitted by the rules to issue by post. A legally represented party, by contrast, was subject to a mandatory requirement to use Electronic Working. The same physical act could therefore have different legal consequences.

As to CPR 3.10, the court held that it could provide no remedy. It reasoned that CPR 3.10 can only operate where proceedings are already extant at the time of the procedural error. Here there were no extant proceedings when the claimants failed to comply with the mandatory method of commencement. In any event, a rule of court could not override the statutory prohibition in primary legislation against bringing a tort claim after expiry of the limitation period.

The court therefore concluded that the claims had not been brought in time and were statute barred.

Decision and Outcome

The court held that the claimants’ negligence and nuisance claims were time barred. It concluded that the claimants had no real prospect of succeeding and that there was no other compelling reason for the claims to proceed to trial.

Summary judgment was accordingly entered for both defendants.

The judgment, as provided, does not set out any separate costs order beyond recording the applications and the entry of summary judgment.

Conclusion

The decision is a strict but orthodox application of the authorities on when proceedings are brought for limitation purposes. It confirms that the protection afforded to claimants where delay is attributable to the court does not extend to cases in which the claimant, or the claimant’s solicitors, has failed to use a method of commencement required by the rules.

For practitioners, the point is straightforward and important. Where Electronic Working is mandatory, a represented party cannot rely on the physical receipt of paper claim forms by the court office to stop time running. For clients, the case underlines the practical significance of limitation compliance and the serious consequences that may follow from procedural error at the point of issue.

Further Reading

• Professional Negligence Solicitors Expert Claims Advice
• Solicitor Negligence Claims
• Limitation Periods in Professional Negligence
• Loss of the Ability to Bring Litigation
• Key Solicitor Negligence Cases