R (Duke of Sussex) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 548
RAVEC’s Risk Analysis Policy vs Prince Harry’s Security Decision: What Happened and Why it Was Lawful
What Is Judicial Review?
Judicial review is the process by which the courts examine the lawfulness of decisions or actions taken by public bodies. It ensures that such bodies act within the limits of their legal powers, follow fair procedures, and make decisions that are not irrational or perverse. Judicial review does not enable the court to re-make the decision; rather, it examines how the decision was made.
Applications for judicial review must be brought promptly and, in any event, within three months of the date of the decision under challenge. This strict time limit reflects the need for legal certainty and the public interest in the timely resolution of disputes concerning public administration.
In this case, the Duke of Sussex challenged decisions of the Executive Committee for the Protection of Royalty and Public Figures (RAVEC), alleging that they were procedurally unlawful and irrational under public law principles.
Background: RAVEC, the Risk Management Board, and the 2017 Terms of Reference
The Executive Committee for the Protection of Royalty and Public Figures (known as RAVEC) is the body responsible for deciding which members of the Royal Family and other public figures receive official protective security. Under its published Terms of Reference 2017, RAVEC’s decisions are meant to be informed by a specialist sub-committee called the Risk Management Board (RMB). In particular, the Terms of Reference provided that RAVEC would “evaluate the risk analysis conducted by the Risk Management Board in order to determine which individuals … should receive” protective security measures. In short, RAVEC’s risk evaluation is ordinarily based on the RMB’s risk assessments, albeit tempered by policy judgments such as the Government’s risk appetite. This framework made an RMB assessment a standard, expected part of RAVEC’s decision-making process for protectee security.
By design, the RMB comprises security experts (including senior police and security service officials) who conduct threat and risk assessments for individuals. RAVEC then uses those assessments to decide what level of security (if any) is justified. Nothing in the 2017 Terms of Reference suggested that this process was optional, and indeed it appeared mandatory that an RMB analysis precede RAVEC’s security decision. This policy served to ensure that decisions about royal and VIP protection were based on up-to-date expert risk evaluations, rather than ad hoc judgment.
Prince Harry’s Security Review and Departure from the Policy
In early 2020, Prince Harry, the Duke of Sussex, announced he would be stepping back from official royal duties and would spend much of his time outside the UK. This prompted RAVEC to review his protective security arrangements, which had hitherto been publicly funded due to his status as a senior working Royal. On 28 February 2020, following discussions among RAVEC members and officials, RAVEC decided that the automatic provision of police personal protection for Prince Harry and his wife in the UK would be withdrawn as of 31 March 2020 (when the Prince’s transition out of royal duties took effect). Instead of guaranteed year-round police protection, any security support for the Duke in the UK would henceforth be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Crucially, RAVEC made this decision without commissioning a fresh risk analysis from the RMB, even though the 2017 Terms of Reference would normally require an RMB assessment to inform such a decision. In fact, no RMB risk assessment was obtained for Prince Harry immediately before the February 2020 decision, or at any time thereafter. This was an acknowledged departure from RAVEC’s usual policy and process, a point that later became the centre of legal challenge. Prince Harry’s camp argued that if RAVEC had followed its own rules (by convening the RMB to reassess the threat and risk to him), the outcome might have been different. From their perspective, failing to run the case through the RMB meant RAVEC “misapplied its policy”, potentially treating him unfairly compared to others who did receive full, policy-compliant assessments.
RAVEC’s Rationale: Why No New Risk Analysis Was Commissioned
Why did RAVEC not seek a new RMB risk analysis in Prince Harry’s case? The internal reasoning at the time, later evidenced through witness statements by Sir Richard Mottram (then RAVEC Chair) and contemporaneous emails, was that a formal RMB process was deemed unnecessary and not suited to the unprecedented situation. Sir Richard Mottram testified that the previous RMB assessment on the Prince (conducted in April 2019, when he was still a full-time working royal) had been “overtaken by events.” By early 2020, Harry’s role had fundamentally changed. He was stepping away from official duties and relocating abroad, so the methodology and assumptions of a typical RMB review no longer fit his circumstances.
Instead, Sir Richard adopted what he described as a more “flexible and tailored approach” to match the Prince’s revised circumstances. In practice, this meant deciding Harry’s security arrangements via bespoke decision-making by RAVEC itself, rather than through the routine annual RMB cycle. An email exchange on 26–27 February 2020 between Sir Richard and the Home Office official who chaired the RMB at that time illuminates this reasoning. The RMB Chair emailed Sir Richard to confirm his understanding that “there would not be a further/final RMB” for the Duke of Sussex on the grounds that it was “no longer required given alternative governance arrangements” were being put in place. Sir Richard replied that this understanding was “correct.” In other words, RAVEC deliberately chose to forgo a new RMB risk assessment because it planned an alternative arrangement for handling the Duke’s security going forward.
Those “alternative governance arrangements” referred to an ad hoc, case-by-case process to manage the Sussexes’ security needs. Since Prince Harry would be primarily based overseas (initially Canada, then the United States) and only occasionally in the UK, RAVEC’s view was that risk could be managed through periodic threat updates and specific security measures for visits, rather than a standing protection detail. Sir Richard’s evidence was that by late February 2020 it was already clear to him, based on intelligence briefings he had received, that the Prince faced certain threat levels (details are classified) justifying inclusion in RAVEC’s “protected” cohort, but that the manner of protection needed to change given the change in status. RAVEC had in fact obtained other up-to-date threat assessments on Prince Harry in February 2020 outside the RMB framework (for example, assessments on 14 and 19 February addressing specific threat vectors). Sir Richard considered that he had sufficient expert input on the threats. What remained was a policy decision about who should pay for security and how it should be provided, and that fell squarely to RAVEC’s judgment.
Moreover, Sir Richard believed that RAVEC’s ultimate decision was actually more favourable to Prince Harry than the likely outcome of a by-the-book process. He noted that had the matter simply followed the standard framework, once Harry ceased to be a working royal and was mostly abroad, the “Royal and VIP” risk assessment machinery might well have recommended no ongoing UK police protection at all (especially for time spent outside the UK). RAVEC’s chosen approach instead kept the door open for police protection when necessary, through an “exceptional” or bespoke arrangement for the Duke’s visits to Britain. In short, RAVEC felt it had good cause to depart from its normal policy: the situation was unique, the existing risk assessment model didn’t readily apply, and the committee’s tailored solution would adequately address the Prince’s security while adapting to his new status.
The Legal Challenge: Was Departing from the Policy Lawful?
Prince Harry challenged RAVEC’s decision by way of judicial review, arguing that the Committee’s failure to follow its own published Terms of Reference (specifically, the omission of a fresh RMB risk analysis) was unlawful. This challenge raised a fundamental public law issue: to what extent must a public body adhere to its stated policies, and in what circumstances can it lawfully deviate?
In public law, there is a well-established principle that policies and guidance should be followed unless there is a good reason to depart. This was succinctly expressed by Laws LJ in (R (Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363)), who said that “Where a public authority has issued a promise or adopted a practice which represents how it proposes to act in a given area, the law will require the promise or practice to be honoured unless there is good reason not to do so.” The Supreme Court has endorsed this principle: in Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 59, for example, the Court affirmed that consistent application of policies is a requirement of good administration. In practical terms, this means an individual can expect a public authority to apply its published policy fairly and equally, and if the authority deviates, it should be prepared to justify why. Prince Harry’s argument was essentially that RAVEC had no compelling reason to ignore the 2017 Terms of Reference in his case, and by doing so, it treated him differently (and less favourably) than others who would ordinarily receive a full RMB risk assessment.
His legal team also pointed to cases like (R (Munjaz) v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 58to argue that even if a policy isn’t strictly legally binding, decision-makers must have “cogent reasons” for departing from it. In Munjaz, concerning deviation from a mental health code of practice, the House of Lords stressed that those who choose not to follow an established policy or guidance “must give cogent reasons … spelled out clearly, logically and convincingly”. In other words, policy departures cannot be taken lightly. The greater the departure, “the more compelling must the reasons” be, as one High Court judge put it in another case. Applying that principle, Prince Harry contended that RAVEC had offered no adequate explanation at the time for bypassing the RMB stage, which, in his view, violated the Nadarajah/Mandalia duty of consistency and fairness.
RAVEC’s Defence: Context, Expertise and a “Good Reason” for Departure
The Home Office (as the defendant, being the department accountable for RAVEC’s decisions) accepted that RAVEC did depart from the literal terms of its 2017 policy. However, it argued that this departure was justified by a “good reason”, given the exceptional context. A key plank of the defence was the national security and public safety context of RAVEC’s role. Decisions about personal protection for public figures are not routine administrative choices; they involve assessments of threat, risk, and the allocation of finite security resources – all matters calling for expert judgment. The courts have consistently held that in areas touching on national security or protection from hostile threats, courts should be slow to second-guess the specialist decision-maker’s assessment.
The case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman (Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47) (House of Lords, 2001) is often cited on this point. Lord Hoffmann in Rehman explained that what national security requires in any given situation is not a question of legal entitlement but a matter of judgment and policy for the executive. The courts recognise their own institutional limitations in such matters: a judge is not in the same position as security experts to evaluate threats or the efficacy of protective measures. This principle was reaffirmed by the UK Supreme Court in Begum (R (Begum) v Special Immigration Appeals Commission [2021] UKSC 7) (2021) (the Shamima Begum case), where Lord Reed cautioned that courts must not substitute their own assessment for that of the Secretary of State on questions of national security risk.
Although RAVEC’s decision about Prince Harry’s security was not a classic “national security” decision like deporting a terror suspect, it did involve similar considerations of personal safety, threat mitigation, and public policy prioritisation. The Home Office argued – and the court ultimately agreed – that this context matters when assessing whether a policy needed to be strictly followed. In particular, the fact that RAVEC’s decision-making is an exercise of the Royal Prerogative (executive power) in policing and security, rather than a decision under a statute, frames how rigidly its Terms of Reference should be applied.
The defence emphasised Sir Richard Mottram’s expertise and long experience in security matters. As RAVEC Chair, he had to weigh up the intelligence and the practical arrangements, and his judgment was that convening the RMB (which would essentially convene a multi-agency panel) would not yield any better information than he already had, and would not alter the necessity of a policy decision about the Sussexes’ changed status. Sir Richard’s prompt solution, the bespoke, case-by-case security arrangement, was presented as a reasonable and proportionate way of dealing with an unprecedented situation, not a capricious flouting of the rules.
In legal terms, the Home Office contended that RAVEC did have “good reason” to depart from the Terms of Reference in this instance. They also argued that the court’s role was limited to assessing the rationality of that departure. In other words, provided RAVEC’s decision to skip a new RMB review was not Wednesbury unreasonable (irrational in the public law sense), it should stand. This raised an interesting point of law: some case law suggested that if a policy is justiciable (capable of being enforced via judicial review), the court might insist on a demonstrably cogent reason (the Nadarajah/Munjaz standard), which is a somewhat stricter scrutiny than bare-bones rationality. The Home Office, however, maintained that because of the security context, the court should defer to RAVEC’s specialist judgment and not treat the Terms of Reference as an inflexible rulebook. They noted that not all policies are equal; truly internal or general guidance might not be enforceable at all by the courts, and while RAVEC’s policy did have external effect, it was still part of a scheme that relied on expert discretion at its core.
The High Court’s Decision: A Flexible Application of the Policy
Mr Justice (Sir Peter) Lane heard the case at first instance (High Court). In a detailed judgment, he agreed that the relevant RAVEC policy was justiciable – i.e. Prince Harry could legitimately challenge its non-application – because the Terms of Reference were outward-facing in the sense of affecting individuals like the Duke. This was in contrast to purely internal policies that courts sometimes refuse to enforce. However, he also agreed with the Home Office that the policy could not be treated as a “hard-edged” or absolute rule in this context. The judge noted two key factors that informed this view:
Subject Matter & Expertise:
The policy concerned personal protective security, a domain requiring evaluative judgments by experts. The court had to keep in mind “the expertise and the constitutional responsibilities of the decision-makers” when interpreting what the policy demanded and whether a departure was justified. That is, the Terms of Reference had to be read in a sensible, purposive way, not mechanically. It would be wrong to assume the policy-makers intended to tie RAVEC’s hands even when doing so would not make sense in light of expert input or evolving threats. The judge cited the Supreme Court’s observation that policies are not law, and do not create legal rights as such – they should guide but not straitjacket decision-makers, especially specialists.
Mr Justice (Sir Peter) Lane heard the case at first instance (High Court). In a detailed judgment, he agreed that the relevant RAVEC policy was justiciable – i.e. Prince Harry could legitimately challenge its non-application – because the Terms of Reference were outward-facing in the sense of affecting individuals like the Duke. This was in contrast to purely internal policies that courts sometimes refuse to enforce. However, he also agreed with the Home Office that the policy could not be treated as a “hard-edged” or absolute rule in this context. The judge noted two key factors that informed this view:
Nature of the Decision & Discretion:
Sir Peter Lane characterised the challenge as coming “close to a complaint about the adequacy of investigation or inquiry”. In administrative law, such a complaint (for example, that an authority failed to take a particular step in its fact-gathering process) is usually judged by a Tameside (Secretary of State for Education and Science v Metropolitan Borough of Tameside [1977] AC 1014) duty: essentially, was it irrational not to make that inquiry? Here, not obtaining an RMB risk analysis was akin to not making one particular kind of inquiry. The judge held that it needed to be evaluated through the lens of reasonableness, not simply by checking against a checklist in the Terms of Reference. He pointed out that requiring an RMB assessment “at face value” would be a mechanistic and overly literal approach to the policy.
Applying these considerations, the High Court found that RAVEC had demonstrated a “good reason” for departing from the normal policy in Prince Harry’s case. In the judgment, Sir Peter Lane devoted a section to analysing the evidence for why no RMB was done, citing the February 2020 email exchange and Sir Richard’s witness statements at length. He concluded that RAVEC’s bespoke arrangement was indeed the kind of cogent justification that the law requires when an authority deviates from its usual practice. The judge noted that by the time of the decision letter, “in the opinion of the relevant experts,” a formal RMB process was considered unnecessary. This satisfied him that the Nadarajah principle’s threshold was met: the departure wasn’t arbitrary or unexplained, but rather rooted in a logical assessment of Prince Harry’s changed position and the security framework being put in place.
Importantly, Mr Justice Lane also emphasised judicial restraint given the context. He invoked the principle (drawn from cases like Hopkins Homes (Hopkins Homes Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2017] UKSC 37) in the Supreme Court) that courts should respect the specialist judgment of decision-makers on matters within their expertise. Here, that meant crediting Sir Richard Mottram’s judgment about what the RMB could or could not usefully add. The judge rejected what he saw as Prince Harry’s “mechanistic” interpretation of the Terms of Reference, i.e. the idea that RAVEC must tick the RMB box in every case come what may. Policies must be applied with a degree of flexibility where circumstances warrant. Given that Sir Richard’s approach was, if anything, tailored to ensure Prince Harry continued to receive necessary protection (albeit on new terms), the court found nothing unlawful about RAVEC not strictly adhering to the normal process.
In summary , the High Court held that the departure from the 2017 Terms of Reference was justified. Sir Richard had properly considered the relevant factors and made a call that was within the range of reasonable responses. There was therefore no breach of public law standards by RAVEC.
The Court of Appeal’s View: Departure Upheld as Justified
Prince Harry was not satisfied with the High Court’s decision and appealed. The case went to the Court of Appeal (heard by the Master of the Rolls, Sir Geoffrey Vos, with Bean LJ and Edis LJ). The main issue on appeal remained the same: whether RAVEC’s failure to get an RMB risk analysis, contrary to its Terms of Reference, was unlawful – or whether the judge was right that RAVEC had a sufficient good reason for that departure.
After reviewing the evidence and the law, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court. It endorsed much of Mr Justice Lane’s reasoning on the flexibility of the policy and the deference owed to the decision-maker’s expertise. In the appeal judgment, Vos MR reiterated that the general rule is an authority should follow its policy absent good reason (citing Nadarajah, Mandalia, etc.). However, he noted that this “good reason” principle is “protean”, meaning its application may vary with context. The court pointed out that here the decision was taken under the Royal Prerogative in a national security-related sphere, and was akin to an issue of investigative judgment (whether to seek an RMB report) – all of which suggested the need for a more flexible, non-literal application of the policy.
The Court of Appeal carefully examined the contemporaneous email exchange of 26–27 February 2020 (between Sir Richard and the RMB Chair) and Sir Richard’s stated reasoning. It concluded that this evidence amply supported the existence of a cogent rationale for not convening a new RMB panel. In Vos MR’s words, the proposed “bespoke arrangement” for the Duke’s security was effectively the good reason for the policy departure. The Prince had left the cohort of individuals automatically protected by RAVEC when he stepped back from official duties, but he re-entered that protective cohort under bespoke terms for his visits to the UK. Since RAVEC’s experts deemed a full RMB risk review unnecessary in reaching that tailored solution, the requirement in the Terms of Reference could not be read as compelling one in these novel circumstances.
The Court of Appeal agreed that Prince Harry’s contrary approach was too formalistic. The Duke’s lawyers had argued that nothing short of an RMB assessment would satisfy the policy, and that anything else was an unlawful abdication of procedure. But the appellate judges found that viewpoint to ignore the reality of how RAVEC operates. They noted that policies are there to serve the decision-making process, not to enslave it. Here, RAVEC did base its decision on comprehensive threat information – it simply obtained that via briefings and intelligence updates at the RAVEC level, rather than through the mechanism of the RMB. There was no prejudice to the Prince in that; on the contrary, as discussed, RAVEC’s approach ensured he continued to get protection albeit on a different basis.
Vos MR remarked that the decisions made (both the initial withdrawal of automatic protection and the subsequent security arrangements for each visit) were an “understandable, and perhaps predictable” reaction to Prince Harry’s change of status and residence. In other words, any reasonable security policy-maker might have responded in that way: it was hardly outlandish or inexplicable. The court stressed that Prince Harry’s disagreement with the outcome (he clearly would have preferred to keep full police protection at will) does not translate into a legal flaw in the process. Despite the Prince’s sincere concerns, the judges found “none of that disagreement supports a legally sustainable public law claim to vitiate the decisions” made by RAVEC. In essence, the courts cannot declare a decision unlawful simply because the person affected would have liked a different policy applied, unless the departure from policy was itself unjustified or irrational, which was not the case here.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal held that Sir Richard had good reason to depart from the 2017 Terms of Reference, and therefore the claim that the decision was unlawful failed. They dismissed Prince Harry’s appeal on this ground. In doing so, the Court of Appeal also clarified an important point of law: when assessing a departure from a policy, the court does not require the claimant to show full Wednesbury unreasonableness. The proper approach is to ask whether a cogent justification (good reason) has been shown, not merely to rubber-stamp the decision if it’s not outright irrational. In this case, however, that nuance made no difference to the outcome; by either standard, RAVEC’s decision passed muster.
Conclusion
This episode illustrates how public bodies may depart from their established policies in exceptional cases, provided they have a sound, evidence-based reason and act within the bounds of rationality. RAVEC’s 2017 Terms of Reference set a clear expectation that risk decisions would normally follow an RMB risk assessment. Departing from that was indeed a serious matter, and Prince Harry was justified in querying it. However, both the High Court and Court of Appeal, after examining the internal communications and context, were satisfied that this departure was not a product of error or bias, but a conscious and reasonable adaptation to unique circumstances. The internal emails showed RAVEC grappled with how best to handle the Prince’s security and settled on a bespoke solution, effectively treating the Terms of Reference as flexible enough to permit a different route in that scenario.
In legal terms, the courts reaffirmed the principle that policies are there to guide fair and consistent decision-making, but they are not iron shackles. A deviation will be upheld if the decision-maker can demonstrate a “good reason” – one that is substantively rational and justified by the facts known at the time. The case also highlights the judiciary’s willingness to grant due deference to specialist bodies like RAVEC. Especially where matters of security risk are concerned, judges will not readily substitute their own judgment for that of those with long experience in the field. As long as the process is fair and the reasoning plausible, a court will not insist on slavish adherence to a policy at the expense of practical wisdom.
For Prince Harry, the outcome meant that while he understandably felt “singled out” for losing automatic police protection, in the eyes of the law RAVEC had acted within its lawful discretion. The committee’s departure from its 2017 Terms of Reference was deemed justified on the evidence, and thus not a ground to quash the decision. The case serves as a notable precedent in UK public law, confirming that flexibility exists within policy frameworks, particularly in high-stakes contexts like royal security, so long as any departure is for defensible reasons and not an abuse of power.
If you are considering a judicial review or have concerns about the lawfulness of a public body’s decision, Carruthers Law can help. Contact us today on 0151 541 2040 or email info@carruthers-law.co.uk to discuss your case in confidence.