Valery Siniakovich v (1) Nivin Hassan Hassan-Soudey (aka Sarah Hamilton) (2) Glass Door Homeless Charity (3) Matthew Falk [2026] EWCA Civ 215

March 19, 2026

Court of Appeal Clarifies That Underpayment of the Issue Fee Does Not Prevent an Action Being Brought in Time

Introduction

In Valery Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey and others [2026] EWCA Civ 215, the Court of Appeal considered whether an action for defamation and malicious falsehood had been brought within the one year limitation period where the claimant’s solicitors delivered the claim form to the court in time, but underpaid the court fee because the particulars included claims for non-monetary relief. The appeal arose from an order which purported to treat the claim as having been issued, and brought, on an earlier date.

The Court of Appeal held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to backdate either the date of issue or the date on which the action was brought. However, it also held that the claimant’s action for defamation and malicious falsehood had in fact been brought in time when the claim form was first delivered to the court office on 27 March 2025. In doing so, the Court resolved an important point on the interaction between limitation and underpayment of court fees.

The decision is of practical importance in media and communications litigation, where the one year limitation period is short and where claimants often issue close to the deadline. It also contains a clear warning against misguided procedural applications which are unnecessary and unsupported by jurisdiction.

Background

The respondent claimant had brought proceedings against three defendants for, among other matters, defamation and malicious falsehood. The second and third defendants appealed against an order made by a Deputy High Court Judge on 23 May 2025, following a hearing on 21 May 2025, which purported to grant relief treating the claim as having been issued on 27 March 2025 and deeming the claim to have been brought on that date.

The publications relied upon were said to have been made on 28 March 2024 and 5 April 2024. For malicious falsehood, the limitation period therefore expired on the first anniversary of the relevant publication, with the latest date being 5 April 2025. For defamation, because of the single publication rule in section 8(3) of the Defamation Act 2013, the cause of action was treated as accruing on 28 March 2024, so the one year limitation period expired on 28 March 2025.

The claim form stated that the claimant brought an action for defamation, malicious falsehood and other causes of action, and valued the claim at £370,000 plus costs. On its face, it sought damages. However, the particulars of claim, which were filed with the claim form, also sought a final injunction, a retraction and apology, and a compliance order under section 167(2)(b) of the Data Protection Act 2018.

The claimant’s solicitor paid a fee of £10,000, calculated solely by reference to the money claim. She then attempted to file the claim form and particulars by CE-File on 27 March 2025, the day before expiry of the defamation limitation period. On 7 April 2025 the court office rejected the filing on the basis that the correct fee had not been paid because the claim included non-monetary relief, attracting an additional fee. The solicitor immediately paid the further fee and re-submitted the documents, and also applied for relief seeking to treat the claim as having been issued on 27 March 2025, or otherwise to permit retrospective issue.

The claim form was sealed and issued on 8 April 2025. The court later directed that the applications should be heard inter partes. The first defendant was not properly notified of the hearing, and later appealed on that basis. At the hearing below, the judge accepted the claimant’s case that the claim could properly be considered to have been brought on 27 March 2025, and made the order now under appeal.

Legal Framework

The court considered section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980, which provides that no action for libel, slander or malicious falsehood shall be brought after the expiration of one year from the date on which the cause of action accrued. It also considered section 8(3) of the Defamation Act 2013, which applies the single publication rule in defamation claims.

The Court of Appeal reviewed CPR Part 7 and the associated practice directions. CPR 7.2 provides that proceedings are started when the court issues a claim form at the request of the claimant, and that a claim form is issued on the date entered on the form by the court. However, PD 7A states that where a claim form as issued was received in the court office on an earlier date, the claim is brought for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 on that earlier date.

The court also examined CPR 16.2, which requires the claim form to specify the remedy sought, and PD 51O, which then governed CE-File. Under PD 51O, electronic filing required the party to upload the document and pay the appropriate fee. Where a submission failed acceptance, notice was to be given and, if it concerned a claim form, it was deemed not to have been issued.

As to fees, the Civil Proceedings Fees Order 2008 required a fee of £10,000 on starting High Court proceedings to recover a sum exceeding £200,000 or an unlimited sum, and a further fee on starting proceedings for any other remedy. Where a money claim was additional to a non-money claim, both fees were payable.

The court also considered a substantial body of authority on when an action is “brought” for limitation purposes, including Barnes v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1372, Page v Hewetts Solicitors [2012] EWCA Civ 805, Hayes v Butters [2021] EWCA Civ 252, Chelfat v Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 455, and a series of first instance authorities dealing with underpayment of court fees.

The Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeal addressed first the validity of the order below. It held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to backdate the date on which a claim form is issued. Nor did it have jurisdiction to change the date on which an action is brought. Those are not matters of case management. They depend on the true legal position. CPR 3.10 could not remedy the failure to pay the correct fee, and CPR 3.9 was irrelevant because there was no sanction from which relief was sought.

The court also held that the judge below was wrong to conclude that the correct fee had been paid. The particulars of claim had been filed with the claim form and were intended to be read with it. They sought non-monetary relief, including a final injunction and a compliance order. The court office was therefore correct to require an additional fee. The judge’s findings that the particulars were inaccurate, or that the inclusion of injunctive relief was not intended, had no proper evidential basis.

The central issue, however, was whether underpayment of the fee meant that the action had not been brought for limitation purposes when the claim form was received by the court office. On that point, the Court of Appeal held that it did not.

Lady Justice Andrews returned to first principles. The question of when an action is “brought” is a matter of statutory interpretation, not case management, and not a question that can sensibly turn on the solicitor’s state of mind, whether the mistake was innocent or deliberate, or how quickly the court office spotted the shortfall. The court emphasised the need for a bright line and for legal certainty.

The court accepted that the fee had been underpaid, and that the court office was entitled to reject the filing and require re-submission before issue. But that did not answer the limitation question. The claimant had delivered to the court office, within time, a claim form identifying the parties, the causes of action, and a claim for damages. That was sufficient to bring an action for defamation and malicious falsehood to the attention of the court. Payment of the court fee was an administrative act. It did not affect the substance of the claim.

The court rejected the proposition that an action is only brought in time if the appropriate fee accompanies the claim form. It held that the earlier authorities of Barnes and Page were not authority for such a rule. To the extent that Page (No 2) had held otherwise, it was wrongly decided. The court considered that a contrary rule would generate arbitrary results, because claimants making the same error would face different outcomes depending solely on the speed of the court’s administrative processes.

An action is brought when the claim form is first delivered to the court office, even if the office legitimately refuses to issue it (or, if filed electronically, it fails Acceptance) because the whole of the appropriate fee has not been paid.

The court also rejected the distinction drawn in some earlier cases between situations where the shortfall is discovered before issue and those where it is discovered only afterwards. An action cannot sensibly be “brought” at one time if the error is spotted, and at another if it is overlooked. The date on which the action is brought must be the same in both scenarios.

On the separate issue of fee calculation, the court held that where particulars of claim are filed with the claim form and intended to be read with it, they may properly be taken into account in assessing the fee payable on issue. Here, because the particulars claimed non-monetary relief, there was indeed a shortfall.

Decision and Outcome

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals. It held that the first defendant had been subjected to significant procedural unfairness because she had not been properly notified of the hearing below. It also held that the second and third defendants’ grounds of appeal were well-founded.

Paragraph 4 of the order below, which purported to grant relief treating the claim as having been issued on 27 March 2025, was made without jurisdiction and was set aside. Paragraph 5, which deemed the claim to have been brought on that date, was also set aside.

However, the court further held that the claimant’s action for defamation and malicious falsehood had in fact been brought on 27 March 2025, when the claim form was first delivered to the court office. The claims were therefore not time-barred.

The court declined to grant a declaration, considering that unnecessary in light of its reasoning and conclusions.

Conclusion

The decision provides authoritative appellate confirmation that underpayment of the court fee does not, without more, prevent an action from being brought for limitation purposes when the claim form is delivered to the court office in time. That is an important clarification, particularly in defamation and malicious falsehood litigation, where the limitation period is short and procedural mistakes can have acute consequences.

At the same time, the judgment does not soften the court’s approach to procedural competence. The solicitor’s errors were repeatedly criticised, the application for backdating was described as wholly unnecessary, and the order obtained below was beyond the court’s powers. The case therefore stands both as a limitation authority of general significance and as a reminder that defective procedural applications can create avoidable cost and complication even where the underlying claim survives.

Further Reading

• Defamation Solicitors (Libel and Slander)
• Solicitor Negligence Claims
• Professional Negligence Claims

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