Limitation, reasonable diligence and “worthwhile claim” in the Mirror hacking litigation

In Paul Sculfor & Ors v MGN Limited [2026] EWHC 597 (Ch), Fancourt J determined a preliminary limitation issue in five sample claims within the Mirror Newspapers Hacking Litigation. The court was not deciding whether phone hacking or other unlawful information gathering had in fact occurred. It was deciding whether, on the assumption that the pleaded wrongdoing could be proved, the claims were already out of time.

The decision is important because the five claimants were selected as test cases for a wider body of unresolved fifth-wave claims against MGN. The judge recorded that it was expected that the obstacle to settlement in all remaining cases would be removed by a final decision in those five claims on how section 32 applied in such cases.

Facts, application and procedural history

All five claimants accepted that their claims had been issued outside the primary six-year limitation period. Their case therefore depended on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, under which time does not begin to run until the claimant has discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the fraud or concealment relied upon. The hearing took place on 26 January 2026 for pre-reading, then on 27 to 30 January and 3, 5 and 6 February 2026. Judgment was handed down on 16 March 2026.

The five claimants were Paul Sculfor, Melanie Cantor, Murray Harkin, Camilla Sacre-Dallerup and Patrick Cox. They were selected because their claims reflected recurring features in the remaining fifth-wave cases, including allegations that claimants had been misled about the source of published private information, claims by managers, agents or friends rather than article subjects, periods of residence abroad, and reliance either on legal advice or on Metropolitan Police communications.

The legal framework in brief

Fancourt J applied the approach he had previously set out in Duke of Sussex v MGN Ltd [2023] EWHC 3217 (Ch). The critical question was whether each claimant knew, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, facts sufficiently showing that there was a worthwhile claim. That did not require knowledge of every concealed fact, nor evidence sufficient to prove the case at trial. Once the claimant had enough to appreciate that there was a worthwhile claim, time began to run, and the claimant then had six full years in which to investigate further, collect evidence and decide whether to issue.

Drawing on Gemalto Holding BV v Infineon Technologies AG [2022] EWCA Civ 782, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2020] UKSC 47 and BAT Industries plc v Commissioners for HMRC [2025] EWCA Civ 1271, the judge held that a “worthwhile claim” means something more than a claim merely worth investigating, but not a claim known to be likely to succeed. In this context, what was needed was knowledge of, or the ability to discover, sufficient facts to amount to a credible basis of claim, not the evidence that would later be required at trial to prove it. Facts that would leave a claim liable to be struck out for disclosing no cause of action would not suffice, but the claimant did not need all essential facts or proof-level material before time could run.

A substantial issue at the hearing was the claimants’ “counterfactual case”. They argued that, even if they had been put on inquiry, a competent solicitor at the relevant time would have advised that they had no sufficiently worthwhile claim unless there was stronger claimant-specific material, usually in the form of an MPS notification. The judge rejected that submission. He held that, in a concealment case, section 32 is concerned with discovery of concealed facts. It is not in principle necessary for a claimant first to obtain positive legal advice on the merits before the claimant can reasonably appreciate that there is a worthwhile claim. What matters is whether there is some factual basis for the claimant reasonably to conclude that he or she was potentially a victim.

The judge considered by analogy the reasoning in AB v Ministry of Defence [2013] 1 AC 78, but held that it did not assist the claimants. Even if section 14 case law is considered by analogy, it does not follow that positive legal advice on the merits is required before time can run. The relevant distinction is between knowledge of a real possibility of a claim and possession of the evidence needed to prove it.

The judgment therefore draws a clear distinction between a claim that is not yet proved and a claim that is already worthwhile for limitation purposes. A claimant does not need a smoking gun, claimant-specific proof sufficient for trial, or confirmation that particular solicitors would be willing to act on a CFA before time starts to run.

What the hearing was about

The hearing concerned a single preliminary issue, namely whether each claim was statute-barred by expiry of the postponed limitation period under section 32. In practical terms, the court had to decide when each claimant either knew, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, enough concealed facts to appreciate that there was a worthwhile claim against MGN. The judgment emphasises both actual and constructive knowledge. A claimant may be fixed not only with what he or she in fact knew, but also with what a reasonably attentive person in the claimant’s circumstances would have become aware of, and with what reasonable investigations pursued with reasonable diligence would have revealed.

There was also a further question about timing. MGN argued that time started to run as soon as a claimant was put on notice to inquire. The claimants argued that additional time should be allowed for taking advice and making inquiries. Fancourt J held that considered legal advice on the strength of the case was irrelevant. However, where a claimant reasonably needed further factual information or explanation in order to understand the link between his or her own position and MGN’s wrongdoing, some short period might in principle be allowed to obtain that information. Four weeks was treated as a realistic period, but not as a fixed rule. No such further period was necessary where the claimant already knew the relevant facts.

The decision in relation to each claimant

Paul Sculfor

Mr Sculfor’s complaint arose from Mirror articles published between 2007 and 2009 about his relationships with Jennifer Aniston and Cameron Diaz. He had read almost all of them at the time. The judge found that he had been materially misled by the content of the articles into thinking that family members or close friends were the source of the private information. He made accusations, was met with denials, and relationships were damaged. Unlike claimants who remained actively perplexed about how the information had reached the press, Mr Sculfor had been led by MGN’s concealment to look in the wrong direction.

That mattered because, given the operative deception, reasonable diligence did not require him to remain as attentive to another possible explanation as someone who had never been misled. He lived in the United States for much of the relevant period, heard only some of the larger headlines associated with the phone-hacking scandal, and was not aware of the developing MGN story or the Gulati trial. Fancourt J held that there was nothing sufficient to put him on notice to continue to investigate, and no particular trigger came his way before 15 June 2015. He was therefore the only claimant to succeed on the preliminary issue.

Melanie Cantor

Ms Cantor was an agent and publicist. No article had been written about her personally, but she had followed the phone-hacking story closely and knew that Ulrika Jonsson, with whom she had had a very close professional and personal relationship, had been hacked and had made a claim. Ms Cantor maintained that her trusted relationships with senior Mirror figures led her to think she was personally safe from MGN. The judge held that, if she in fact thought that, it was a naïve and unreasonable conclusion.

The court held that by May 2015, if not earlier, Ms Cantor either knew enough, or could readily have discovered enough, to appreciate that she was likely to have a claim worth pursuing. Indeed, the judge considered that she probably already knew sufficient facts, had she considered the matter and done some appropriate research, to conclude that she was likely to have a worthwhile claim herself, even though the hard evidence of targeting remained buried. She did not need a solicitor first to tell her that the case was strong, and no additional period was required for advice because she already knew the relevant facts. Her claim was therefore time-barred.

Camilla Sacre-Dallerup

Ms Sacre-Dallerup’s case arose from articles published between 2004 and 2009 during her Strictly Come Dancing years. The judge found that she was not significantly misled into fixing on one identifiable source. Rather, she was left uncertain as to how the information had got into the press. That distinguished her case from Mr Sculfor’s.

The decisive feature was her contact with the Metropolitan Police. In April and May 2014 she learned that her details and address had appeared on a list from around 2004. More significantly, in July 2015 she received an email explaining that her name and address appeared on material associated with convicted phone hackers, including Dan Evans, and that the Sunday Mirror investigation was continuing. Fancourt J held that, if not the information obtained on 1 May 2014, then certainly the confirmation and greater detail provided on 9 July 2015 were sufficient to put her on notice to investigate further. A reasonably diligent person would not simply have treated that as the end of the matter and waited to see whether the police came back later. Had she made reasonable inquiries, she would have discovered enough for a worthwhile claim. Her claim was therefore time-barred.

Murray Harkin

Mr Harkin’s case was different because he had long believed he was the victim of unlawful press conduct and had taken legal advice more than once. His case involved articles containing confidential business and private information, an attempted blag of bank information, inexplicable knowledge of holiday arrangements, MPS material and information from Paddy French suggesting unlawful conduct connected with MGN. His difficulty was not lack of suspicion, but the fact that he had repeatedly been advised that the evidence was not yet strong enough and that the matter should effectively remain on the back burner while stronger claims were pursued.

The judge held that this did not assist him on limitation. Had Mr Harkin acted with reasonable diligence, he would by no later than September 2014 have had a sufficient factual basis for bringing a claim against MGN. The inferential basis for a claim was already present, even though the stronger evidence later obtained through disclosure was not yet available. A worthwhile claim of this kind did not have to be strong or proved. It merely had to be supported by sufficient facts and inferences to resist strike out. The solicitors’ cautious approach reflected, at least in part, litigation strategy, funding considerations, or an incorrect focus on proof rather than on the existence of a worthwhile claim in the legal sense. His claim was therefore time-barred.

Patrick Cox

Mr Cox’s case did not depend on articles written about him personally. None of the articles relied upon was about him. Rather, his case arose from his close relationships with Sir Elton John, David Furnish and Elizabeth Hurley, and from the publication of private information relating to that circle. The judge found that Mr Cox had not been misled by anything MGN said or published. He knew that his friends considered themselves to have been hacked or otherwise targeted, and he discussed those matters with them. He also knew that Ms Hurley was bringing a claim against MGN in relation to information she had shared with him in confidence.

On those facts, the court held that Mr Cox knew enough to put him on notice that there was at least a real possibility that his private information could have been misused by MGN. In particular, by March 2015, when Ms Hurley issued her claim, he was clearly on notice to inquire whether his own phone or voicemail had been used as a route to access private information involving close friends. He did not need an MPS notification before time could run. Had he pursued inquiries by reasonable means with reasonable diligence from March 2015, he could have known sufficient facts. His claim was therefore time-barred.

Why the decision matters

This is a significant judgment on limitation in privacy and phone-hacking litigation. Its central point is that time can begin to run before a claimant has proof, before all claimant-specific disclosure has emerged, and before a solicitor is willing to run the case on a no win no fee basis. The real question is whether enough facts were known, or could reasonably have been discovered by a reasonably attentive claimant exercising reasonable diligence, to support a credible inferential claim and show that there was a worthwhile claim.

The judgment is also a useful reminder that the court will look carefully at the claimant’s particular position. A claimant who was genuinely misled into thinking that family or friends were responsible may not be expected to remain as attentive as someone who was never misled. By contrast, where a claimant knew of close associates being hacked, received police information pointing towards possible targeting, or already suspected wrongdoing and sought advice, the court is likely to conclude that time started much earlier than the claimant contended.

The decision is likely to be of continuing importance in the remaining MGN claims because it gives a structured and fact-sensitive account of how section 32 is to be applied in concealed wrongdoing cases where much of the claimant’s case is inferential at the point when time begins to run.

Further reading

• Defamation
• Misuse of Private
• Damages in Misuse of Private Information Claims
• Limitation Periods in English Law, Key Time Limits Explained
• Harassment by Journalists and Photographers, Remedies in English Law
• More legal articles from Carruthers Law