TWH Legal Services Limited t/a B&L Solicitors and another v Shanaz Niazi and another [2026] EWHC 746 (KB): online reviews, meaning and fact or opinion
Introduction
In TWH Legal Services Limited t/a B&L Solicitors and another v Shanaz Niazi and another [2026] EWHC 746 (KB), Deputy High Court Judge Guy Vassall-Adams KC determined preliminary issues in a libel claim arising from three one-star online reviews about solicitor Elaine Liddle.
The decision is important for two principal reasons. First, it shows the court’s insistence on publication by publication analysis in libel actions, rather than an undifferentiated single meaning applied across several different publications. Secondly, it contains a careful treatment of the distinction between fact and opinion in the context of online reviews, including strongly worded reviews posted by a disgruntled former employee.
The judgment did not decide whether the allegations in the reviews were true, nor whether serious harm had been established. The court was concerned only with meaning, defamatory tendency at common law, whether the publications were statements of fact or opinion, and, so far as opinion was concerned, whether the basis of that opinion was indicated.
Factual background
The Second Claimant, Ms Elaine Liddle, is a solicitor and the owner of the First Claimant, TWH Legal Services Limited, which trades as B&L Solicitors. The firm is based in Croydon and offers, among other things, wills, trusts and probate services.
The First Defendant, Ms Shanaz Niazi, worked for the company as a Probate Executive for about two months between December 2022 and January 2023. The Second Defendant, Elizabeth Radcliffe, is a retired solicitor and formerly ran Rowe Radcliffe, a high street Surrey practice which closed in 2023.
The wider proceedings were issued on 28 January 2025. They include claims for breach of contract, breach of confidence and unlawful means conspiracy against both defendants, together with a defamation claim brought only against the First Defendant. The broader allegations concern client files and will banks, namely depositories of wills and probate papers held on behalf of clients. The Claimants allege that Ms Niazi took client files and will banks and conspired with Ms Radcliffe to advance their own economic interests at the expense of the First Claimant. Those allegations are denied.
Ms Niazi’s case in the non-defamation parts of the proceedings is, in summary, that she started work expecting to join a new firm the Claimants said they were establishing, but later concluded that the real object was to secure her clients and obtain access to will banks which had originally belonged to Ms Radcliffe. Her position was that she did nothing wrong in taking clients and documents she says she was entitled to retain.
Against that background, the libel claim concerned three online reviews posted by the First Defendant between April and September 2024 on Review a Solicitor and Birdeye. The reviews accused Ms Liddle, in various formulations, of dishonesty, fraud, lying, incompetence, lack of professionalism, mishandling client matters and being unfit to remain in practice.
The issues before the court
The preliminary issues had been ordered by Judge Armstrong on 25 October 2025. The court was asked to determine:
- the natural and ordinary meaning of the three reviews;
- whether those meanings were defamatory of the Claimants at common law;
- whether the statements complained of were, or contained, statements of fact and or expressions of opinion; and
- if any part was opinion, whether the review indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of that opinion.
The claimants’ proposed meanings
At paragraph 12, the Claimants pleaded that the ordinary and natural meaning of each of the three reviews was as follows:
a. “The Second Claimant (a practicing solicitor) (i) is dishonest; (ii) lacks integrity; (iii) fails to comply with her duties to her clients; (iv) committed fraud; (v) is incompetent; (vi) handles client affairs negligently; and (vii) ought to be struck off as a solicitor.”
b. “Prospective clients should not retain the services of the First Claimant and existing clients should cease to do so.”
The first defendant’s proposed meanings
The judge recorded at paragraph 13 that the First Defendant “admits the Claimants’ pleaded meanings set out above.” Her position on meaning was therefore the same. Accordingly, her proposed meanings for each of the three reviews were:
a. “The Second Claimant (a practicing solicitor) (i) is dishonest; (ii) lacks integrity; (iii) fails to comply with her duties to her clients; (iv) committed fraud; (v) is incompetent; (vi) handles client affairs negligently; and (vii) ought to be struck off as a solicitor.”
b. “Prospective clients should not retain the services of the First Claimant and existing clients should cease to do so.”
The court’s reasoning
Pleading and approach
A striking feature of the judgment is the court’s criticism of the Claimants’ pleading. The judge held that the Particulars of Claim did not comply with CPR PD 53B, rule 4.2. The Claimants had pleaded one identical meaning for all three publications, rather than identifying the specific words complained of in each review and pleading a distinct meaning for each publication.
That mattered. The judge emphasised that each publication gives rise to its own cause of action, and differently worded publications on a similar theme can give rise to different meanings and different defences. The court was therefore not prepared to adopt a single composite meaning. It had to determine the meaning of each review separately.
The judge also noted that, although the First Defendant had admitted the Claimants’ pleaded meaning, the court remained free to decide for itself what the ordinary and natural meaning was, provided it did not go beyond the maximum sting of the Claimants’ own pleaded case.
Context of the publications
The First Defendant argued that the reviews would be understood merely as the views of a disenchanted former employee and would not be taken seriously by the ordinary reasonable reader. The judge accepted part of that submission, but not the conclusion.
He considered that the ordinary reasonable reader would indeed recognise that the reviews were written by someone with an axe to grind. Even so, that did not mean the reader would simply dismiss them. On the contrary, the reader would also see that the author was someone who had worked with Ms Liddle, claimed first-hand knowledge of the events described, and purported to provide an insider’s account. In those circumstances, the allegations would still be taken seriously.
That conclusion is important. It means that intemperate language, personal hostility and obvious grievance do not necessarily deprive a publication of defamatory force, particularly where the writer appears to have inside knowledge.
Review 1
In relation to Review 1, the judge rejected both extremes advanced by the parties. He did not accept the First Defendant’s contention that everything was comment, but equally rejected the Claimants’ case that everything was fact.
He considered that the review conveyed a distinct allegation of fact that Ms Liddle had improperly acquired Elizabeth Radcliffe’s will banks by promising payment and then failing to pay, together with a distinct allegation that she had lied about whether she held a will in her possession. By contrast, the headline description of Ms Liddle as “extremely dishonest and dodgy” would be understood as a criticism founded on those factual allegations.
The judge therefore treated Review 1 as a mixed publication. Some parts were factual allegations. One part, namely the evaluative conclusion that Ms Liddle was “extremely dishonest and unscrupulous”, was opinion.
He had no difficulty in holding that the review was defamatory at common law of Ms Liddle. Allegations that a solicitor has acted dishonestly, lied, behaved unprofessionally and failed in duties owed to clients are plainly of a kind likely to lower her in the estimation of right-thinking people and adversely affect how others deal with her.
Review 2
The same broad approach was adopted for Review 2. Again, the judge considered that the review contained a specific factual allegation about the dishonest acquisition of will banks from Ms Radcliffe.
The more interesting point concerned the word “fraudster”. The Claimants argued that this was a statement of fact. The judge disagreed. Reading the sentence as a whole, he held that the ordinary reasonable reader would understand the allegation that Ms Liddle was a “fraudster” as a deduction drawn from the preceding factual allegation that she had “stole the Will banks”, rather than as a free-standing factual assertion.
The judge also dealt separately with the allegation that Ms Liddle’s former husband had been convicted of drug driving. He held that this was not defamatory of Ms Liddle. The review did not suggest she had been complicit in that conduct or had approved it.
As with Review 1, the court held that Review 2 contained a mixture of fact and opinion, and that the opinions were not bare comment. Their basis was sufficiently indicated by the allegation that Ms Liddle had dishonestly taken Ms Radcliffe’s will banks.
Review 3
Review 3 was the most expansive and abusive of the three publications. Even so, the judge subjected it to the same disciplined analysis.
He held that it again contained a detailed factual account of Ms Liddle’s allegedly dishonest acquisition of the will banks, alongside broader condemnatory language. In context, the allegation that Ms Liddle was “a total fraudster” was treated as criticism based on the detailed factual allegations about the will banks. The exhortations not to use her, not to trust her with client money, and the suggestion that it was a mystery how she qualified as a solicitor, were also treated as opinions, with the sting that she was unfit to practise.
By contrast, the allegation that she was a liar was treated as factual in character. The judge also drew an important line between defamatory meaning and mere abuse. The phrase “nasty piece of work” was described as abuse rather than defamatory.
Again, the court rejected the contention that the review contained bare opinion. The publication set out a sufficiently indicated basis for the evaluative conclusions, namely the factual assertions about the will banks and the further allegations of lying, incompetence and lack of professionalism.
The company’s claim
The company’s libel claim failed at the preliminary issue stage.
Its pleaded meaning was that prospective clients should not retain its services and existing clients should cease to do so. The judge found difficulty with that as a pleaded defamatory meaning in its own right. It read more like a possible conclusion a reader might draw after reading defamatory material, rather than a proper meaning conveyed by the words themselves.
More fundamentally, once the reviews were analysed separately, the pleaded company meaning did not fit the publications. Review 1 did not support it. Review 2 did not refer to the company at all. Review 3 mentioned the company, but its focus remained on Ms Liddle and the exhortation was to avoid her, not the company.
The Claimants attempted in their skeleton argument to say that, because Ms Liddle was the only solicitor involved in the operation of the company, the allegations necessarily attached to both claimants. The judge rejected that course as procedurally impermissible. It was a different case on meaning, it had not been pleaded, no amendment had been sought, and the First Defendant had not had a fair opportunity to meet it.
The decision
The court held that Reviews 1, 2 and 3 were defamatory at common law of Ms Liddle. Each review contained both factual allegations and expressions of opinion, and the basis of the opinions was sufficiently indicated. The separate allegation about Ms Liddle’s former husband in Review 2 was not defamatory of her. The court further held that the reviews were not defamatory of the company at common law, with the result that the libel issues were thereafter to continue only between Ms Liddle and the First Defendant.
The judge’s final meanings
For ease of review, the final meanings below are reproduced exactly from the judgment. In the original judgment, the passages identified by the court as opinion were underlined.
Review 1 (para 45)
(1) The Second Claimant dishonestly acquired the will banks held by Elizabeth Radcliffe by falsely promising Ms Radcliffe payment in return for them and then refusing to pay her once she had them in her possession.
(2) The Second Claimant is a liar.
(3) The Second Claimant is extremely dishonest and unscrupulous.
(4) The Second Claimant is incompetent, unprofessional and fails to comply with her duties to her clients.
In the judgment, item (3) was underlined and treated as opinion.
Review 2 (para 49)
(1) The Second Claimant dishonestly acquired will banks from Elizabeth Radcliffe. Her actions were tantamount to theft.
(2) The Second Claimant is a fraudster.
(3) The Second Claimant is a liar.
(4) The Second Claimant is incompetent and unprofessional.
In the judgment, the second sentence of item (1) and item (2) were underlined and treated as opinion.
Review 3 (para 56)
(1) The Second Claimant dishonestly acquired the will banks held by Elizabeth Radcliffe by falsely promising Ms Radcliffe payment in return for them and then refusing to pay her once she had them in her possession.
(2) The Second Claimant is extremely dishonest and unscrupulous. She is a fraudster.
(3) The Second Claimant is a liar.
(4) The Second Claimant is incompetent and unprofessional and fails to comply with her duties to her clients.
(5) The Second Claimant is unfit to be in practice as a solicitor.
In the judgment, items (2) and (5) were underlined and treated as opinion.
Why the decision matters
This decision matters first as a pleading case. In a multi-publication libel claim, each publication must be treated separately. A claimant cannot safely collapse several different statements into one global meaning and hope the court will adopt it. Nor can a claimant at trial shift to a materially different meaning by way of skeleton argument. In practice, this is a reminder that careful pleading under PD 53B is not a formality. It can determine the shape, and potentially the survival, of the claim.
Secondly, the decision is a useful illustration of how the courts approach online reviews. The fact that a review appears on a consumer-style platform, and is written in hostile or intemperate terms, does not mean that everything in it will be dismissed as venting. Where the reviewer appears to speak from direct experience and sets out specific allegations, the ordinary reasonable reader may still take the publication seriously.
Thirdly, the case shows that the distinction between fact and opinion is intensely contextual. Labels such as “in my opinion” are not decisive. A reviewer may use the language of opinion, but still make factual allegations, such as an allegation that someone lied. Equally, a serious epithet such as “fraudster” may, in context, be understood as a conclusion drawn from disclosed facts rather than as a separate factual imputation. The real question is how the publication would strike the ordinary reasonable reader, read as a whole.
Fourthly, the judgment is a practical illustration of the modern honest opinion framework. The court accepted that even aggressive online criticism can amount to opinion where the review itself identifies, in general or specific terms, the facts on which that opinion is based. A defendant does not lose the possibility of an honest opinion defence merely because the language is emphatic or hostile. Equally, a claimant cannot assume that everything said in a bad review is factual and therefore vulnerable only to a truth defence.
Finally, the case is significant for corporate claimants. If a company wishes to say that defamatory sting directed primarily at an individual also attaches to it, that case must be pleaded clearly and coherently. It is not enough to assume that criticism of the solicitor who owns or runs a firm will automatically transfer to the firm itself.
Further Reading
- A Guide to Determination of Meaning in Defamation Cases
- The Honest Opinion Defence in English Defamation Law
- Johnson v Helm [2025] EWHC 1546 (KB): Fact vs Opinion in Defamation
- Serious Harm in Defamation Claims
- Pre-Action Protocol – Media & Defamation Claims
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