Ahmadi v Guardian News & Media Ltd
Ahmadi v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2025] EWHC 1191 (KB)
Safiullah Ahmadi, an Afghan national, sued the Guardian for libel over an online article published on 18 October 2022 titled “Gay Afghan student ‘murdered by Taliban’ as anti-LGBTQ+ violence rises.” The article reported on the murder of a gay Afghan student (Hamed Sabouri) by the Taliban and included a photograph that, mistakenly, was of Ahmadi rather than the victim. Ahmadi, who identifies as heterosexual, alleged that the juxtaposition of his image with the headline suggested he was homosexual and in a same-sex relationship, thereby falsely implicating him as the subject of the story. He contended this implication put his life in danger due to views prevalent in Afghan and Iranian communities.
Ahmadi claimed the publication forced him into hiding and caused severe reputational harm. In evidence, he stated that after the article he went into hiding in Afghanistan (where homosexuality is illegal), unable to study or work due to fear of the Taliban and the perception he is a gay man arising from this publication. He sought £150,000 in general damages, £50,000 in aggravated damages and £50,000 in exemplary damages.
The Guardian removed Ahmadi’s photograph on the same day of publication upon learning of the mistake. No complaint was made by Ahmadi until nearly a year later, shortly before the one year defamation limitation period expired. When proceedings were eventually issued, Guardian News & Media (“GNM”) applied for the claim to be struck out or summarily dismissed before trial. The defendant argued that the words complained of were not capable of bearing a defamatory meaning about Ahmadi, that the article did not refer to him, and that Ahmadi could not show serious harm to his reputation as required by statute. GNM also raised procedural objections, contending the claim form was issued out of time and that particulars of claim were served late.
Is Calling Someone Gay Defamatory?
A central issue was whether suggesting a person is homosexual amounts to a defamatory imputation. At common law, a statement is defamatory if it tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally. It is not sufficient that a statement would cause some people (even a subset of the community) to think worse of the claimant; the imputation must be one that society at large (i.e. the hypothetical reasonable reader) would regard as lowering reputation.
Historically, imputations of homosexuality were once treated as defamatory in English law. In past decades, being called gay or lesbian could give rise to libel claims. For example, in Kerr v Kennedy [1942] 1 KB 409 an implication that a woman was a lesbian was held to be defamatory, and famously the entertainer Liberace recovered damages in the 1950s over insinuations about his sexuality. However, societal values have shifted dramatically since those times. By 2023, English societal attitudes towards homosexuality, as reflected in law and public policy, are fundamentally different. Mr Justice Johnson surveyed these changes: the decriminalisation of homosexual acts (1967), equality and non-discrimination protections, the allowance of gay people to serve in the military, the adoption rights for same-sex couples, and the legalisation of civil partnerships (2005) and same-sex marriage (2014). He noted a social shift demonstrating that gay men and women are entitled to the same respect and dignity as others.
Ahmadi’s counsel argued that whether calling someone gay is defamatory or not had not been authoritatively decided in England and Wales. They urged the court to consider the perspective of the specific community to which Ahmadi belonged. In particular, it was argued that a significant portion of the Afghan (and broader Muslim) community, including diaspora in the UK, holds conservative views influenced by religion and the fact that homosexuality is outlawed in Afghanistan (e.g. under the 2018 Afghan Penal Code). Thus, the claimant contended, the relevant society for the right-thinking person test should factor in those community values, implying that the suggestion he is gay would indeed lower him in the eyes of many who know him (even if not in the eyes of the average British person). This was a novel argument aiming to localise the standard of defamatory meaning to a particular sub-society or cultural group.
GNM’s counsel, by contrast, submitted that being described as gay (or in a same-sex relationship) is not, without more, defamatory in 2025 . There was no insinuation in the article of any additional misconduct such as hypocrisy, deceit, or immoral behaviour on Ahmadi’s part, only an implied sexual orientation. Absent some further defamatory implication (for example, that the person had lied about their sexuality, or engaged in some impropriety), saying someone is gay cannot meet the threshold of defamation. Defense counsel emphasised that a few individual’ prejudices (whether homophobic attitudes in certain communities or otherwise) are irrelevant; the test is societal standards generally. They pointed to powerful indicators of British societal values: Parliament’s enactment of same-sex marriage and anti-discrimination laws, and even the fact that expressions of homophobia are now considered discreditable. Indeed, as the judge noted, a recent UK case found it defamatory to suggest someone had made homophobic statements, a mirror image of this case, underscoring how much attitudes have inverted. In short, labeling someone homophobic is potentially defamatory (because bigotry is viewed negatively by right-thinking people), but labeling someone gay is not (because sexual orientation per se carries no stigma in modern society).
Mr Justice Johnson agreed with the defendant on this point. The court held that imputations of being gay do not meet the common law test for defamatory meaning, as they do not lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. The judge rejected Ahmadi’s invitation to calibrate the standard to the views of a particular subset of society (the Afghan or Muslim community). The proper frame of reference remains the mainstream, ordinary reasonable person in England and Wales. Johnson J acknowledged there was no modern authority directly on point in this jurisdiction (given the issue had not been tested in recent times). Nevertheless, the court found the evolution of social mores and comparative case law compelling. In light of the “seismic” shift in societal attitudes and legal norms, what might have been considered defamatory decades ago is no longer so.
Reference (Identification of the Claimant)
Even if a statement is defamatory in tendency, a claimant must also show the words were published of and concerning them, i.e. that the defamatory meaning would be understood to refer to the claimant. Ahmadi faced a hurdle here because the article’s text explicitly named another individual (Hamed Sabouri) as the subject of the story. The only link to Ahmadi was the erroneously used photograph. The question was whether the presence of his image in the article could lead reasonable readers to believe Ahmadi was being referred to (and thus that he was gay and a Taliban target). This raised a identification issue: a photograph of X accompanying a text about Y can, in some circumstances, defame X if readers reasonably infer the text applies to X. However, courts approach such cases with caution.
Johnson J found that, on the facts, no ordinary reader would think the article was about Ahmadi. He noted that aside from the photo, nothing in the article was capable of referring to the claimant, indeed the article explicitly refers to someone else altogether. A reader who recognised Ahmadi’s face would also see that the article’s subject was named as a different person, and thus, “A reasonable reader, acquainted with the claimant, would not, after reading the full article, conclude that the article referred to the claimant or that it meant that the claimant was gay or that he had had a relationship with a man.” In other words, anyone who knew Ahmadi well enough to identify him from the photograph would also realise that the story was talking about another individual, not about Ahmadi. The court considered that such a reader would likely attribute the mismatched photo to a mistake, rather than reinterpret the article as being secretly about Ahmadi.
This finding illustrates that misidentification via image, without more, may not satisfy the reference requirement, especially when the text contradicts the idea that the claimant is the subject. The judge’s stance was that the photograph alone was not arguably a sufficient basis for readers to believe Ahmadi was being identified. The context, an explicit narrative about another named individual, negated the suggestion that the piece was about the claimant. Thus, the libel claim also failed on the reference/identification element.
Serious Harm to Reputation
Finally, even if a statement is defamatory at common law, a claimant since 2014 must clear the statutory “serious harm” threshold. Section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 provides that “A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant.” This provision (clarified by the Supreme Court in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27) requires proof of a tangible adverse impact on the claimant’s reputation or a likelihood thereof, rather than just theoretical tendency. GNM argued that Ahmadi could not demonstrate serious reputational harm in England and Wales, especially given the benign nature of the imputation and the limited publication circumstances.
The High Court agreed that Ahmadi had no real prospect of establishing that he has sustained serious harm, or that the publication was likely to cause him serious harm. The judge’s reasoning was twofold. First, because the imputation (being gay) was found not defamatory to begin with, it would follow that it could not seriously harm his reputation among right-thinking people. If society does not generally think less of a person for that characteristic, one cannot credibly claim one’s reputation suffered serious diminishment. Second, the claimant had provided minimal evidence of actual reputational damage within the jurisdiction. His primary evidence of harm was that he feared for his life and went into hiding from the Taliban. While that underscores his personal anxiety and physical risk, it is not the same as damage to reputation in the estimation of others in England. Ahmadi did not show that people in this jurisdiction thought worse of him as a result of the publication. The court noted he gave no concrete particulars of any actual reputational harm in England, for example, no evidence that friends, community members, or colleagues shunned him or ridiculed him upon seeing the article. His pleaded case was confined to publication within England and Wales, yet he was hiding abroad for fear of what extremists might do, not because of any demonstrated loss of esteem locally. The judge characterised Ahmadi’s distress and precautionary hiding as subjective fears on C’s part as opposed to demonstrating serious harm to his reputation. Such subjective fear, however understandable, does not meet the statutory test, which looks at reputational impact objectively and in evidential terms.
In summary, even if the words had been defamatory in tendency (which they were not), the claim would likely have foundered on the serious harm requirement for want of evidence. This component of the judgment reinforces the post-Lachaux paradigm: claimants must prove actual or probable serious reputational damage, and claims based on speculative or purely subjective harm will not succeed.
Procedural Aspects: Service and Limitation
Defamation claims are subject to a one-year limitation period (Limitation Act 1980, s 4A), meaning Ahmadi had until 18 October 2023 to issue proceedings. In the event, his solicitors attempted to file the claim form on 11 October 2023 – one week before the deadline, but they did so by emailing it to the County Court at Central London. This was problematic for two reasons: (1) email is not generally an accepted method of filing a claim form under the Civil Procedure Rules without prior permission or specific provision; and (2) the claim should have been lodged in the High Court (King’s Bench Division), since defamation cases are typically within High Court jurisdiction, yet it was sent to a County Court address. No immediate confirmation or response came from the court. The solicitor followed up in December 2023, and eventually on 2 January 2024 court staff located the materials and formally issued the claim (in the County Court) on that date. The court treated the issued claim form as the same document originally lodged by email in October 2023.
GNM argued that the claim was time-barred, since the official issue date (2 January 2024) was outside the one-year period . They contended no valid claim was initiated before expiry, due to the claimant’s procedural errors (wrong forum, wrong method, missing claim value on the form, etc.) . The claimant relied on a saving provision in the CPR Practice Direction 7A 5.1 (formerly PD 7.2 6.1) which states that if the claimant has “done everything reasonably possible” to get the claim form issued in time, the claim may be treated as brought when it was received by the court (even if processed later). Ahmadi’s counsel argued the claim form should be deemed filed on 11 October 2023 when it arrived at the court’s inbox. The defence, citing Chelfat v Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 455, maintained that Ahmadi had not done everything reasonable, pointing to the multiple procedural missteps, and thus could not benefit from that provision.
Mr Justice Johnson decided this limitation issue in the claimant’s favour (to the extent needed at an interim stage). He held that the question was whether a limitation defence was so clear-cut that the claim should be struck out or summarily dismissed on that basis. Here, the court found the issue was arguable: “the claimant has a real prospect of showing that he did everything that was necessary and sufficient to cause the court to issue proceedings” by the initial attempt. The judge noted that the claim form ultimately issued was indeed the one sent in October, which supported Ahmadi’s case that the proceedings were effectively initiated then. While acknowledging the “deficiencies” in how the claimant proceeded, Johnson J was not prepared to hold at this stage that the limitation defence would inevitably succeed. He refused to strike out the claim as time-barred, reasoning that the claimant arguably satisfied the test of doing what was reasonable to get the claim issued in time. Thus, the limitation challenge did not dispose of the case (though this became academic given the ultimate outcome on substantive grounds). This aspect of the ruling illustrates a degree of flexibility where a claimant made timely efforts to lodge a claim form, even if through irregular means, especially when court administration contributed to delays.
The second procedural problem was the late service of the Particulars of Claim. Under CPR 7.4, once a claim form is served, the claimant must serve particulars of claim (the detailed statement of the facts relied on) within 14 days, unless it was served with the claim form. Ahmadi’s claim form was served on GNM by 10 January 2024, so particulars were due by 24 January 2024. The claimant’s solicitor did email the particulars to the defendant on 24 January, but without prior consent to email service, that was not valid service. A postal copy was sent on 27 January, arriving (deemed served) on 29 January 2024. By then, the deadline had passed by five days. The defendant invoked the strict rule from Venulum v Space Architecture Ltd [2013] EWHC 1242 (TCC) that a failure to serve particulars within time (in the absence of a granted extension) can lead to the claim’s automatic termination . GNM applied to have the action declared a nullity for non-compliance and lack of jurisdiction, under CPR Part 11 and 3.4(2)(c).
Johnson J, however, disagreed that late service of particulars ousted the court’s jurisdiction at this juncture. He pointed out that in Venulum, the fatal result occurred only after a retrospective application to extend time was refused by the court. Until such issues are adjudicated, a court does not automatically lose jurisdiction. Here, Ahmadi had already filed an application notice (in late 2024) seeking to rectify the service misstep, asking the court to retrospectively validate the email service or grant an extension or other relief. As the judge observed, “it is open to the claimant to seek an extension of time for service of the particulars of claim or … relief from sanctions. There is an outstanding application notice to that effect.” Thus, the proper course was to consider that application, not to treat the claim as dead. In any event, because the court was dismissing the claim on the merits, the application to validate late service was rendered moot. The judge expressly refused the defendant’s Part 11 application which argued the court lacked jurisdiction due to the procedural error. He also declined to separately strike out the particulars for breach of rules, deeming it unnecessary given the substantive dismissal.
In short, the court held that procedural missteps in service did not automatically extinguish the claim while curative measures were still available. This provides a reminder that defendants cannot short-circuit a case merely by pointing to late service if the claimant is actively seeking and able to obtain relief. Nonetheless, the episode is a cautionary tale for practitioners: choosing the correct court and method for issuing claims, and adhering to service deadlines (or timely seeking extensions), is vital. Here, those issues ultimately did not change the outcome, but only because the claim was substantively without merit, otherwise, the claimant’s lawyers would have been forced to expend significant effort (and risk) in salvaging the procedure.
The High Court’s Reasoning and Conclusion
Mr Justice Johnson concluded that the claim had to be struck out in its entirety and entered summary judgment for the defendant. In the court’s view, Ahmadi had no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and no real prospect of success at trial. The judge’s ruling made clear findings on each element:
- The meanings alleged (that Ahmadi is gay and in a gay relationship) are not defamatory as a matter of law in England today. Such statements do not meet the threshold of tending to lower reputation in the eyes of society.
- Reference to Claimant: The publication, in the meanings alleged, did not refer to Ahmadi or identify him to the reasonable reader . The mistaken photograph alone was insufficient to make him the subject of the article.
- Serious Harm: Consequently, and additionally, Ahmadi could not demonstrate that the publication caused or was likely to cause serious harm to his reputation in this jurisdiction . There was no evidence of serious reputational damage, only evidence of personal fear.
Procedurally, the court was not persuaded by the defendant’s technical objections on limitation and service (it found those issues arguable or curable) , but these became academic since the substantive claim failed. In result, the High Court dismissed the action in full at the interim stage.
In light of the High Court’s judgment in Ahmadi v Guardian News & Media Ltd [2025] EWHC 1191 (KB), it is now beyond doubt that, in modern England and Wales, an imputation of homosexuality, absent any further derogatory insinuation, fails to meet the threshold for a defamatory meaning.
Moreover, the court’s determination on identification and serious harm underlines the procedural rigour required in defamation litigation. A mismatched photograph,even of the claimant, cannot sustain a claim if the surrounding text unmistakably refers to another individual, and subjective fear, unsubstantiated by objective evidence of reputational damage, will not satisfy the statutory serious-harm criterion. Practitioners and publishers alike should take heed: timely and precise procedural steps remain vital, but substantive success now turns decisively on whether the words complained of would, in the eyes of right-thinking members of society, lower the claimant’s reputation.
In conclusion, Ahmadi v Guardian crystallises two key principles for future defamation claims: first, that asserting a person’s homosexual orientation, in isolation, is not defamatory; and second, that claimants must demonstrate clear, objective harm to reputation and unmistakable of and concerning identification.
If you or your business have been defamed, contact our specialist defamation solicitors for a confidential discussion about your claim.
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