Cohabitation Property Disputes

September 29, 2025

Cohabiting Couples and Beneficial Interests in the Family Home: Constructive Trusts and Alternatives

September 28, 2025

Unmarried cohabiting couples in England and Wales do not benefit from any special statutory scheme for dividing property when they separate. Instead, their property disputes are governed by general principles of property and equity, most notably the common intention constructive trust (CICT). A CICT is an equitable doctrine that can grant a beneficial interest in a property to a partner who is not on the legal title, provided the couple intended to share ownership and the non-owner relied on that intention to their detriment. In practice, to successfully claim a share of the home, the non-owner must prove that such a shared intention existed and that they acted on it – for example, by contributing money or making sacrifices because of that understanding. This article examines how these claims are established, covering the legal tests for CICTs, alternative remedies like proprietary estoppel, the impact of express trust declarations, and the default presumptions based on legal title, all reflecting the law in England and Wales as of 2025.

Effect of Express Trust Declarations

Cohabiting couples sometimes explicitly set out their property shares at the time of purchase – for example, by signing a declaration of trust in the purchase deed stating that they hold the property as joint tenants or specifying their percentage shares. It has long been the position that a valid express declaration of trust is usually conclusive in determining the parties’ beneficial interests. In simple terms, if a cohabiting couple have a signed agreement or deed saying exactly how the equity in the home is divided, the courts will hold them to that arrangement. For instance, in Pankhania v Chandegra [2012] EWCA Civ 1438, the Court of Appeal stated that when there is an explicit trust declaration in place, a court cannot later depart from its terms by imposing a different outcome through a constructive or resulting trust. A classic example is Goodman v Gallant [1986] 2 WLR 236, where a woman paid the entire purchase price of the home but was still limited to a 50% share because the deed explicitly declared the couple as equal joint owners. In short, unless an express trust is shown to be invalid (for example, a sham or a forgery) or is set aside, it will generally dictate the outcome of any dispute.

That said, the binding nature of an express trust has been tested in recent times. In Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, Baroness Hale observed that an express trust is binding “unless varied by a subsequent agreement or affected by proprietary estoppel.” This raised the question of whether and how a written trust declaration could be altered by a later informal arrangement. Traditionally, the orthodox view – reinforced by cases like Pankhania – was that any change to beneficial ownership must comply with the formal legal requirements for land transactions (specifically, the requirement of signed writing under section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989). Under that strict view, a mere oral agreement or an implied understanding could never override a prior written trust. For example, in Pankhania, one party later claimed that a family arrangement had been made which gave her the entire property, but the court held that the original 50/50 written declaration was conclusive and could not be displaced by an unwritten deal. Only if the express trust were shown to be a sham or otherwise invalid would the courts refuse to follow it.

However, a recent High Court decision has opened the door to unwritten variations of express trusts. In Nilsson v Cynberg [2024] EWHC 2164 (Ch), the court confirmed that a subsequent oral agreement can, in principle, vary an earlier written trust of a home’s equity. In that case, a divorcing couple had originally declared equal (50/50) ownership of their home in writing, but after they separated, the husband orally agreed to relinquish his half to the wife under certain terms. Years later, creditors of the husband argued he still owned 50% because of the written trust, but the court found that the informal post-separation agreement gave rise to a new constructive trust in favour of the wife, effectively overriding the original written declaration. The judge rejected the argument that only a signed written instrument could change the trust. He held that as long as there was clear evidence of a later mutual intention to alter their shares, equity could recognize that change through a constructive trust, even without formal documentation. This appears to be the first definitive ruling that an oral agreement can effectively supersede an earlier express trust in the context of a family home.

In summary, an express trust remains a very powerful factor in these disputes; parties should assume it will bind them. Nonetheless, recent developments suggest that if both partners genuinely agree later on to change their shares – for example, one partner agrees to give up their interest – a court might give effect to that new understanding even if it was not put in writing. This is still an evolving area of law, so any claim to informally vary an express trust should be approached with caution. In the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hudson v Hathway [2022] EWCA Civ 1648, a separated cohabitant sought to enforce email communications in which her ex-partner stated that she could keep the house (which was jointly owned) and that he would make no claim on it. The Court of Appeal held that such emails, when signed off with the sender’s name, could satisfy the statutory requirement of writing for disposing of an equitable interest (Law of Property Act 1925, s.53(1)(c)). Crucially, however, the court also reaffirmed that a party claiming a changed beneficial share based on a post-separation agreement must demonstrate detrimental reliance on that new common intention. In other words, even a clear written assurance from one partner to the other will only take effect in equity if the promisee has incurred a detriment by relying on it (for example, by foregoing other claims or benefits on the strength of the promise). Hudson thus underlines that detrimental reliance remains an essential element whenever a constructive trust is alleged, even where the variation of interests is evidenced in writing.

Legal Title and Presumptions in Family Home Cases

When resolving beneficial ownership between cohabiting partners, the starting point is often the old maxim that equity follows the law. In plain terms, that means the person (or people) whose name is on the legal title of the property is initially presumed to own the beneficial interest as well, unless and until evidence shows otherwise. The legal title might be held in one partner’s name alone or jointly in both names, and the law attaches a default presumption to each scenario:

Sole legal owner: If the home is registered in only one partner’s name, the starting position is that the legal owner has sole beneficial ownership. In a sole-name situation, the other partner begins with no automatic share. The onus is on that non-owner to rebut the presumption by proving they have an equitable interest (for example, by establishing a constructive trust or some other claim). If they cannot show evidence of a right to a share, the legal owner will retain 100% of the property.

Joint legal owners (domestic context): If the property is put in both partners’ names and it is intended as their shared home, the assumption is that they hold the beneficial interest in equal shares (50/50), even if one contributed more money than the other. This principle was firmly established by the House of Lords in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 and later affirmed by the Supreme Court in Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53. The presumption of equal shares in a jointly owned family home can be rebutted, but the burden of proof lies on the party who claims that the split should be something other than 50/50. Courts are generally reluctant to infer that the beneficial ownership is different from what the title document indicates, especially in family situations where concrete evidence can be sparse and memories may be clouded by the acrimony of a break-up.

If a jointly owned property was originally held as a joint tenancy and one partner later severs the joint tenancy (converting it into a tenancy in common) without any agreement on what each share should be, the general rule from Goodman v Gallant [1986] is that they each hold equal shares. In other words, splitting a joint tenancy into two separate interests results in a 50/50 division by default, unless there was a clear prior agreement to a different split.

If both partners’ names are on the title, equal division is the default. To displace this default, a party must demonstrate either that from the outset the couple intended a different division of shares, or that they later formed a mutual intention to change how the equity is divided. Such intentions can be evidenced by things the couple said or by their conduct over time. For example, if there is proof that although “both our names are on the deed, we never intended it to be split evenly,” then a court can depart from the 50/50 presumption. The facts of Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 itself illustrate this: that couple kept their finances largely separate and contributed very unequally to the property, so the court inferred they did not intend an equal split and ultimately awarded about 65% to one partner and 35% to the other. However, without strong contrary evidence, a jointly titled family home will remain 50/50 in equity. Indeed, in the majority of cases the equal-share presumption ends up determining the outcome, simply because most cohabiting couples do not explicitly discuss ownership percentages and there is not enough evidence to prove a different intention.

For sole-name cases, the non-owner’s task is even more challenging. They must affirmatively prove that despite the legal title being in one partner’s name, both partners had a shared intention that the other would have a beneficial share in the property. If the claimant cannot show any such common intention – even implicitly – then the inquiry stops there and the sole legal owner keeps the entire interest. But if the claimant can establish that a common intention to share did exist, then the court will ask the follow-up question: to what extent did they intend to share? In other words, a successful claimant in a sole-owner case has to demonstrate two things: first, that there was a common intention (express or inferred) for them to have some ownership interest, and second, that they incurred a detriment by relying on that intention. These two elements (intention and detriment) often intertwine. Frequently, the claimant’s very actions in contributing to the property (for example, helping pay the mortgage or financing improvements) serve as the evidence from which the court infers the required intention in the first place. The burden of proof rests on the claimant to establish both the existence of a shared intention to share the property and that they incurred detriment based on that shared understanding.

It is important to recognize that the generous presumptions favoring equal sharing apply mainly in the domestic context – that is, when the property was acquired to be the couple’s home. Different considerations can arise if the property purchase was a commercial or investment venture, even if the parties are in a relationship. Courts have distinguished between a true domestic consumer context (a home intended for the couple or family to live in) and a situation where, for example, two people in a relationship buy property together purely as an investment or business project. In a clearly commercial scenario, a court might default to traditional resulting trust principles (each party’s share reflects their financial contribution) rather than the family-law approach of inferring joint beneficial ownership. For instance, in Laskar v Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347, a mother and daughter purchased a house as a rental investment. The Court of Appeal applied a resulting trust, meaning each got a share proportional to what they contributed financially, since this was not a typical domestic home purchase intended for joint occupation.

Conversely, even some unusual cases on the margins have been treated as domestic. In Rowland v Blades [2021] EWHC 426 (Ch), an unmarried couple bought a weekend home in joint names. One partner provided all the purchase money – a scenario that looks more like an investment – but the High Court still treated it as a domestic arrangement and awarded a 50/50 split. The court noted that the legal owner had agreed at the time of purchase to share the property jointly with their partner, and could not later backtrack simply because they ended up contributing all the funds. The lesson is: if a property was acquired as a home for the couple, even if it also had an investment aspect, courts tend to lean toward the family-home approach, applying the common intention constructive trust with its presumptions. If the purchase was clearly a business or investment venture between the partners, a contribution-based resulting trust analysis is more likely to be used. That said, such purely commercial joint purchases among cohabiting couples are relatively rare. In the vast majority of cohabitation disputes over a family home, the common intention constructive trust framework will be the central approach. Notably, the Privy Council in Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 cautioned that the choice between a resulting trust and a constructive trust approach depends ultimately on the parties’ actual intentions in each case, and should not be governed by a rigid distinction between “domestic” and “commercial” contexts.

Common Intention Constructive Trusts: Framework and Test

When the legal title alone does not resolve who should get what, for example if an unmarried partner not on the title is claiming a share, or if two joint owners disagree on the division, the courts turn to the doctrine of the common intention constructive trust. The goal in such cases is to ascertain and give effect to what the couple actually intended regarding ownership of the property, so far as fairness allows. In analyzing a CICT claim, the court typically follows a two-stage process:

Stage One: Establishing a Beneficial Interest (Acquisition)

The first question is whether the claimant can establish that they have any beneficial interest at all in the property. To do this, the claimant must prove two key elements:

• Common intention: that the couple had a common intention, either expressly agreed or inferred from conduct, for the claimant to have a proprietary interest in the home; and
• Detriment: that the claimant acted to their detriment in reliance on that common intention.

If the claimant fails to show that there was a shared intention to give them an interest, or if there was such an intention but they never acted on it to their detriment, then no trust arises and the legal owner’s rights stand untouched. However, if a common intention to share and a related detriment are established, then equity will recognize that the claimant does have a beneficial interest in the property. The inquiry then proceeds to determining the size of that interest (Stage Two).

Proving a Common Intention (Express or Inferred): A common intention to share ownership can be proven in two ways:

• Express agreement or assurance: There were conversations or promises between the partners indicating that the non-owner was to have a share in the property. This understanding does not need to be formal or written down; even a casual statement like “This house is as much yours as mine,” or an assurance such as “I’ll put your name on the deed as soon as I can,” may suffice if the court believes it was sincerely meant as a promise of ownership. One category of cases under this umbrella is the so-called “excuse” cases, where the legal owner gives the other partner a reason – often a flimsy one – for why their name is not on the title, thereby implying that but for that excuse, the partner would have been a co-owner. For example, in Eves v Eves [1975], the man told his partner she was too young to be named on the house title, strongly implying that otherwise he would have included her. Relying on this excuse, she went on to put substantial effort into heavy renovation work on the property. The court found that this conduct demonstrated an implied common intention that she would have a share, and it awarded her 25% of the beneficial interest in the home. Likewise, in Grant v Edwards [1986], a man claimed he could not put his partner on the legal title because it might jeopardize her ongoing divorce proceedings. Because of this excuse, the partner did not insist on being on the title, but she did pay a large portion of the household expenses while he paid the mortgage, effectively contributing indirectly to the home. The court held that the very fact he felt the need to offer that excuse indicated a common understanding that she was to have an interest; coupled with her financial contributions – her detriment in reliance on that understanding – she was entitled to a beneficial share of the property. By contrast, consider Curran v Collins [2015]: in that case, the man told his partner that adding her name to the title was “too expensive” (an excuse about the cost or hassle), but crucially he never actually promised her any share, and she made no meaningful contributions toward the property. The court concluded that this scenario did not reveal any genuine common intention to share ownership. It was just an excuse with nothing substantial behind it, and since she also had not acted to her detriment in reliance, her claim to an interest was rejected outright.
• Inference from conduct: If there was no explicit discussion or promise about ownership, the court must infer a common intention from the couple’s conduct and all the circumstances of their relationship. This is often necessary because many cohabiting couples never really talk about who owns what share until things go wrong. Historically, following Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991], courts set a very high bar for inferring a shared intention. Judges would normally not infer that the parties intended to share ownership unless the non-owner had made direct contributions to the purchase price or mortgage. In other words, without such direct financial input, it was exceedingly difficult to convince the court that an intention to share ownership existed. However, more modern cases (notably Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 and Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53) have broadened the approach. Today, courts will look at the entire course of dealing between the parties in relation to the property to decide if a common intention can be discerned. As Baroness Hale famously said in Stack, “context is everything.” A variety of factors might be relevant beyond just who paid the mortgage, including (but not limited to) the following:

Factors Considered by the Courts: When inferring a common intention, courts may consider:

• Financial contributions: Who paid the deposit? Who serviced the mortgage or covered other significant purchase costs? Direct payments towards acquiring the property – especially paying part of the purchase price or mortgage installments – remain one of the strongest indicators that a share was intended.
• Overall financial arrangements: How did the couple handle their finances generally? Did they pool their resources and share all expenses, or keep their money mostly separate? If one partner paid all the daily household bills while the other paid the mortgage, the first partner’s indirect contributions can be seen as enabling the acquisition of the property, since their support freed up the other’s income.
• Discussions at the time of purchase and reasons for the title arrangement: What, if anything, was said about ownership at the time of purchase? Why was the property registered in the way that it was? Sometimes a house is put in one partner’s name for practical reasons, such as a better credit rating or mortgage eligibility. If there is evidence that the sole-name registration was only for convenience, it might suggest the couple still intended to share the equity.
• Nature of the relationship and family circumstances: Did the couple treat the home as a shared family asset? For instance, did they have children together, with one partner perhaps sacrificing career opportunities or working less to take care of the family or household? A long-term, marriage-like relationship where partners entwined their lives and made sacrifices can imply an understanding that “the house is our home,” even if legally only one name is on it.
• Contributions to improvements: Did the non-owner partner invest substantial effort or money in renovating, refurbishing, or expanding the property? Significant labor or funds invested by someone not on the title can indicate they believed they had (or would have) a stake in the home.
• Subsequent conduct and statements: How did the partners refer to and use the property during the relationship? Did they consistently call it “our house,” or did the legal owner reassure the other, “You will always have a home here”? Such behavior and statements after purchase can support an inference that both parties considered the property to belong to them jointly.

Direct financial contributions to the property (especially toward the purchase price or mortgage) are still the clearest evidence of a common intention to share ownership. The more difficult cases are those involving primarily indirect or non-financial contributions. Courts are increasingly willing to consider scenarios like one partner paying the mortgage while the other pays all the other bills and living expenses; they will look at the arrangement holistically. However, purely domestic contributions, such as homemaking, cooking, cleaning, or childcare, by themselves have traditionally not been enough to infer an intention to share at the first stage.

A notable decision illustrating this evolving approach is R (L) v L (Family Court) [2022] 4 WLR 57 (often cited as R v Lam). In that case, the Court of Appeal confirmed that non-financial contributions, such as years of child-rearing and household management, can be integral to inferring a common intention to share the beneficial interest, even in sole-owner cases. Recent case law also underlines the importance of proving detriment. In O’Neill v Holland [2020] EWCA Civ 1583, the Court of Appeal stressed that a claimant must clearly demonstrate detrimental reliance on the alleged common intention and plead it properly; otherwise, the constructive trust claim can fail.

Stage Two: Quantifying the Share

Once it is established that the claimant does have a beneficial interest in the property, the next step is to determine how much that interest is worth. In some cases, there may be evidence of a specific agreement on the division – for instance, perhaps at some point the couple agreed one partner would own 30% and the other 70%. If there is clear proof that the couple agreed on particular shares, the court will simply enforce that agreement.

However, in the vast majority of cohabitation cases, couples do not expressly decide on exact percentages in advance. Therefore, the court must assess a fair division based on the parties’ overall course of conduct and dealings with the property. The guiding principle, as set out in Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546 and later affirmed in Stack and in Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53, is that each party should receive whatever share the court deems fair in light of the entire course of dealing between them with respect to the property.

In making this assessment, the court will first try to infer from the evidence what shares the couple actually intended. If no clear actual intention as to the size of shares can be found which is common then the court will impute a fair share to each partner. This approach was confirmed in Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53, where the Supreme Court imputed shares to a separated couple when it was clear their intentions had diverged over time and no explicit agreement on updated shares existed.

A recent case, Howard-Hampshire v Bonser [2025] EWCC 55 (CC), illustrates how courts apply this fact-driven fairness inquiry in quantifying shares. There, a couple had cohabited for 25 years, but the house a renovated guesthouse business was in the woman’s sole name. The man contributed no money to the initial purchase, yet he had sacrificed his career, sold his own property, and invested years of labour into renovating and operating the home as a joint enterprise. The court inferred a common intention that he would have some stake in the property and awarded him a 15% beneficial interest, balancing his significant in-kind contributions against the woman’s financial input.

Proprietary Estoppel as an Alternative Route

Aside from constructive trusts, another route for an unmarried partner to claim an interest in the home is proprietary estoppel. This doctrine applies when it would be fundamentally unfair for the legal owner to insist on their strict legal rights. Proprietary estoppel can arise if the owner encouraged the other partner to believe they had (or would receive) some rights in the property, the other partner reasonably relied on that belief, and as a result suffered a detriment.

If those elements are proven, an equity arises in favour of the claimant, and a court can step in to prevent an unjust outcome. The remedy in estoppel cases is very flexible: the court has discretion to award whatever is necessary to do justice in the circumstances. This could mean granting a share of the property, a lifetime right to live in the property, or a cash payment. Notably, the Supreme Court in Guest v Guest [2022] UKSC 27 (a family farm case) emphasised that any award should not be out of all proportion to the detriment suffered, underlining that the aim is to achieve a fair outcome the minimum equity needed to do justice rather than to automatically fulfill the claimant’s entire expectation.

In practice, proprietary estoppel is often pleaded in cohabitation disputes as a fallback if a constructive trust claim fails. A leading example is Southwell v Blackburn [2014] EWCA Civ 1347, where a man bought a house in his sole name but assured his partner that she would “have a home for life.” Relying on this promise, she gave up her own secure housing and job to move in with him. When they later separated, she could not establish a constructive trust, but the Court of Appeal upheld her proprietary estoppel claim and awarded her a financial sum to compensate her. In Southwell, the promise of security and the partner’s reliance on it to her detriment by relinquishing her flat and job – yielded an equitable remedy: the court ordered the man to pay her a lump sum reflecting the value of the assurance she had lost.

This is a fundamental but sometimes blurred distinction. Both constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel are equitable doctrines that can give a non-owner rights in property, but they are conceptually different.

Comparative Perspectives

Australia: Since 2009, most Australian states treat qualifying de facto couples much like married spouses for property division. A cohabiting partner who meets certain criteria can apply for a property settlement, and the family courts have broad discretion to achieve a just and equitable distribution of assets based on contributions (financial and non-financial) and future needs.

Canada: In several provinces, legislation grants unmarried cohabitants property rights akin to those of married couples. For example, British Columbia’s Family Law Act treats couples who have lived together for 2+ years as spouses for property division. In other provinces, cohabitants must rely on equitable doctrines chiefly unjust enrichment to claim a share in property.

United States: Rules vary by state, but generally unmarried cohabitants do not have automatic property rights upon separation. Most U.S. states adhere to the principle that, absent a marriage or civil union, each partner’s property remains their own. Cohabitants may resort to contract and equity (for instance, some states allow “palimony” suits for support based on agreements), but there is no exact equivalent to England’s common intention constructive trust as a default doctrine for adjusting ownership of the family home.

These comparative examples show that England’s heavy reliance on common intention and detriment is not the only model. Other jurisdictions have chosen to legislate solutions or expand equitable remedies to better protect long-term cohabitants. This divergence has fuelled reform proposals in England and Wales.

Reform Proposals in England and Wales

The piecemeal and often unpredictable nature of cohabitation property disputes has prompted calls for reform over many years. In 2007, the Law Commission published a report recommending the introduction of a new statutory scheme of financial relief on separation for cohabiting couples. The proposed scheme would not automatically equate cohabitation with marriage, but it would allow an eligible cohabitant to apply for fair financial provision when the relationship ends. Importantly, entitlement would not depend on proving an agreement to share ownership; instead, it would be based on qualifying contributions each partner made to the relationship.

Despite the Law Commission’s clear recommendation, these proposals have not been implemented. The Government initially postponed action in 2008, deciding to wait and see how similar cohabitation provisions fared in Scotland before proceeding. In 2011, the Law Commission also recommended giving certain cohabitants the right to inherit on intestacy, but that too was left on the shelf.

The debate was reignited by the House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee in August 2022, which conducted an inquiry into the rights of cohabiting partners. The Committee concluded that the law was “left decades behind” changing social norms, and it urged reform of family law to better protect cohabiting couples and their children from financial hardship in the event of separation. The Committee endorsed the Law Commission’s 2007 opt-out scheme as the way forward.

To date, the Government has responded coolly to these reform calls. In its official response to the Women and Equalities Committee (published in early 2023), the Government rejected the Committee’s recommendations for immediate legislative change. It indicated that any reform would need to be considered only after other related law reforms (such as a planned review of financial provision on divorce) were completed. Notably, the Government stressed that the Law Commission’s 2007 proposals were now dated and that such reforms could not be implemented without a thorough review of the 2007 report and a fresh public consultation to update them. No specific timeline for cohabitation reform was provided. Nonetheless, pressure for reform continues to mount, and there are signs that the political climate may be shifting. As of 2025, no concrete reform has been enacted. Indeed, the current Government has pledged to consult on cohabitation law reform within the next year, signaling that change could finally be on the way.

Professional Advice and Negligence Issues

Disputes over beneficial ownership often arise because co-owners were not properly advised at the time of purchase. A common example is a solicitor’s failure to explain the difference between holding property as joint tenants or as tenants in common, or neglecting to prepare an appropriate declaration of trust. Such errors can give rise to claims in professional negligence, particularly where clients suffer financial loss or family members are disinherited. These disputes may also overlap with contentious probate matters and can escalate into litigation. For a focused discussion of negligence claims where solicitors fail to advise on joint tenancy versus tenancy in common, see our dedicated article.

Conclusion

• Check for any special arrangements or documents first: Before launching into a constructive trust fight, see if there is an easier answer. Is there a written declaration of trust or agreement stating who owns what? If yes, that will usually determine the outcome (unless there is very strong evidence that the situation changed later, or an estoppel argument applies).
• Start with the legal title: The starting point in any cohabitation property dispute is the name on the title deeds. If only one name is on the title, the default assumption is that this person owns the whole property; if both names are on the title, the default is that they own it equally. However, these presumptions can be rebutted with evidence.
• Common intention constructive trusts are the primary legal tool for cohabitants: In the absence of a written agreement, most cohabitation property claims will be decided by the law of constructive trusts. To succeed, a claimant has to prove the couple had a common intention to share the property and that the claimant relied on that to their detriment.
• Detrimental reliance is critical: Showing that “we intended to share” is only half the battle; the claimant must also show they acted on that intention to their detriment.
• Deciding the size of the share is about fairness (within the framework of what was intended): Courts will strive to come up with a division of the equity that is fair in light of the couple’s entire relationship and contributions.
• Every case is fact-specific, so evidence is key: Small differences in the facts can lead to very different outcomes in cohabitation cases. It is crucial for a claimant to gather as much proof as possible of their contributions and any agreements or assurances about the property.
• Unmarried cohabitants should be aware of their legal vulnerability: Unlike divorcing spouses, cohabitants do not have any automatic rights to a fair share of each other’s property upon separation. Any claim to a share must fit into the legal framework of trusts or proprietary estoppel.
• Be proactive and document arrangements: If an unmarried couple is living together – especially if one partner is contributing financially to a home that is in the other’s name – it is wise for them to document their understanding about ownership. Better yet, they should formalise it with a cohabitation agreement or a declaration of trust, rather than leaving it to chance. Keeping records of contributions and communications about the property can also prevent future disputes. Until reform is enacted, cohabitants must take proactive steps to protect their own interests under the current law.
  

  Further reading

  • Proprietary Estoppel in English Law
  • Professional Negligence
  • Solicitors’ Negligence
  • Conveyancing Negligence
  • Guide to Bringing a Professional Negligence Claim
  • Limitation Periods in Professional Negligence and Section 14A and Date of Knowledge
  • Will Disputes & Inheritance Claims

  Contact Carruthers Law

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  Disclaimer: This article is provided for general information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Carruthers Law accepts no responsibility for any reliance placed on the contents. This article may include material from court judgments and contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.