Clarke v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2025] EWHC 2193 (KB)

August 29, 2025

High Court examines public interest defence in Clarke v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2025] EWHC 2193 (KB)

Introduction

In the recent High Court case of Clarke v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2025] EWHC 2193 (KB), Mrs Justice Steyn DBE conducted an examination of the publication on a matter of public interest defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013. This article focuses on how the judge analysed that public interest defence in Noel Clarke’s libel claim and how she reached her conclusions on each element of the defence. Notably, the Guardian also ran a truth defence, and the judge found the articles to be substantially true, meaning the libel claim would have failed in any event. However, Mrs Justice Steyn still addressed the section 4 public interest defence in full, given its importance, thereby providing a valuable study of how a court will assess responsible investigative journalism under the Defamation Act.

Background

The claimant, Noel Anthony Clarke, brought a libel claim (and a now withdrawn data protection claim) against Guardian News & Media Limited in relation to eight articles. The first and principal article, entitled “‘Sexual predator’: actor Noel Clarke accused of groping, harassment and bullying by 20 women”, was published online on 29 April 2021. It reported allegations by 20 women that Clarke had, over a 15-year period, used his power in the film and TV industry to engage in unwanted sexual contact, sexual harassment, bullying and other misconduct. Clarke denied these accusations, but the article, along with several follow-up pieces between April 2021 and March 2022 prompted significant public scrutiny and led to the suspension of Clarke’s BAFTA membership and an award he had recently received. In April 2022, Clarke issued defamation proceedings against the Guardian’s publisher. A High Court judge, Mr Justice Johnson, had determined the single meaning of the articles at a preliminary hearing in November 2023. The trial before Mrs Justice Steyn DBE commenced in March 2025 and ran for six weeks, culminating in a judgment handed down on 22 August 2025.

Procedural Chronology

Clarke’s claim was issued on 29 April 2022, exactly one year after publication of the first article. A preliminary meaning trial was held on 1 November 2023, at which the court fixed the defamatory meaning of each article, the meanings of the later articles did not extend beyond that of the first. The words were held to mean that:

“There are strong grounds to believe that the claimant is a serial abuser of women, that he has, over 15 years, used his power to prey on and harass and sometimes bully female colleagues, that he has engaged in unwanted sexual contact, kissing, touching or groping, sexually inappropriate behaviour and comments, and professional misconduct, taking and sharing explicit pictures and videos without consent, including secretly filming a young actor’s naked audition.”

This was the single meaning determined for the first, and by extension subsequent, articles. The trial before Steyn J opened in March 2025 and concluded in April 2025. During the trial, Clarke withdrew his data protection claim, and the court ultimately found in its judgment that the serious harm threshold in defamation was not satisfied for several of the later articles. In other words, those secondary publications had not caused additional serious harm to Clarke’s reputation beyond the first article, which provided an independent ground for dismissing those parts of the claim. The High Court’s judgment was delivered on 22 August 2025.

The Public Interest Defence under the Defamation Act 2013

Clarke’s libel claim was defended, in part, on the basis of publication on matters of public interest, the statutory defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013. To succeed in this defence, a defendant must satisfy the court of three key requirements:

1. Public interest subject matter: the statement complained of was on, or formed part of, a matter of public interest. This is an objective question for the court. Broadly, the publication must deal with issues to which the general public has a legitimate interest, as opposed to purely private matters.
2. Belief that publication was in the public interest: the defendant actually believed that publishing the statement was in the public interest. This is a subjective test, focusing on the defendant’s state of mind at the time of publication. Contemporaneous evidence of the editorial decision making process can be important to establish this element.
3. Reasonableness of that belief: the defendant’s belief must be reasonable, judged objectively in all the circumstances. In assessing this, the court looks at what the defendant knew and did (or did not do) up to the time of publication, taking a fact sensitive and flexible approach that has regard to practical realities. The court must have regard to all the circumstances (section 4(2)) and should make appropriate allowance for editorial judgment (section 4(4)). In practice, this means that even if the court might have approached some aspects differently, it should respect the editorial choices of the publisher, including tone, content and the steps taken to verify information, provided those choices were within a reasonable range. The section 4 defence, derived from the former common law Reynolds privilege, does not prescribe a rigid checklist, but factors such as the seriousness of the allegation, the credibility of sources, steps taken to verify, and whether the claimant was given a chance to respond are all potentially relevant considerations.

Publication on a Matter of Public Interest

The Guardian’s pleaded defence identified the core issues in its investigation as a successful male actor and producer using his power to sexually harass and bully women over many years, the decision of BAFTA to bestow a prestigious award on him despite having received warnings of this misconduct, and the broader failure of the industry to protect women from such abuse. These are, on their face, serious matters affecting not only the individuals involved but also the film and television industry and its governance.

The claimant at one stage suggested that allegations of non criminal misconduct by a formerly public figure should not be treated as matters of public interest, particularly when publication could lead to trial by media and the destruction of a career. Mrs Justice Steyn rejected that stance. She noted it was a curious position given that none of the Guardian’s senior editorial witnesses were challenged on their evidence that the story was in the public interest. Ultimately, the judge had little difficulty concluding that the first article was on the matters of public interest identified by the Guardian. Sexual abuse and bullying in a workplace, especially involving a prominent BAFTA honoured figure were examples of matters of public concern. Any potential adverse consequences of publication for Clarke’s career were not relevant to whether the subject itself was in the public interest; rather, such consequences would be considered at the later question of whether the publication was responsible and in the public interest overall.

Honest Belief that Publication was in the Public Interest

The decision to publish the first article was made by Katharine Viner, the Guardian’s Editor in Chief, with input from other senior editors. The judge examined in detail the state of mind of the key journalists and editors at the time of publication, to determine whether they genuinely believed the publication was in the public interest. On this point, Clarke did not seriously dispute that the Guardian’s team held an honest belief in the importance of the story; indeed, he did not directly challenge the evidence of Viner or the investigations editor, Paul Lewis, that they saw the investigation as serving the public interest. Instead, Clarke’s argument on this element was more indirect  suggesting that the Guardian’s conduct was so irresponsible in certain respects that it could not have truly believed it was acting in the public interest. However, as Mrs Justice Steyn noted, there was ample evidence that the Guardian’s journalists and editors were sincerely motivated by the significance of the issues and were not pursuing a personal or malicious agenda against Clarke.

Notably, the claimant belatedly attempted to attack Paul Lewis’s integrity by accusing him of being a rogue journalist with his own agenda. Steyn J described this allegation as “wild and wholly unfounded.” It had never been put to Lewis in cross examination nor supported by any evidence, and the judge gave it short shrift. There was no suggestion that anyone at the Guardian had an improper motive or lacked a genuine belief in the importance of the story.

Reasonableness of the Belief: The Guardian’s Journalistic Process

The crux of the case was whether the Guardian’s belief in the public interest of publishing these serious allegations was objectively reasonable. This required a thorough examination of the journalistic process, how the story emerged, how it was investigated and evaluated, and the editorial judgments made along the way. In undertaking this analysis, Mrs Justice Steyn reiterated that the court must take a practical, holistic view, having regard to all the circumstances and giving due latitude to editorial decisions. Over nearly 60 pages of her judgment, she addressed various criticisms raised by Clarke, each labelled as a distinct issue in the case, Hostility, Verification, Contamination, Reply, Deletion, and assessed whether any of these matters undermined the reasonableness of the Guardian’s publication decision. The judge’s findings on these points can be summarised as follows.

Sources and Corroboration

The Guardian’s investigation that led to the first article began in early April 2021, when the newspaper was approached by a small group of individuals concerned about Clarke’s behaviour. On 1 April 2021, Guardian journalist Homa Khaleeli was contacted by filmmaker Ms Sultan Al El Hosaini and her husband, Mr Krishna Floyd, who reported that multiple women had made allegations of misconduct by Noel Clarke. This information was surfacing in the wake of BAFTA’s announcement on 29 March 2021 that Clarke would receive a special award. They, along with a few others – including actor Jing Lusi, another woman pseudonymised as “Maya,” a man named Kevin Proctor, and Imogen, had formed an informal network to raise the alarm; some had even written anonymously to BAFTA to warn about Clarke. After speaking with Ms El Hosaini and reading their correspondence to BAFTA, investigations editor Paul Lewis was impressed by the credibility and sincerity of these initial informants. By 6 April 2021, after some exploratory inquiries and receiving information from a few anonymous sources, Lewis, in consultation with Deputy Editor Owen Gibson, decided there were sufficient grounds to launch a full investigation.

Lewis assembled a strong investigative team to pursue the story. Notably, he brought in two experienced freelance journalists, Lucy Osborne and Sirin Kale, both of whom had prior experience reporting on sexual misconduct in the workplace. Osborne had worked on investigations including the Harvey Weinstein abuse allegations for the BBC’s Panorama and misconduct in the fashion industry, and Kale was a respected journalist on similar issues. As Gibson testified, it was essential to assign journalists with suitable skill, experience and sensitivity for such a subject. The judge found that the Guardian’s choice of personnel cannot sensibly be criticised,  Osborne and Kale were selected for their expertise, and it was clear they had no interest in publishing any allegation that they did not believe to be true or fit and ready for publication.

Over the next few weeks (7 to 29 April 2021), Osborne and Kale conducted an intensive investigation under Lewis’s supervision. By the time the first article went to press, the reporters had interviewed at least 22 sources, including 13 women who became primary accusers in the story. Many additional individuals were contacted as potential witnesses or to provide background and corroboration. The women’s accounts spanned a 15-year period and various productions; the journalists carefully documented each allegation of sexual assault, harassment, inappropriate behaviour, bullying or professional misconduct that would eventually appear in the article. Crucially, the Guardian did not publish any allegation lightly, it only included claims supported by first-hand testimony from the women involved. Hearsay or second-hand rumours were not reported in the first article. For each primary allegation, the team sought to test and corroborate the story wherever possible. This meant, for example, finding people whom the accusers had confided in at the time, or colleagues who witnessed relevant incidents, or obtaining any contemporaneous records.

In one instance, a source, Ms Kaiser, could not recall the names of certain potential witnesses, but Osborne reached out to those she could identify and even directly contacted a person, codenamed CJS1, in whom Ms Kaiser had confided about the incident. Although not every allegation had an eyewitness to back it up, many did have some form of independent support, and the striking consistencies among separate accounts also served to reinforce their credibility. The judge was satisfied that the Guardian’s journalists took all reasonable steps to verify the allegations that were published. Mrs Justice Steyn highlighted that Osborne and Kale made extensive efforts to investigate, test and corroborate the information they received, and importantly, they did not publish allegations they could not substantiate. Indeed, just before publication, the reporters and Lewis conducted a meticulous line-by-line fact check of the article, scrutinising every quote and detail one final time. Steyn J concluded, on the evidence, that the steps taken to verify the accounts were sufficient and responsible in the circumstances.

Neutrality and Leading Questions, the Contamination Issue

The claimant alleged that the Guardian’s reporters lost their neutrality and improperly influenced the witnesses, essentially coaching them or asking leading questions to elicit more serious allegations. This argument was comprehensively rejected by the court. The judge reviewed the actual recordings and transcripts of the journalists’ interviews, which the claimant had combed through for any sign of impropriety. Out of many hours of conversations, only two specific instances were identified as purportedly leading questions, and the judge found even those instances unobjectionable when viewed in context. For example, in one interview a reporter asked a woman if the pub where she met Clarke was the Prince Regent, but this was only after the woman had already given a description of the pub and its location, effectively identifying it herself.

Clarifying a name in this way did not improperly shape the source’s account. In another interview, Lucy Osborne asked a source who had described Clarke smacking her on the bottom at a cast party whether she would describe that act as inappropriate behaviour or consensual flirting, and later, whether it amounted to a sexual assault. Ms Seltveit answered that at the time she had not labelled it, but in hindsight “definitely it is; I did not ask for that.” Osborne candidly accepted in court that she probably could have put that question in a better way. However, as Steyn J observed, by that stage in the interview the source had already in substance described a sexual assault, a non consensual sexual touching. The journalist’s question did not plant any new idea, but merely checked if the source herself would use that label for what happened; and importantly, the article did not even use that loaded term, it simply reported the facts of the incident. In short, there was nothing sinister in the reporters’ questioning techniques, they were appropriately probing and clarifying, not coercive. On the contrary, the judge found that Osborne and Kale approached their sources with empathy and professionalism, using open ended questions and allowing the women to tell their own stories in their own words.

The claimant’s counsel at times seized on the reporters’ supportive tone, for instance, the journalists saying they understood how hard it was for the women to speak out, to claim the reporters “just believed” the women and abandoned objectivity. Mrs Justice Steyn rejected this mischaracterisation, noting that showing understanding and building rapport is simply good practice in investigative interviews, especially on sensitive topics. It did not mean the journalists failed to rigorously check the facts. In fact, the evidence showed they were very conscious of the need to be even-handed. Steyn J concluded there was no evidence of any improper journalistic techniques such as fabrication, nor of the reporters instigating complaints. The claimant’s assertion that the Guardian’s journalists pushed the complainants into making their allegations was unfounded.

Alleged Collusion or Contamination Among Sources

The claimant also argued that the integrity of the witnesses’ accounts was compromised because some of the sources had communicated with each other and with certain intermediaries during the process. The Guardian’s team was well aware from the outset that a handful of individuals in the initial group of seven knew each other and had shared concerns about Noel Clarke. For instance, Imogen and Jing Lusi were in contact with Kevin Proctor (Imogen’s partner) and had jointly written to BAFTA; and they were also aware of some of the other women’s experiences. Rather than being wilfully blind to this, the journalists acknowledged and managed it. Paul Lewis explicitly instructed Osborne and Kale not to rely on Adam Deacon, a friend of Mr Proctor’s, as a source, precisely because Deacon had a known feud with Clarke and might have his own agenda. All three journalists confirmed they never communicated with Adam Deacon at all during the investigation, a point the judge found was proved by contemporaneous records and even admissions from the claimant’s side. She rejected the claimant’s theory that Deacon secretly influenced the Guardian’s investigation in the background.

The Guardian also understood that some of the women sources were talking to each other, naturally so, given that a few had worked on the same productions or had been put in touch once the article was in preparation. Rather than seeing this as a negative, Osborne explained that the reporters actually compared notes on independently gathered accounts to look for patterns. Strikingly similar experiences described by women who had no connection to each other were a powerful indication of truth, not collusion. For example, one woman in the USA recounted Clarke telling her he would like to “climb her like a tree” and “finish her like a Happy Meal,” while completely independently another woman in the UK reported Clarke saying he wanted to “climb her like a tree.” It was highly implausible, as the judge noted, that two strangers on different continents would invent such an unusual, identical phrase by coincidence – that kind of similarity pointed to a common truth. Conversely, where individuals were in the same circle, the Guardian took care.

The journalists held off any group conversations until after each person’s account had been captured, precisely to avoid cross influence at the evidence-gathering stage. The claimant’s suggestion that there was some orchestrated authoring of allegations, for example, implying one woman with a legal background might have helped script others’ stories, was unsupported by any evidence. Mrs Justice Steyn found no collusion that undermined the story. The Guardian had appropriately balanced the realities of sources talking to each other against the need to assess each account on its own merits. In fact, the court observed that many of the Guardian’s sources did not know each other at all, and those that did were not in cahoots to fabricate allegations. The consistency across numerous independent accounts was legitimately regarded by the journalists as corroborative. There was nothing improper in the Guardian’s handling of source interconnections.

Right of Reply to Noel Clarke

A significant aspect of responsible journalism, and the section 4 reasonableness analysis, is whether the claimant was given a fair opportunity to respond to the allegations prior to publication. In this case, the Guardian’s right of reply process was detailed and robust, though the claimant criticised it as being unreasonably rushed. The timeline was as follows. On 26 April 2021, the Guardian sent Noel Clarke, via email and through his agent, a comprehensive 12 page letter outlining all the allegations they intended to publish, and invited his comments within about 24 hours, by midday 27 April. Clarke, through his solicitors (Simkins), requested a 48-hour extension on the morning of 27 April. The Guardian did not grant a full 48 hours, but it did extend the deadline to 5 pm that day, giving him the rest of the day to respond. By 5 pm on 27 April, Simkins supplied a detailed 29 page letter of response on Clarke’s behalf, defending him against the allegations. The Guardian’s team then went through this response, which prompted a few follow up questions.

On the morning of 29 April 2021, the planned publication date, they sent Simkins a further seven-page document with three specific additional queries, asking for a reply by noon. Simkins asked for more time; the Guardian gave an extension until 4 pm that day. By that afternoon (29 April), Simkins provided a second response, about five pages, answering the additional questions. Finally, at 4:50 pm on 29 April, the Guardian informed Clarke’s lawyers that the article would be published that evening, and invited a final comment that could be included in the piece. Simkins did indeed provide a written statement attributable to Noel Clarke, and the Guardian incorporated it prominently into the article, high up in the text. In the published piece, Clarke’s general denial and his specific rebuttals to each allegation were given significant space and emphasis, each accuser’s story was immediately followed by the claimant’s version or denial, point by point.

The claimant argued that the timeframes imposed by the Guardian were grossly inadequate. The claimant later complained that the “industry standard” is to allow a subject seven to ten days to respond to such allegations, and that giving roughly 24 hours (and then another 24 hours on follow up) was outrageously unreasonable and oppressive. They suggested the Guardian was in an unseemly rush to publish, driven by a desire to beat rival newspapers to the scoop. Mrs Justice Steyn rejected this line of attack. There is no fixed seven to ten day rule, indeed no witness was even asked about any such industry standard, and no evidence was adduced to support its existence. In practice, what is reasonable will depend on the context. In this case, the Guardian did extend time when asked (albeit not as much as requested), and Clarke was represented by a top media law firm who successfully provided substantive responses within the deadlines. Importantly, during the correspondence, Simkins never protested that the timeframe was unfair or impossible; they sought and obtained short extensions and then delivered the replies.

The judge noted that in the leading case Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44 (under the old Reynolds defence), a defendant was found to have acted responsibly even though it gave the subject of the story less than a day to respond, in that case a request for 24 hours was refused and only an overnight window was given. What matters is whether, in all the circumstances, the time allowed was reasonable and whether the subject was actually prejudiced by any brevity. Steyn J accepted the Guardian’s explanation that there were valid reasons for urgency here that had nothing to do with beating competitors. Both Katharine Viner and Owen Gibson gave evidence, which the judge found credible and unchallenged, that they knew Noel Clarke was already aware of the Guardian’s investigation before the official right to reply letter was sent. In fact, some sources told the Guardian that Clarke or his associates had contacted them in early April 2021, indicating that Clarke had got wind of the inquiries. This raised a concern on the Guardian’s part that providing too long a notice period or too much detail could enable Clarke to intimidate or coach witnesses, or otherwise undermine the story. Viner considered it appropriate that Mr Clarke was given a reasonable (but not lengthy) period of time in which to comment in light of this risk. Gibson similarly noted that some sources had felt distressed by calls they received from Clarke or his associate, and that giving Clarke a long lead time with full details of who was alleging what could have led to pressure on those women.

The judge found this to be a legitimate factor to consider when deciding the timing of publication. By contrast, she found no evidence that commercial rivalry played any determinative role; Guardian editors were aware that other outlets (for example, the Daily Mirror) might also be investigating Clarke, but Gibson testified that given the gravity of the story, they did not let competition dictate the pace. Steyn J accepted that testimony, noting it went unchallenged, and she saw nothing to suggest the Guardian had sacrificed fairness for speed. In the end, Clarke had expert lawyers who managed to put forward his position extensively in writing; his side of the story was fully reflected in the article. The judge held that the Guardian gave Clarke adequate opportunity to respond and indeed positioned his responses to each allegation in a way that provided real balance for readers. Far from being presented as a fait accompli, the article included Noel Clarke’s denials prominently and repeatedly, enabling the public to consider both the accusations and Clarke’s rebuttals. This weighed in favour of the reasonableness of the Guardian’s belief that it was engaging in a responsible public service rather than a hit-piece.

Deletion of Journalists’ Notes, the Deletion Issue

One of Clarke’s more technical objections was that the Guardian journalists deleted certain internal communications, specifically Signal messenger threads between Lewis, Osborne and Kale – on the day of publication, which the claimant argued showed a consciousness of guilt or an attempt to pervert the course of justice. This issue had actually been litigated earlier in the proceedings: in February 2025, Steyn J heard an application by Clarke to strike out the Guardian’s defences on the basis of alleged evidence destruction, which she refused, finding no abuse of process. At trial, the judge again addressed this point and reached the same conclusion. The context was that the Guardian has a data minimisation policy for sensitive investigations, and Signal, an encrypted messaging app, was used by the team mainly for quick, logistical chats while working remotely under COVID-19 conditions. Company policy was that such communications should be set to disappear or be deleted once no longer needed. On 29 April 2021, as the Guardian was preparing to publish, Paul Lewis reminded Osborne and Kale to delete their Signal message threads, which they did, largely to protect the confidentiality of sources and internal deliberations. In fact, Lewis inadvertently failed to delete two chat threads (labeled “Last Day” and “Final”), which later came to light in disclosure. These surviving messages showed the instruction to delete and some mundane exchanges, but nothing of significance about the substance of the case.

Clarke’s counsel invited the court to infer that the journalists anticipated legal action and deliberately wiped evidence to hinder any future claim. The judge declined to draw such an inference. She noted that at the time of publication, no litigation was contemplated in any formal sense – indeed Noel Clarke did not send a letter of claim until 16 months later, in August 2022. The Guardian’s legal department had issued no litigation hold in April 2021, so the journalists were under no duty to preserve documents at that stage. More tellingly, Paul Lewis and his colleagues gave frank evidence about their mindset: they knew legal action was possible but, based on the strength of their evidence, they honestly thought it unlikely that Clarke would sue, or that if he did, he would not succeed. Lewis even said he assumed Clarke might instead apologise and seek PR rehabilitation after publication, rather than litigate. Osborne and Kale likewise acknowledged the possibility of a lawsuit but did not believe at the time that one was likely or that they were under any legal obligation regarding document retention. None of this evidence was challenged as inconsistent or untruthful. In short, the deletion of the Signal messages was done in line with a standard newsroom policy, not as any kind of cover-up. The judge was satisfied it had no impact on the fairness of the proceedings or on the public interest question, indeed, she had already determined in her February 2025 ruling that the missing messages did not prejudice Clarke’s ability to have a fair trial. Thus, the Deletion Issue did not detract from the reasonableness of the Guardian’s conduct.

Editorial Judgment and Tone

Finally, Steyn J considered the overall presentation of the article, its tone, content and style, as part of the reasonableness inquiry. The law explicitly allows the court to make allowance for editorial judgment on these matters, and here the judge found that the Guardian’s editorial choices were well within reasonable bounds. All the editors and journalists involved were cognisant of the seriousness of publishing these allegations and took that responsibility very seriously. They deliberately ran a lengthy, detailed article so that they could lay out each allegation with nuance and include Clarke’s response side by side with it. Clarke’s statement denying wrongdoing was placed prominently at the top of the article, and each individual allegation was immediately followed by Clarke’s rebuttal or contextual comment within the text. This balanced format allowed readers to form their own view of the credibility of the claims and of Clarke’s answers. The Guardian also exercised restraint in terms of privacy and sensationalism, the editors omitted certain lurid details and personal information that were not necessary for the story; for example, intimate aspects of Clarke’s private life and family were left out. The judge agreed with Ms Viner’s assessment that the article’s content was presented in a measured and accurate way, without being exaggerated or sensationalised. In her judgment, Mrs Justice Steyn explicitly endorsed the tone of the coverage, finding that it was fact-focused and fair. Even the headline’s use of the term “sexual predator,” which appeared in quotes, was supported by the underlying accounts of serial predatory behaviour, and the article made clear these were allegations by identified women, not a proved fact. The court noted that some degree of strong language or provocative phrasing in journalism is acceptable, provided it is anchored in the allegations and not a distortion. Here, nothing in the Guardian’s presentation crossed the line into unjustified sensationalism. The care the Guardian took to give Clarke a voice in the story and to avoid overstating the allegations underlined that the publication was a responsible piece of investigative journalism, not a reckless hit piece.

Outcome and Wider Significance

Ultimately, Mrs Justice Steyn DBE dismissed Noel Clarke’s libel claim in its entirety. In her 224 page judgment, she found that the Guardian had proven the substantial truth of the allegations in the articles, and also that publication was in the public interest. Either defence was sufficient to defeat the claim. Additionally, the court noted that several of the later articles had not caused serious harm to Clarke’s reputation above and beyond the first article, as required by section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013, providing an alternative ground for those parts of the claim to be dismissed. Clarke’s associated data protection claim was withdrawn during trial and played no part in the outcome. As a result, judgment was entered for the Guardian on all counts, and Noel Clarke obtained no relief.

Importantly, the judge also commented on Clarke’s own credibility. While she accepted some of his evidence, overall “I find that he was not a credible or reliable witness.” His general pattern, she observed, was one of only being prepared to admit that which was established by clear documentary evidence (which he had carefully studied beforehand), and even then only to the minimum extent shown. When faced with incontrovertible proof that contradicted his denials, Clarke sometimes resorted to implausible accusations; for example, at one point he desperately invented a baseless allegation of forgery or falsification of documents rather than accept the evidence. This damaging credibility assessment underscored the court’s findings against him.

Beyond the immediate result, the public interest defence analysis in this case is of wider significance for media law and investigative journalism. Steyn J’s application of section 4 provides a detailed roadmap of how the defence operates in practice. She examined everything from the genesis of the story and the quality of the evidence, to the steps taken in verification and source handling, to the way the subject’s response was obtained and presented. The judgment makes clear that the court will indeed “make such allowance for editorial judgment as it considers appropriate,” meaning it will respect editorial decisions on tone, content and emphasis so long as the publishers have acted responsibly and in good faith. In Clarke v Guardian, the Guardian’s investigation was an example of how to do this, the journalists were persistent but careful, open minded but appropriately sceptical, and ultimately published a story of great public interest in a manner found to be accurate, balanced and justified. The judge concluded that the Guardian’s belief in the public interest was undoubtedly reasonable.

This case underlines to publishers that if they thoroughly investigate, fairly put the allegations and the responses, and conscientiously weigh the public interest, the section 4 defence can shield their publications, even when the allegations are, as here, highly damaging to the subject. In the words of Mrs Justice Steyn, the Guardian “has succeeded in establishing that the first article was published on a matter of public interest, and that belief was undoubtedly reasonable.

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